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Abstract
This thesis aims at contributing to make the energy renovation market long-lasting and
self-sustaining. To achieve this, our objective is to quantify the risk of not achieving energy
performance after renovation. In a ﬁrst chapter, we analyze the psychological factors that
should be taken into account to improve future energy consumption prediction models.
Drawing on the Je rénove BBC renovation program, we highlight four cognitive biases
of households that negatively impact the diﬀerence between actual and predicted energy
consumption. Then, we study the most appropriate contract structures to improve the
ﬂow and quality of renovation projects, encouraging craftsmen to work better. Thus, on
one hand, we determine optimal contracts for an Agent who has to perform two tasks and
underestimates the impact of one of them on the building’s performance. On the other
hand, we test individual-based and group-based incentives on the ability of several real
Agents (craftsmen) to coordinate, according to their initial training (DORéMI training or
other).
Keywords: cognitive biases, applied econometrics, contract theory, experimental eco-
nomics, energy renovation
Résumé
Cette thèse vise à contribuer à rendre le marché de la rénovation énergétique durable
et autonome. Pour y parvenir, notre objectif est de contribuer à quantiﬁer le risque de
non atteinte de la performance énergétique après rénovation. Dans un premier chapitre,
nous analysons les facteurs psychologiques à prendre en compte pour améliorer les futurs
modèles de prédictions de consommation d’énergie. En nous appuyant sur le programme de
rénovation Je rénove BBC, nous mettons en évidence quatre biais cognitifs des ménages
impactant négativement la diﬀérence entre la consommation d’énergie réelle et prédite.
Par la suite, nous étudions les structures de contrats les plus appropriés pour améliorer
le déroulement des chantiers de rénovation, incitant les artisans à mieux travailler. Ainsi,
nous déterminons d’une part des contrats destinés à un Agent devant eﬀectuer deux tâches
et qui sous-estime l’impact de l’une d’entre elles sur la performance du bâtiment. D’autre
part, nous testons des incitations individuelles et de groupe sur la capacité de plusieurs
Agents réels (artisans) à se coordonner, selon leur formation initiale (formation DORéMI
ou autre).
Mots-clés : biais cognitifs, économétrie appliquée, théorie des contrats, économie expéri-
mentale, rénovation énergétique
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Résumé étendu
L’objectif principal de cette thèse, coﬁnancée par l’ADEME et la Région Grand Est, est de
contribuer à l’émergence d’un marché de la rénovation énergétique pérenne, plus ﬁable et
capable de fonctionner sans intervention (notamment ﬁnancière) du gouvernement et des
décideurs publics. Ceci est nécessaire en vue d’entraîner une augmentation du nombre de
rénovations à long terme. Ainsi, nous pourrons plus eﬃcacement contribuer à réduire les
émissions de gaz à eﬀet de serre (GES), permettant de ralentir le réchauﬀement climatique.
Nous répondons à cet objectif de trois manières diﬀérents. Dans un premier chapitre, nous
abordons le problème d’un point de vue économétrique en analysant des données que
nous avons recueillies auprès de ménages ayant participé à un programme de rénovation
énergétique de grande échelle. Dans un deuxième chapitre, nous contribuons à l’objectif
principal de la thèse d’un point de vue théorique en présentant un modèle Principal-
Agent à deux tâches, où l’Agent peut ne pas être au courant de certaines conséquences
de ces tâches sur la performance énergétique ﬁnale du bâtiment. Enﬁn, dans un troisième
chapitre, nous adressons l’objectif d’un point de vue expérimental en mobilisant de "vrais"
artisans ayant suivi diﬀérentes formations professionnelles.
Avant d’aller plus loin, commençons par développer le contexte de cette thèse. Les
problèmes environnementaux actuels liés au changement climatique font naître le besoin
de nouvelles mesures eﬃcaces qui contribueront à réduire les émissions de gaz à eﬀet de
serre. En eﬀet, les scientiﬁques sont de plus en plus alarmistes quant à la santé de notre
planète et sensibilisent face à l’urgence de la situation. Depuis plus de 45 ans maintenant,
nous somme témoin du Jour de Dépassement1. Il correspond au jour de l’année où les
êtres humains ont consommé plus de ressources naturelles que notre planète ne peut en
1En 1970, le Jour de Dépassement avait lieu le 29 décembre. En 2018, il avait déjà lieu le 1er août. En
moins d’un demi-siècle, nous avons donc perdu 41% d’une année (151 jours) pour consommer les ressources
réellement disponibles par an.
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régénérer en un an. Il ne fait donc aucun doute que les problèmes environnementaux
actuels nous rendent vulnérables. Pourtant, beaucoup de gens ne se rendent pas compte
que leurs actions quotidiennes et leurs décisions ont souvent un impact sur les générations
futures (par exemple, les décisions politiques, l’utilisation excessive des voitures et les
transports polluants, le désir de confort, le mode de vie général, etc.). Cela signiﬁe que
nous faisons partie du problème. Cependant, nous pouvons mettre en place certaines
actions concrètes qui peuvent contribuer à limiter les dommages. C’est la raison pour
laquelle les gouvernements du monde entier s’eﬀorcent de voter divers accords, lois et
mesures visant à lutter contre ces problèmes et, entre autres, à limiter les émissions de
GES.
La plus importante conférence mondiale sur le climat discutant des solutions visant
à limiter les émissions de dioxyde de carbone et d’autres GES, est la Conférence des
Parties (COP). En décembre 2015, la COP 21 a permis de convenir d’une hausse maximale
de la température globale de 2°C d’ici 2100 par rapport à l’ère préindustrielle. Pour
respecter cette limite, une série d’objectifs ont été ﬁxés à l’échelle de l’Union européenne
(UE). Concernant les objectifs ﬁxés pour les émissions de GES, le dernier accord, entré en
vigueur en octobre 2014, est la Stratégie Énergie 2030, dans le cadre de la Stratégie Europe
2020 adoptée en juin 2010. Ces stratégies visent à coordonner eﬃcacement les diﬀérentes
politiques économiques et sociales des 28 États membres. Par rapport aux niveaux de
1990, les principaux objectifs de l’UE en 2030 sont (1) une réduction de 40% des émissions
de GES, (2) une part d’au moins 27% de la consommation d’énergies renouvelables et
(3) 30% d’économies d’énergie. Il est d’autant plus important d’essayer de respecter ces
objectifs que la consommation d’énergie a recommencé à augmenter dans l’UE entre 2014
et 2017. L’Union s’éloigne ainsi des objectifs d’eﬃcacité énergétique pour 2020 et 2030.
Entre 2016 et 2017, la consommation d’énergie primaire2 a augmenté de 1%, ce qui montre
que la tendance à la baisse depuis 2013 n’est pas assez forte pour atteindre les objectifs
d’eﬃcacité énergétique. Les États membres de l’UE devront renforcer leurs politiques et
2Selon Eurostat, la consommation ﬁnale d’énergie est "l’énergie totale consommée par les utilisateurs
ﬁnaux, telle que comme les ménages, l’industrie et l’agriculture. C’est l’énergie qui arrive à la porte
du consommateur ﬁnal et exclut ce qui est utilisé par le secteur de l’énergie lui-même." D’autre part, la
consommation d’énergie primaire "mesure la demande totale d’énergie d’un pays. Il couvre la consommation
du secteur de l’énergie lui-même, les pertes au cours de la transformation (par exemple, du pétrole ou du
gaz en électricité) et de la distribution de l’énergie, et la consommation ﬁnale des utilisateurs ﬁnaux." Par
conséquent, la consommation d’énergie primaire comprend la consommation d’énergie ﬁnale.
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leurs objectifs pour atteindre les résultats escomptés.
Pour atteindre l’objectif indicatif de 30% d’économies d’énergie d’ici 2030, les États
membres ont transposé ces objectifs européenes en objectifs nationaux d’eﬃcacité énergé-
tique, et ont voté une série de lois et mis en place des mesures les atteindre. Cette trans-
position est basée sur les directives et règlements communautaires et sont ainsi soutenus
par (1) la directive sur l’efficacité énergétique, qui exige de promouvoir des facilités de
ﬁnancement pour l’eﬃcacité énergétique, et des programmes de sensibilisation sur le fait
que les audits thermiques permettent de proposer des conseils appropriés aux maîtres
d’ouvrage, (2) la directive sur la performance énergétique des bâtiments, qui vise à réduire
la consommation d’énergie dans les bâtiments, (3) des normes minimales de performance
énergétique pour les appareils électroménagers, indiquées sur des étiquettes informatives,
permettant ainsi aux ménages de faire de "meilleurs" choix d’achat, (4) des normes de per-
formance pour les voitures, (5) un ﬁnancement accru par diﬀérents fonds communautaires,
(6) l’installation de compteurs intelligents3 et (7) le système communautaire d’échange de
quotas d’émission4.
Prenons comme exemple de transposition des directives et règlements de l’UE visant
à réaliser les économies d’énergie requises pour 2020, 2030 et 2050, le cas de la France.
Diverses lois, comme par exemple les lois Grenelle I et II adoptées en 2009 et 2010, visent à
transposer les décisions de l’UE en matière d’environnement et d’énergie. Plus important
encore, la loi sur la transition énergétique pour une croissance verte (LTECV) adoptée en
août 2015 permet de contribuer plus eﬃcacement à ces objectifs, ainsi que de renforcer
l’indépendance énergétique de la France, tout en oﬀrant à ses entreprises et citoyens un
accès à l’énergie à un coût compétitif5. Les objectifs principaux de la loi visent une
réduction de 40% (75%) des émissions de GES d’ici 2030 (2050) par rapport aux niveaux
de 1990. Elle vise également à réduire la consommation ﬁnale d’énergie de 20% d’ici
2030 et de 50% d’ici 2050 par rapport à 2012. En ce qui concerne plus spéciﬁquement le
secteur résidentiel, il représente environ 40% de la consommation d’énergie ﬁnale (dont
3Un compteur intelligent est un compteur d’énergie (d’électricité en général) capable de surveiller en
détail et en temps réel la consommation d’électricité d’un bâtiment, d’une entreprise ou d’un ménage.
L’information est généralement directement transmise aux fournisseurs d’énergie, qui peuvent détecter les
postes les plus énergivores, et donc permettre aux ménages de faire des économies. De plus, la facturation
diﬀérenciée peut être proposée aux ménages, en fonction de leur demande réelle d’électricité.
4Source : https://eur-lex.europa.eu
5Source: https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/loi-transition-energetique-croissance-verte
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la plus grande partie provient du chauﬀage individuel, avec 66,3% en 2016) et 27% des
émissions de GES en 20176. À titre de comparaison, dans l’UE, le secteur résidentiel
représente un quart de la consommation totale d’énergie ﬁnale (25,4%) en 2016, dont 64,6%
pour le chauﬀage individuel, 14,5% pour l’eau chaude sanitaire et 13,5% pour l’éclairage.
Étant très énergivore, ce secteur a un grand potentiel pour contribuer à l’atteinte des
objectifs d’eﬃcacité énergétique. En ce sens, de nombreux États membres de l’UE ont
adopté une stratégie de rénovation des bâtiments, des programmes obligatoires en matière
d’eﬃcacité énergétique et un plan d’action national pour l’eﬃcacité énergétique (European
Commission, 2014). L’évaluation des économies d’énergie réalisées par l’UE en 2015 dans
le secteur résidentiel montre que la consommation moyenne d’énergie ﬁnale a diminué de
11% au cours des dix dernières années. En France, la LTECV prévoit comme l’un de
ses principaux objectifs d’améliorer l’eﬃcacité énergétique des bâtiments en atteignant
d’ici 2050 un niveau de performance énergétique conforme aux normes "Bâtiment Basse
Consommation" (BBC) pour l’ensemble du parc immobilier7. Ces normes obligatoires
sont résumées dans la Réglementation Thermique (RT) des Bâtiments Existants8. Pour
atteindre ces objectifs, il est prévu de réaliser 500 000 rénovations énergétiques par an à
partir de 2017. Cette dernière mesure a déjà été ﬁxée par le Plan rénovation énergétique des
bâtiments en mars 2013, avec un objectif intermédiaire de 270 000 rénovations énergétiques
par an entre 2014 et 2016. De plus, la LTECV a mis en place la Stratégie nationale bas
carbone (SNBC) ainsi que le Programme pluriannuel de l’énergie (PPE). Le PPE prévoit,
entre autres, dans le secteur du bâtiment, la massiﬁcation de la rénovation énergétique
des bâtiments résidentiels et tertiaires pour atteindre une économie d’énergie de 28% d’ici
2030 par rapport à 2010. De même, la SNBC prévoit de rendre obligatoire la rénovation
thermique (isolation des murs, fenêtres étanches à l’air, etc.) lors de travaux de rénovation
importants, et vise 41% de bâtiments BBC en 2030.
Ainsi, une action importante de la LTECV pour soutenir les rénovations énergétiques
est la création de plateformes locales de rénovation énergétique des logements privés, indi-
viduels et collectifs, qui renforcent le service indépendant d’information et de conseil fourni
6Source : https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/strategie-nationale-bas-carbone-snbce7
7Les deux autres objectifs principaux de la LTECV sont la lutte contre la précarité énergétique et
l’amélioration de la qualité de vie des ménages.
8Source : https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000000000822199
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par le réseau Rénovation Info Service. Les principales missions des plateformes sont de (1)
mobiliser les ménages et les accompagner tout au long de leur projet de rénovation (par
exemple les informer sur la rénovation énergétique, les assister dans la mise en place d’un
plan de ﬁnancement, les assister dans le choix des professionnels), (2) organiser des audits
thermiques pour faire l’état de lieux des bâtiments et hiérarchiser les travaux à réaliser, (3)
mobiliser les acteurs ﬁnanciers (e.g. les banques) pour aider les ménages à obtenir un tiers
ﬁnancement, des prêts et des subventions liés aux travaux de rénovation énergétique, et
(4) mobiliser les artisans en les aidant à créer des groupements, en les formant via des for-
mations professionnelles spéciﬁques et en les aidant à accéder au marché de la rénovation
énergétique. Un exemple de plateforme régionale est Oktave lancée par l’ADEME et la
région Grand Est en 20159. Elle vise à rénover des maisons individuelles uniquement. L’un
des points forts de cette plateforme est le point (4) mentionné ci-dessus, à savoir, former
et encourager les professionnels à constituer des groupements d’artisans. Pour ce faire, ils
sont formés au niveau régional, puis interviennent dans le cadre de plateformes locales.
Les formations proposées s’appuient sur la méthode DORéMI, lancée pour la première fois
en 2012 dans la région Rhône-Alpes et qui s’articule autour de trois modules. Ces modules
ont pour but d’enseigner aux artisans toutes les connaissances nécessaires à la coordination
et à l’organisation d’un projet de rénovation complet. De plus, il enseigne aux groupe-
ments d’artisans comment eﬃcacement coordonner leurs tâches à travers la rénovation
eﬀective d’au moins deux maisons au cours de leur formation. En eﬀet, le point de départ
de la méthode DORéMI est de dire que l’eﬃcacité énergétique d’un bâtiment peut être
très diﬃcile, voire impossible, à atteindre sans une coordination eﬃcace entre les artisans
intervenant sur le chantier. Au chapitre 3 de la thèse, nous testons expérimentalement
la capacité de coordination des artisans formés avec cette méthode, face à des incitations
individuelles et collectives, et nous la comparons à des artisans non formés ou formés avec
une méthode alternative moins complète.
Dans un premier temps, la plateforme régionale Oktave a été créée pour apporter une
réponse aux obstacles observés dans l’accompagnement technique et ﬁnancier des ménages
dans leurs projets de rénovation énergétique. Ces obstacles ont été mis en évidence par
9Des plateformes de rénovation énergétique similaires ont été mises en place dans toutes les régions de
France. On peut citer, entre autres, la plateforme Habitat Solidaire et Durable en Normandie, le Picardie
Pass Rénovation dans les Hauts-de-France, ou encore le SEM Energies POSIT’IF en Ile-de-France.
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le programme Je rénove BBC dans la région Grand Est, qui a été le premier programme
de rénovation à grande échelle en France. Ce programme a permis de rénover 473 loge-
ments individuels jusqu’au niveau BBC en Alsace et a vu le jour grâce à une convention
signée entre Électricité de France (EDF) et les autorités régionales de la région Alsace
en 2008. Les ménages admissibles10 ont eu la possibilité de rénover leur maison dans le
cadre de ce programme entre 2010 et 2014, et les derniers travaux de rénovation ont duré
jusqu’en 2017. L’objectif principal était de réduire les émissions de carbone en isolant au
moins l’enveloppe thermique du bâtiment, mais les ménages sont souvent allé plus loin en
décidant d’installer un système de ventilation mécanique contrôlée (VMC) et un système
de chauﬀage plus eﬃcient. L’objectif de performance énergétique de chaque bâtiment
était de 104 kWh/m2.an en énergie primaire11. Des procédures de test d’étanchéité à l’air
(test d’inﬁltrométrie) ont permis d’attester que ce seuil ne soit dépassé en ﬁn de travaux.
La particularité de ce programme était double. Tout d’abord, l’intervention d’un maître
d’œuvre pour chaque projet de rénovation était obligatoire aﬁn de coordonner au mieux
les travaux. En eﬀet, un projet pilote de 30 rénovations BBC (50 Chantiers Pionniers),
où la présence d’un chef de projet n’était pas obligatoire, a permis de constater que les
chantiers où un maître d’œuvre était présent, ce dernier a permis de rassurer les proprié-
taires et de mieux organiser les travaux. Deuxièmement, le programme proposait des aides
ﬁnancières supplémentaires. Si celles-ci visaient d’abord à attirer les propriétaires, elles
les ont également encouragé à aller au bout de leur démarche de rénovation. Grâce au
programme Je rénove BBC, nous avons pu mener l’analyse du chapitre 1, présentée plus
loin dans l’introduction.
La thèse dans ce contexte de "rénovation énergétique"
Étant donné que l’amélioration de l’eﬃcacité énergétique des bâtiments existants représente
un potentiel non négligeable de réduction de la consommation d’énergie, une mesure clé
(adoptée par la plupart des États membres de l’UE) consiste en la rénovation énergé-
10Les critères d’admissibilité pour participer au programme Je rénove de la BBC étaient de rénover une
maison individuelle située en Alsace, construite avant 2005, et ne comprenant pas plus de trois logements.
11En France, pour obtenir le label BBC-Eﬃnergie Rénovation, la consommation du bâtiment ne doit pas
dépasser 80 kWh/m2.an d’énergie primaire. Cette performance est multipliée par un coeﬃcient de rigueur
climatique (déterminé par l’emplacement), multiplié en fonction de l’altitude du projet. La consommation
totale d’énergie primaire est mesurée en fonction de quatre composantes : chauﬀage, eau chaude sani-
taire, éclairage, ventilation et auxiliaires. Le refroidissement dans des bâtiments individuels n’est pas une
condition préalable dans cette région.
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tique du parc immobilier existant. Cependant, rénover des bâtiments au niveau BBC ne
se fait pas toujours sans diﬃcultés. En eﬀet, il subsiste un risque de ne pas atteindre
la consommation d’énergie prédite après une rénovation BBC, et donc de ne pas réaliser
les économies ﬁnancières prévues. En eﬀet, de nombreux facteurs (météorologiques, com-
portementaux, techniques) peuvent intervenir à diﬀérents niveaux (phase de conception,
phase d’exécution, phase d’utilisation). La rénovation d’un bâtiment représentant un in-
vestissement important pour les ménages, ils auraient besoin d’une garantie de pouvoir
réaliser les économies nécessaire au remboursement de leur crédit et rentabiliser leur in-
vestissement sur le long terme. Pourtant, nous disposons à ce jour de relativement peu
d’informations ﬁables sur ce risque. La grande incertitude quant à l’épargne potentielle
d’un ménage après une rénovation peut rendre les banques et les compagnies d’assurance
réticentes à oﬀrir de nouveaux produits comme des prêts ou des assurances de crédit liés
à la rénovation énergétique. Les banques ne peuvent pas encore baser le remboursement
des prêts accordés sur les futures économies d’énergies des ménages. Jusqu’à aujourd’hui,
la plupart des crédits accordés pour rénovation énergétique sont garantis par l’État (par
exemple, l’"éco-prêt à taux zéro" en France, où l’État paie les intérêts). Sans intervention
des États, ces diﬃcultés contribuent à rendre le marché de la rénovation énergétique peu
attractif, risqué et inaccessible pour de nombreux ménages individuels, ce qui se traduit
par un faible nombre de rénovations énergétiques sur le long terme. L’objectif d’eﬃcacité
énergétique de l’UE 2030 devient donc plus diﬃcile à atteindre.
Dans ce contexte, cette thèse vise, par le biais de trois analyses, à contribuer à (1) mieux
identiﬁer et évaluer le risque de ne pas atteindre la consommation d’énergie prédite, après
une rénovation BBC, et (2) réduire le risque de ne pas atteindre la performance énergétique
des bâtiments. Rendre la rénovation énergétique plus ﬁable et déterminer le risque (et
son ampleur) de consommer plus que prédit après une rénovation pourrait encourager
de plus en plus de compagnies d’assurance et de banques à entrer sur le marché de la
rénovation énergétique. A long terme, cela pourrait contribuer de manière signiﬁcative
à rendre ce marché pérenne et capable de fonctionner sans intervention (ﬁnancière) des
gouvernements, ce qui permettrait d’augmenter le nombre de rénovations et d’atteindre
les objectifs d’eﬃcacité énergétique de l’UE.
Nous abordons cet objectif ﬁnal d’un point de vue empirique, théorique et expérimen-
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tal. Au chapitre 1, grâce à des données que nous avons collectées auprès du programme
Je rénove BBC et à une analyse économétrique approfondie, nous cherchons à fournir de
nouvelles connaissances sur les facteurs psychologiques (c.-à-d. les biais cognitifs) relative-
ment peu étudiés dans le domaine de la consommation d’énergie, qui peuvent inﬂuer sur la
diﬀérence entre la consommation d’énergie réelle et celle prédite par les bureaux d’études
thermiques, après la rénovation d’un bâtiment. Cet écart est connue dans la littérature
comme l’écart de performance énergétique. Déterminer l’impact de ces facteurs, inﬂuant
sur le comportementaux liés à l’énergie des ménages, est utile pour deux raisons. Première-
ment, si les banques et les compagnies d’assurance considèrent ces biais cognitifs comme
un facteur de risque potentiel, ces derniers peuvent être inclus dans le calcul du risque de
consommer plus (ou moins) que prédit théoriquement. Deuxièmement, s’ils sont pris en
compte par les auditeurs thermiques (c’est-à-dire les ingénieurs qui calculent le potentiel
d’économie d’un bâtiment en termes d’argent, d’énergie et d’émissions de CO2), cela peut
les aider à améliorer la précision des simulations de consommation d’énergie. Aux chapitres
2 et 3, notre recherche est motivée par l’hypothèse selon laquelle d’autres facteurs que les
facteurs comportementaux liés à l’énergie peuvent être à l’origine de bâtiments moins per-
formants, comme par exemple des facteurs inhérents à la phase d’exécution des travaux
(p. ex. la qualité de la main-d’œuvre). Ainsi, en mobilisant la théorie des contrats et
l’économie expérimentale, nous visons à déterminer des structures et des caractéristiques
des contrats qui incitent les artisans à déployer des eﬀorts importants et à coordonner ef-
ﬁcacement leurs tâches sur un chantier de rénovation. De tels contrats peuvent contribuer
à améliorer l’eﬃcacité énergétique des bâtiments et donc à réduire le risque susmentionné.
De manière plus détaillée, notre analyse empirique (chapitre 1) étudie l’impact de
quatre biais cognitifs pouvant inﬂuer sur l’écart de performance énergétique en agissant sur
les comportements, les attitudes ou les intentions des ménages en lien avec l’environnement
et à la consommation d’énergie. Ces quatre biais sont le biais du statu quo, le biais
d’optimisme, l’écart attitude-comportement et l’écart intentions-comportement.
Cette étude est motivée de la manière suivante. L’écart de performance énergétique est
reconnu dans la littérature comme étant à l’origine d’eﬀets contradictoires et décourageant
ainsi les investissements dans les technologies d’eﬃcacité énergétique (Jaﬀe and Stavins,
1994; Koopmans and te Velde, 2001b; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Delzendeh et al.,
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2017; Gerarden et al., 2017; Gram-Hanssen and Darby, 2018). Bien que des études aient
été menées pour réduire l’écart de performance énergétique en améliorant les outils de
simulation de consommation d’énergie (p.ex. en intégrant les processus de conception én-
ergétique, en tenant compte des erreurs de conception et d’installation, en améliorant les
inexactitudes dans les simulations, . . . ), moins d’études ont été menées sur l’impact des
comportements face à l’énergie des ménages sur cet écart. De plus, comme les comporte-
ments réels sont rarement pris en compte dans les modèles de prévisions de consommation
d’énergie (Branco et al., 2004; Tetlow et al., 2015; Delzendeh et al., 2017; Khoury et al.,
2017), l’écart de performance énergétique se retrouve être encore plus prononcé. Pour ten-
ter de combler ce vide, une littérature de plus en plus abondante analyse la façon dont les
comportements des occupants inﬂuent sur leur consommation d’énergie (Seligman et al.,
1978; Van Raaij and Verhallen, 1983a; Haas et al., 1998; Lindén A. Carlsson-Kanyama A.,
2006; Guerra Santin, 2010; Tatiana De Meester Anne-Françoise Marique, 2013). Cepen-
dant, on en sait beaucoup moins sur les paramètres psychologiques et sociaux qui inﬂuent
sur le comportement énergétique et sur la relation entre les comportements énergétiques et
l’écart de performance énergétique (Frederiks et al., 2015b; Tetlow et al., 2015; Delzendeh
et al., 2017). À ce jour, les facteurs psychologiques ont plutôt été étudiés en relation avec
les décisions d’investissement des ménages dans la rénovation ou l’achat de nouveaux pro-
duits électroménagers (Häckel et al., 2017; Stadelmann, 2017; Blasch and Daminato, 2018).
Ainsi, à travers notre analyse, nous suscitons le débat sur l’amélioration des modèles de
simulation en tenant compte des comportements face à l’énergie des occupants, et cher-
chons à mieux comprendre quels biais cognitifs jouent un rôle signiﬁcatif dans l’apparition
systématique d’écarts de performance énergétique après rénovation.
Pour répondre à cette dernière question, nous avons administré (de visu ou par télé-
phone) un questionnaire (il a été élaboré en 2015 dans le cadre de mon stage Master
avec EDF) à 129 ménages ayant participé au programme Je rénove BBC, entre avril 2015
et février 2017. Cela a été possible grâce à une collaboration avec EDF12. La base de
données générée comprenait, entre autres, des informations sur les caractéristiques so-
ciodémographiques des ménages, leur comportement, leur motivation et leurs attitudes
environnementales, les prédictions théoriques de consommation d’énergie et les factures
12Je tiens à remercier tout particulièrement Sabine Mirtain-Roth et Ludovic Parisot pour leur soutien.
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de gaz et d’électricité. Nous présentons des détails sur l’enquête ainsi que des statistiques
descriptives sur les données récoltées. Pour une description détaillée de la méthodolo-
gie utilisée constituer la base de données, vous pouvez consulter le travail de thèse de
Lampach (2016, , chapitre 5). Il a cependant analysé la base de données d’un point de
vue au notre. Contrairement à Lampach (2016) qui a pris en compte la consommation
d’énergie ex-ante et ex-post dans son analyse, nous considérons uniquement la consomma-
tion d’énergie ex-post, aﬁn d’inclure plus d’observations13. Lampach (2016) s’est concentré
sur la détermination de facteurs plus « généraux » expliquant de surconsommation des
ménages, alors que nous nous concentrons plus particulièrement sur l’impact de leurs bi-
ais cognitifs. De plus, nous étudions séparément l’écart de performance énergétique des
ménages qui consomment plus et de ceux qui consomment moins ou comme prévu. Cela
nous permet de capturer certains eﬀets que les biais cognitifs peuvent avoir sur un seul
des groupes, et qui pourraient rester indétectables autrement. Nous proposons de mesurer
les biais cognitifs étudiés à l’aide de comportements, attitudes et intentions auto-déclarés.
La particularité de notre analyse réside dans la méthodologie appliquée pour surmon-
ter les problèmes de modélisation des données (c.-à-d. problème de sur-paramétrisation,
puissance statistique plus faible ou violation des hypothèses de distribution qui peuvent
apparaître en raison de nos 7% de valeurs manquantes, mais aussi un problème poten-
tiel d’endogénéité lié à la nature de nos variables qui sont déclarées). Par conséquent,
nous utilisons une méthode d’imputation multiple pour remplacer les valeurs manquantes
par des valeurs simulées basées sur les informations disponibles dans la base de données
(Gram-Hanssen, 2011; Azur et al., 2011; Grund et al., 2016). De plus, nous eﬀectuons et
comparons un ensemble d’algorithmes d’apprentissage largement utilisés dans la littéra-
ture pour sélectionner les variables de contrôle qui aﬀectent le plus l’écart de performance
énergétique (Breiman, 2001; Ye et al., 2009; Pal and Foody, 2010; Ganjisaﬀar et al., 2011;
Chen et al., 2015). Par ailleurs, étant donné la taille relativement petite de notre base
de données, nous avons inclus un nombre limité de paramètres par régression pour éviter
la sur-paramétrisation (Koebel et al., 2016). Enﬁn, pour exclure les problèmes potentiels
d’endogénéité et approuver la robustesse de notre mesure des biais cognitifs (c’est-à-dire
1350% des ménages interrogés ne vivaient pas dans la maison rénovée avant les travaux, de sorte qu’il y
a moins d’informations disponibles en ce qui concerne la consommation d’énergie ex ante des ménages.
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les comportements, attitudes et motivations auto-déclarés), nous utilisons l’approche de
pondération par probabilité inverse (Austin, 2011; Stuart et al., 2014).
Nous observons que mesurer des biais cognitifs à l’aide de comportements et d’attitudes
auto-déclarés peut, dans une certaine mesure, être une méthode valable. Nous trouvons
que des biais ont eﬀectivement un impact sur l’écart de performance énergétique des mé-
nages, en particulier ceux qui consomment plus que prédit après rénovation. Ainsi, nous
détectons la présence d’un biais de statu quo lié à l’ouverture des fenêtres et d’un biais
d’optimisme ayant un impact négatif sur l’écart de performance énergétique des ménages
qui consomment plus que prévu. De plus, nous trouvons un écart attitude-comportement
et un écart intentions-comportement, car l’écart de performance énergétique des ménages
pro-environnementaux et écologiquement motivés n’est pas plus faible que pour les autres
ménages.
L’analyse théorique (chapitre 2) propose un cadre Principal-Agent dans le but de mod-
éliser la relation contractuelle entre un maître d’œuvre (ou un maître d’ouvrage), et un ar-
tisan sur un chantier de rénovation. Nous partons du principe qu’il est possible d’améliorer
l’eﬃcacité énergétique des bâtiments en proposant des contrats appropriés, incitant les ar-
tisans à travailler plus consciencieusement pendant la phase d’exécution des travaux. En
ce sens, nous proposons un problème d’aléa moral avec un potentiel niveau de conscience
(envers certains aspects) asymétrique entre un Principal (par exemple, le maître d’œuvre)
et un Agent (par exemple, l’artisan) ayant deux tâches à exécuter. La particularité de
notre modèle est l’introduction d’un paramètre représentant le degré d’inconscience de
l’Agent (i.e. « unawareness »). Par exemple, lorsqu’il travaille sur la rénovation d’un
bâtiment BBC, un artisan n’est pas toujours au courant dans quelle mesure l’application
de techniques de rénovation BBC impacte la consommation ﬁnale d’énergie du bâtiment.
Les tâches de l’Agent peuvent inﬂuer sur la performance ﬁnale du bâtiment (et donc sur sa
rémunération) d’une manière qui n’a jamais traversé son esprit. L’objectif de ce chapitre
est de déterminer la structure de rémunération optimale que le Principal devrait oﬀrir à
l’Agent pour qu’il exerce des niveaux d’eﬀort plus élevés, et comment le Principal prend
en compte le niveau d’inconscience de l’Agent dans la rémunération.
Nous présentons d’abord un modèle de référence, dans lequel les deux parties peuvent
avoir des préférences diﬀérentes en matière de risque, et sont parfaitement conscients de
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l’impact de la deuxième tâche de l’Agent sur la distribution de la performance. Contraire-
ment à Sinclair-Desgagne (1999); Chaigneau et al. (2017) et Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter
(2018) qui déterminent la rémunération optimale de l’Agent quand il a une seule tâche,
nous attribuons deux tâches à l’Agent. Dans un deuxième temps, nous présentons notre
"modèle à potentielle inconscience", où l’Agent n’est pas forcément conscient de l’impact
de sa seconde tâche sur la distribution de la performance ﬁnale. Nous examinons le cas
d’un Principal neutre au risque et d’un Agent averse au risque. Nous faisons l’hypothèse
que le Principal connaît le niveau de conscience de l’Agent en ce qui concerne sa deuxième
tâche. Pour résoudre les modèles, nous faisons l’hypothèse d’un rapport de vraisemblance
strictement croissant et concave. Cela signiﬁe qu’une légère augmentation de la perfor-
mance dans l’ensemble des niveaux de performance faibles, donne plus d’informations sur
le niveau d’eﬀort exercé par l’Agent qu’une légère augmentation de la performance dans
l’ensemble des niveaux de performance élevés. Contrairement à Von Thadden and Zhao
(2012, 2014) et Auster (2013) qui étudient les modèles Principal-Agent avec inconscience,
nous ne cherchons pas à rendre l’Agent conscient, mais plutôt de déterminer l’impact de
son inconscience sur la structure optimale de la rémunération.
Nous trouvons que le degré de prudence de l’Agent est déterminant dans la courbure
de la rémunération optimale que le Principal lui oﬀre. De plus, notre contribution est
de montrer que le Principal tient compte stratégiquement du niveau de conscience de
l’Agent en adaptant la structure de la rémunération. Il augmente la rémunération moyenne
de l’Agent inconscient pour des niveaux de performance ﬁnale faibles (aﬁn d’augmenter
l’incitation à travailler plus fort), et diminue sa rémunération moyenne pour les niveaux de
performance qu’il ne pourra atteindre que s’il déploie des eﬀorts importants sur les deux
tâches. En eﬀet, comme il ne connaît pas les conséquences de sa deuxième tâche, elle va
la négliger.
Enﬁn, l’analyse expérimentale (chapitre 3) présente une expérience d’eﬀort réel en
laboratoire dans laquelle nous comparons, dans une conﬁguration intra-groupe, des inci-
tations individuelles et collectives, dans leur capacité à inciter à la coordination sur des
niveaux d’eﬀort élevés. L’originalité de l’expérience est qu’elle teste ces incitations auprès
de "vrais" artisans du secteur du bâtiment, où la coordination est essentielle compte tenu
de la propriété de maillon faible de leurs tâches (c’est-à-dire que si un artisan ne parvient
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pas à atteindre son objectif, tout le travail est impacté négativement). En outre, une con-
tribution principale de cette expérience est que nous ne comparons pas seulement les eﬀets
des diﬀérentes incitations, mais nous examinons également l’eﬀet des "formations profes-
sionnelles insistant sur l’importance de la coordination" en comparant les sujets ayant été
formés de manière endogène et ceux qui ne l’ont pas été. Nous visons donc à déterminer
(1) s’il est possible d’inciter les artisans vers une meilleure coordination avec un contrat
de type « maillon-faible » (c.-à-d. incitation collective) et (2) si ce contrat a le même eﬀet
incitatif sur les deux groupes d’artisans (c.-à-d. formés et non formés à la coordination).
En d’autres termes, nous voulons déterminer si un simple mécanisme de formation exogène
à la coordination peut suﬃre à assurer la coordination à des niveaux d’eﬀort élevés.
Cette analyse peut contribuer à une meilleure exécution des travaux de rénovation en
déterminant des types de contrats appropriés pour un groupe d’artisans intervenant sur la
rénovation BBC d’un bâtiment. Un chantier de rénovation est typiquement une situation
de type « maillon faible » : si au moins un des artisans n’exécute pas correctement sa
tâche (pour laquelle il est le seul à être spécialisé), la performance énergétique ﬁnale du
bâtiment est impactée négativement. Nous partons donc de l’hypothèse générale selon
laquelle la mise en œuvre de mesures incitatives correspondantes (où les travailleurs sont
tous rémunérés en fonction de la plus mauvaise performance des membres de leur équipe)
peut encourager les travailleurs à coordonner leurs eﬀorts à des niveaux élevés. En outre,
le fait d’avoir été spéciﬁquement formé et sensibilisé à une coordination eﬃcace peut
constituer un mécanisme supplémentaire incitant à déployer des eﬀorts importants.
En plus d’être l’une des premières (après Bortolotti et al., 2016) à tester conjointement
l’eﬀet des incitations individuelle et collective sur l’eﬀort et la capacité de coordination
lorsque les sujets doivent déployer un eﬀort réel lors de l’expérience au lieu de choisir leur
action, la nouveauté de notre expérience est double. Tout d’abord, nous assignons spé-
ciﬁquement aux sujets des objectifs de performance individuels qu’ils doivent atteindre.
Brandts and Cooper (2007) montrent que le fait de permettre la communication entre les
managers (c.-à-d. l’expérimentateur) et les employés (c.-à-d. les artisans) mène à une co-
ordination plus eﬃcace et à de meilleurs résultats. Ils recommandent ainsi aux managers
d’exiger un niveau d’eﬀort spéciﬁque. Deuxièmement, nous examinons l’impact d’une for-
mation de coordination exogène sur la coordination de groupe d’artisans. Les participants
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à l’expérience sont des artisans travaillant, entre autres, sur des projets de rénovation BBC
dans la Région Grand Est (9 artisans formés et 26 artisans non formés). La région Grand
Est ayant été co-ﬁnanceur de cette thèse, leur réseau nous a permis de rencontrer et réunir
des artisans du bâtiment. Les plateformes de rénovations locales travaillant avec la Région
Grand Est ont ainsi organisé deux réunions d’information (le programme Habiter Mieux
en Déodatie pour rencontrer les artisans non formés en novembre 2018, et la plateforme
Oktave pour rencontrer les sujets formés en décembre 2018), durant lesquelles les artisans
ont reçu des informations sur des aides ﬁnancières et des futurs projets de rénovations
énergétiques. En début de chaque rencontre, les artisans ont été invités à participer à
notre expérience, sans que nous leur en expliquions la ﬁnalité exacte. Ceux qui ont été
formés de manière endogène ont participé à la formation DORéMI décrite précédemment,
c’est-à-dire qu’ils ont appris (1) les techniques de rénovation BBC, (2) l’importance d’une
coordination eﬃcace des travaux dans la performance énergétique ﬁnale du bâtiment et (3)
comment coordonner leurs tâches (complémentaires) avec leurs collègues de travail. Malgré
la diﬃculté que nous avons rencontrée pour mobiliser des artisans formés pour participer à
notre expérience (ce qui signiﬁe qu’il faut considérer les résultats ultérieurs comme prélim-
inaires), l’analyse non-paramétrique et paramétrique des résultats de l’expérience suggère
que l’incitation individuelle a des eﬀets diﬀérents selon si les artisans sont formés ou non.
En eﬀet, les sujets formés semblent se coordonner à des niveaux d’eﬀort plus élevés que
les sujets non formés lorsqu’ils sont confrontés à une incitation individuelle. Cependant,
face à une incitation collective, les sujets formés se coordonnent de manière semblable à
quand ils sont face à une incitation individuelle, alors qu’il permet aux sujets non formés
de "rattraper" les niveaux de performance des sujets formés. Finalement, nos résultats
suggèrent que les incitations de groupe sont très eﬃcaces pour augmenter le niveau de
performance des sujets non formés.
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General Introduction
The main objective of this thesis, co-ﬁnanced by the ADEME and the Grand Est Region in
northeastern France, is to contribute to the emergence of a long-lasting and self-sustaining
energy renovation market leading to an increased number of retroﬁt measures in the long-
term. This can eﬃciently contribute in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), thus
slowing global warming down. We address the objective from three diﬀerent perspectives.
In a ﬁrst chapter, we approach it from an econometric perspective by analyzing self-
collected data from a large-scale french weatherization project. In a second chapter, we
consider the objective from a theoretical perspective by presenting a two-task Principal-
Agent model, where the Agent is possibly unaware of some contingencies. Finally, in a
third chapter, we focus on the objective from an experimental perspective by mobilizing
"real" craftsmen with diﬀerent training backgrounds. Before explaining more in detail how
we contributed to the main objective of the thesis, let us ﬁrst develop below the context
of the thesis.
The current environmental issues related to climate change raise the need for eﬃcient
measures that will contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, scientists
are more and more alarmist about the health of our planet and raise awareness about
the urgency of the situation. For more than 45 years now, we acknowledge an Earth
Overshoot Day14. It corresponds to the day where humans have consumed more natural
resources than our planet is able to regenerate in one year. Hence, there is no doubt that
the current environmental issues make us vulnerable. Yet, many people do not realize
that their actions and decisions often impact future generations (e.g. political decisions,
excessive use of cars and polluting transports, the desire of comfort, the general lifestyle).
This means that we are part of the global problem. However, some concrete actions can
help to address these issues and limit the damages. This is why governments all over the
14In 1970, the Earth Overshoot Day occurred on 29 December. In 2018, it occurred already on 1 August.
In less than half a century, we lost 41% of a year (151 days) in using actually available resources per year.
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world strive to work on agreements, laws and measures to help ﬁghting the problems and,
among others, limit GHG emissions.
To discuss solutions aiming at limiting emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHG, the
most important world climate conference is the Conference of Parties (COP). In December
2015, the COP 21 permitted to agree on a global warming increase limit of 2°C by 2100
compared to the pre-industrial era. To meet this target, a range of additional objectives
have been set on a European Union (EU) wide level. To limit our discussion on goals set
for GHG emissions, the most recent agreement, entered in force in October 2014, is the
2030 Energy Strategy, as part of the Europe 2020 Strategy adopted in June 2010. The
purpose of these strategies is to eﬀectively coordinate the various economic and social
policies of the 28 Member States. In comparison to the 1990 levels, the main targets for
the EU in 2030 are (1) a 40% decrease of GHG emissions, (2) a share of at least 27%
of renewable energy consumption, and (3) 30% of energy savings. Trying to meet these
objectives is all the more important since energy consumption started to raise again in
the EU between 2014 and 2017. This makes the Union moving away from the 2020 and
2030 energy eﬃciency targets, as depicted on Figure 1. Between 2016 and 2017, primary
energy consumption15 raised by 1%, showing that the declining trend since 2013 is not
strong enough to achieve the energy eﬃciency targets. EU Member States will need to
strengthen their policies and targets to achieve the expected outcome.
To work towards the indicative target of 30% energy savings by 2030, Member States
put in place a range of laws and measures to meet (non-binding) national energy eﬃciency
targets. Their transposed targets are based on European directives and regulations, and
are thus supported by (1) the Energy Efficiency Directive, which requires to promote
ﬁnancing facilities for energy eﬃciency, and programs to raise awareness about the fact
that thermal energy audits permit to propose appropriate advice services, (2) the Energy
Performance of Buildings Directive to make buildings consume less energy, (3) minimum
energy performance standards for appliances, where informative labels permit households
to make "better" purchasing choices, (4) CO2 performance standards for cars, (5) increased
ﬁnancing through various EU funds, (6) the installation of smart meters16, and (7) the
15According to Eurostat, final energy consumption is "the total energy consumed by end users, such
as households, industry and agriculture. It is the energy which reaches the ﬁnal consumer’s door and
excludes that which is used by the energy sector itself." On the other hand, primary energy consumption
"measures the total energy demand of a country. It covers consumption of the energy sector itself, losses
during transformation (for example, from oil or gas into electricity) and distribution of energy, and the
ﬁnal consumption by end users." Hence, primary energy consumption includes final energy consumption.
16A smart meter is an energy meter (of electricity in general) capable of monitoring in detail and in
2
EU Emissions Trading System.17
Source: Eurostat
Note: primary energy consumption is indicated in million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe).
Figure 1: Primary energy consumption in the EU
Let us below consider the case of France as a transposition example of these EU
directives and regulations towards the required energy savings for 2020, 2030 and 2050.
Various laws, as for instance the Grenelle I and II laws adopted respectively in 2009
and 2010, aimed at transposing EU decisions in terms of environment and energy. More
importantly, the Law on Energy Transition for Green Growth (LETGG) adopted in Au-
gust 2015 enables to contribute more eﬀectively to these decisions, as well as to strengthen
France’s energy independence, while oﬀering its companies and citizens access to energy
at a competitive cost18. The global objectives of the law target a 40% (75%) reduction
of GHG emissions by 2030 (2050) compared to 1990-levels. It also aims at reducing ﬁ-
nal energy consumption by 20% by 2030, and by 50% by 2050 compared to the levels
of 2012. Regarding more speciﬁcally the residential sector, it represents roughly 40% of
ﬁnal energy consumption (among which the largest part comes from space heating, with
66.3% in 201619) and 27%20 of GHG emissions in 2017. As a comparison, in the EU, the
residential sector accounts for a quarter of total ﬁnal energy consumption (25.4%) in 2016,
among which space heating represented 64.6%, water heating 14.5%, and lighting appli-
real time, the electricity consumption of a building, a company or a household. Information is generally
directly transmitted to the energy facilities which can detect the most energy consuming items, and thus
permit households to make savings. Furthermore, real-time energy and diﬀerentiated billing can be done
based on the actual electricity demand.
17Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu
18Source: https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/loi-transition-energetique-croissance-verte
19Additionally to space heating, 0.2% came from space cooling, 10% from water heating, 5.5% from
cooking, and 17.4% from lighting appliances.
20Source: https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/strategie-nationale-bas-carbone-snbc#e7
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ances 13.5%. This sector, thus, has a huge potential in contributing to achieve the energy
eﬃciency targets. In this sense, many EU Member States adopted a Building Renovation
Strategy, Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes and a National Energy efficiency Action
Plan (European Commission, 2014). The 2015 EU assessment of energy savings with re-
spect to the residential sector shows that the average ﬁnal energy consumption decreased
by 11% over the last ten years. In France, the LETGG foresees as one of its main ob-
jectives to improve buildings’ energy eﬃciency by achieving an energy performance level
that meets the "low-energy building" standards for the entire housing stock by 2050.21
These mandatory standards are summarized in the french Thermal Regulation of Existing
Buildings22. To meet the objectives, it is planned to realize 500 000 energy renovations
per year from 2017 onward. This last measure was already ﬁxed by the Housing Energy
Renovation Plan in March 2013, with an intermediate objective of 270 000 energy renova-
tions per year between 2014 and 2016. In addition, the LETGG developed the National
Low-Carbon Strategy (NLCS) as well as the Multi-Annual Energy Programming (MAEP).
The MAEP foresees, among others, in the building sector, the massiﬁcation of the energy
renovation of residential and tertiary buildings to achieve a 28% of energy savings by 2030
compared to 2010. Closely related, the NLCS expects to render thermal renovation (e.g.
wall insulation, airtight windows) mandatory during major renovation work, and account
for 41% of energy eﬃcient buildings in 2030, that is, meet the above mentioned low-energy
standards.
As such, an important action of the LETGG to trigger energy renovations is the cre-
ation of local platforms for the energy renovation of private, individual and collective
dwellings, which strengthen the independent information and advice service provided by
the Renovation Info Service network. The platforms’ main missions are to (1) mobilize
households and support them throughout their renovation project (e.g. informing them
about energy renovation, assisting them in setting up a ﬁnancing plan, assist them in the
choice of professionals), (2) organize thermal energy audits to make the state of a building
and prioritize the works to be implemented, (3) mobilize the ﬁnancial actors (e.g. banks)
to help the households getting a third party ﬁnancing, loans and grants related to energy
renovation works, and (4) mobilize craftsmen by helping them to create complementary
worker groups, training them through speciﬁc courses and help craftsmen to get access
21The two additional main objectives of the LETGG are ﬁghting fuel poverty and improving households’
life quality.
22Source: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000822199
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to the energy renovation market (ADEME, 2016). An example of a regional platform is
the Oktave platform launched by the ADEME and the Grand Est region in northeastern
France in 2015.23 It aims at renovating individual houses only. One of the key strength of
this platform is the above mentioned point (4), that is, to train and encourage profession-
als to build up groups of craftsmen. To do this, they are trained at a regional level, and
then intervene within the framework of local platforms. The proposed training courses are
based on the DORéMI method, launched for the ﬁrst time in 2012 in the Rhône-Alpes
region and which is organized around three extensive training modules. These modules
aim at teaching the craftsmen all the necessary background to be able to conduct and
organize an entire renovation project. Moreover, it teaches the groups of craftsmen how
to eﬃciently coordinate their tasks through the actual renovation of at least two houses
during their training course. Indeed, the starting assertion of the DORéMI method is
that achieving energy eﬃciency in a building may be very hard, if not impossible, without
eﬃcient coordination among craftsmen. In Chapter 3 of the thesis, we experimentally test
the coordination capacity of craftsmen having been trained with this method, when facing
individual-based and group-based incentives, and compare it with non-trained craftsmen.
Initially, the regional Oktave platform emerged to provide an answer to the obstacles
observed in the technical and ﬁnancial support of households in deep energy renovation
projects. These barriers have been highlighted through the preceding temporary energy
conservation program Je rénove BBC, which was the ﬁrst large scale energy conservation
program in France. This program renovated 473 individual dwellings up to the level of
low energy buildings in northeastern France, and emerged due to a convention signed
between Électricité de France (EDF) and the regional authorities of the Alsace region in
2008. Eligible households24 had the possibility renovate their house through this program
between 2010 and 2014, and the renovation works lasted until 2017. The main objective
was to reduce carbon emissions by at least insulating the building’s thermal shell, but
households often decided to also install an improved mechanical ventilation system and
upgrade their heating system. The target energy performance of each building was 104
kWhP E/m
2.year in primary energy.25 Air-tightness testing procedures (i.e. blower door
23Similar energy renovation platforms have been implemented in every region of France. We may cite,
among others, the Habitat Solidaire et Durable platform in the Normandie region, the Picardie Pass Rénova-
tion platform in the Hauts-de-France region, or the SEM Energies POSIT’IF platform in the Ile-de-France
région.
24The eligibility criteria to participate in the Je rénove BBC program was to renovate an individual
house in the Alsace region constructed before 2005, comprising not more than three dwellings.
25In France, in the residential sector, to obtain the "BBC-Eﬃnergie Rénovation" label (a certiﬁcation for
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test) permitted to assess that this threshold was not exceeded at the end of the works.
The particularity of this program was twofold. First, there was a mandatory intervention
of a project manager for each renovation project to coordinate the work. A ﬁrst pilot
project of 30 low energy renovations (called 50 Chantiers Pionniers), where the presence
of a project manager was not mandatory, showed that his presence resulted in reassured
owners and better organized renovation works. Second, the program proposed additional
ﬁnancial aids to the owners. This latter measure was meant to attract owners in the ﬁrst
place, but encouraged them to go through the entire process. On the grounds of Je rénove
BBC, we conducted the analysis presented in Chapter 1, which will be introduced later in
this general introduction.
The thesis in this "energy renovation" context
Since making existing buildings more energy eﬃcient represents a potential to achieve
high reductions of energy consumption, a key measure (adopted by most EU Member
States) is thus the energy renovation of the existing building stock. However, carrying
out energy eﬃcient buildings is not always done without diﬃculties. There exists a risk of
not achieving the predicted energy consumption after a low energy renovation, and thus
not making the predicted ﬁnancial savings. Indeed, many factors (e.g. meteorological, be-
havioral, technical) can intervene at diﬀerent levels (e.g. design phase, renovation phase,
utilization phase). Since renovating a building is an important investment for households,
they would need the guarantee to carry out the necessary savings to reimburse their credit
loan and make their investment cost-eﬀective in the long term. Furthermore, households
would need to have access to speciﬁc energy renovation credit loans, where its reimburse-
ment would be based on the actual energy (and thus ﬁnancial) savings. Yet, relatively little
and unreliable information is available about the risk of not making the predicted savings
after renovation. The high uncertainty about the potential savings of a household after
a renovation may make banks and insurance companies reluctant to oﬀer new products
like energy renovation related credit loans or insurances. Until today, most credit loans
granted by the banks for energy renovations are guaranteed by the State (e.g. the ‘eco-
loan at zero interest rate’ in France, where the State pays the interest rates). Without
low energy level), the consumption of the building should not exceed 80kW hP E/m
2.year. This perfor-
mance is multiplied by a coeﬃcient of climatic rigor (determined by the location), increased according to
the altitude of the project. The total primary energy consumption is measured based on four components:
heating, hot water, lighting, ventilation and auxiliaries. Cooling in individual buildings is not a prerequisite
in this region.
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intervention of the States, these diﬃculties contribute to making the energy renovation
market unattractive, risky and inaccessible for many individual households, resulting in
a low number of energy renovations in the long term. This makes the EU 2030 energy
eﬃcient target harder to achieve.
In this context, this thesis aims, through three analyses, at contributing to (1) better
identify and assess the risk of not achieving the predicted energy consumption after a
low energy renovation and (2) reduce the risk of not achieving energy eﬃcient buildings.
Making energy renovation more reliable and determining the risk (and magnitude) of con-
suming more than predicted after a renovation could encourage more and more insurance
companies and banks to enter the energy renovation market. In the long term, this might
signiﬁcantly help making this market sustainable and capable of functioning without (ﬁ-
nancial) intervention of the States, allowing to increase the number of renovations and
helping to achieve the EU energy eﬃciency target.
The thesis addresses the main objective from an empirical, theoretical and experimental
perspective. In Chapter 1, through a self-elaborated database from the Je rénove BBC
program and an extensive econometric analysis, we aim at providing new insights about
relatively little investigated psychological factors (i.e. cognitive biases) that can impact the
diﬀerence between the actual and the predicted energy consumption after the renovation
of a building, known in the literature as the Energy Performance Gap. Determining the
inﬂuence of these energy related behavioral factors can help in two manners. First, if banks
and insurance companies consider these cognitive biases as a potential risk factor, they
can be included in the calculation of the risk of consuming more (or less) than predicted.
Second, if they are taken into account by thermal energy auditors (i.e. engineers calculating
a building’s savings potential in terms of money, energy and CO2 emissions), it can help
them enhance the accuracy of the calculation of the energy consumption predictions. In
Chapters 2 and 3, the motive of our research arises from the assumption that other factors
than energy related behavioral factors might also cause less energy eﬃcient buildings,
such as factors inherent to the renovation phase (e.g. workmanship). Thus, through
mobilizing contract theory and experimental economics, we aim at determining contract
structures and features that incentivize craftsmen to exert high eﬀort levels and coordinate
eﬃciently on a renovation site. Such contracts can contribute to achieve more energy
eﬃcient buildings and thus reduce the above mentioned risk.
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Going more into detail, our empirical analysis (Chapter 1) studies the inﬂuence of
four cognitive biases which may aﬀect the Energy Performance Gap through impacting
households’ energy related behaviors, attitudes or intentions, namely the Status Quo Bias,
the Optimism Bias, the Attitude-Behavior Gap and the Intention-Behavior Gap.
The rationale for such an analysis is the following. The Energy Performance Gap
is known in the literature for leading to counter-eﬀects and thus deterring investments
in energy eﬃciency technologies (Jaﬀe and Stavins, 1994; Koopmans and te Velde, 2001a;
Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Delzendeh et al., 2017; Gerarden et al., 2017; Gram-Hanssen
and Darby, 2018). While investigations have been made to close the Energy Performance
Gap through enhancing the energy simulation tools, (e.g. integrating energy design pro-
cesses, accounting for workmanship installation errors, improving the inaccuracies in the
energy simulation), less has been done with respect to the impact of households’ energy be-
haviors on the gap. Moreover, as actual behavioral patterns are rarely taken into account
in the energy consumption predictions (Branco et al., 2004; Tetlow et al., 2015; Delzen-
deh et al., 2017; Khoury et al., 2017), the Energy Performance Gap may be even more
pronounced. In an attempt to ﬁll this void, a growing literature analyzes how occupants’
behaviors aﬀect their energy consumption (Seligman et al., 1978; Van Raaij and Verhallen,
1983a; Haas et al., 1998; Lindén A. Carlsson-Kanyama A., 2006; Guerra Santin, 2010; Ta-
tiana De Meester Anne-Françoise Marique, 2013). However, far less is known about the
psychological and social parameters driving energy behavior, and the inter-relationship be-
tween energy behaviors and the Energy Performance Gap (Frederiks et al., 2015a; Tetlow
et al., 2015; Delzendeh et al., 2017). Hence, through our analysis, we trigger the debate
on the improvement of simulation models through accounting for occupant’s energy re-
lated behaviors, and to better understand which cognitive biases play a signiﬁcant role in
explaining systematic variations of the Energy Performance Gap after renovation.
To fulﬁll our analysis in Chapter 1, we administrated (face-to-face or per phone) a self-
elaborated questionnaire (this questionnaire was elaborated in 2015 as part of my Masters’
thesis) to 129 households of the weatherization program Je rénove BBC, between April
2015 and February 2017. This has been possible through a collaboration with EDF26.
The generated database comprised, among others, information about households’ socio-
demographic characteristics, self-reported energy behavior, motivation and attitudes, theo-
retical energy consumption predictions and actual energy consumption billing. We present
26I would like to specially thank Sabine Mirtain-Roth and Ludovic Parisot for their support.
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details about the survey and descriptive statistics about the panel data. For an extensive
description about the methodology used to gather information for the database, you may
refer to Lampach (Chapter 5 in 2016). He analyzed the database, for the purpose of his
doctoral thesis, from an diﬀerent perspective. Contrary to Lampach (2016) who consid-
ered ex-ante and ex-post energy consumption in his analysis, this thesis considers solely
ex-post energy consumption in our analysis, in order to include more observations27. He
aimed at determining general factors of household’s over-consumption, whereas we focus
on the impact of their cognitive biases. Moreover, we separately study the Energy Per-
formance Gap of households consuming more and those consuming less or as predicted,
which may be undetectable otherwise. This permits us to capture some eﬀects cognitive
biases may have on only one of the groups. We propose to measure the studied cognitive
biases with self-reported energy related behaviors, and environmental related attitudes
and motivations. The particularity of our analysis may lie in the methodology applied
to overcome data modeling challenges (i.e. overﬁtting problem, lower statistical power or
violate distributional assumptions which may appear due to our 7% of missing values, but
also a potential endogeneity problem related to the self-declared behaviors). As such, we
use a multiple imputation method to replace missing values with predicted ones, based on
information available in the database (Graham et al., 2007; Azur et al., 2011; Grund et al.,
2016). Moreover, we perform and compare a set of most widely used supervised machine
learning algorithms to select control variables which most aﬀect the EPG. (Breiman, 2001;
Ye et al., 2009; Pal and Foody, 2010; Ganjisaﬀar et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2015) Further-
more, since the size of our database is relatively small, we included a limited number of
parameters per regression to avoid overparametrization.(Koebel et al., 2016) Finally, to
exclude potential endogneity problems and approve the reliability of our measurement of
cognitive biases (i.e. the self-reported behaviors, attitudes and motivations), we implement
the ‘inverse probability weighting’ approach. (Austin, 2011; Stuart et al., 2014)
We see that measuring cognitive biases through self-reported behaviors and attitudes
may to some extent be a valid method and that they indeed impact the households’
Energy Performance Gap, especially regarding those consuming more than predicted after
renovation. As such, we detect the presence of a Status Quo Bias related to manual
ventilation and an Optimism Bias negatively impacting the EPG of households consuming
2750% of the interrogated households did not live in the renovated house before the works, so that there
is less available information about households’ ex-ante energy consumption.
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more than predicted. Moreover, we ﬁnd an Attitude-Behavior Gap and an Intention-
Behavior Gap emerging from the households, since pro-environmental and ecologically
motivated households do not have a smaller EPG than the others.
The theoretical analysis (Chapter 2) presents a Principal-Agent framework with the
purpose to model the contractual relationship between an project manager or owner, and a
craftsman, on a renovation site. We indeed believe that it is possible to enhance the build-
ings’ energy eﬃciency through proposing appropriate contracts, incentivizing craftsmen to
work harder during the renovation stage. In this sense, we propose a moral hazard problem
with possible asymmetric awareness between one Principal (e.g. the project manager) and
one two-task Agent (e.g. the craftsman). The particularity of our model is the introduc-
tion of a parameter representing the Agent’s degree of unawareness. For instance, while
working on a low energy renovation of a building, a craftsman may not necessarily be aware
to what extent applying recent low energy renovation techniques impacts the buildings’
ﬁnal energy consumption. There may be relevant contingencies aﬀecting the performance
distribution (and thus her payment) that have never crossed the Agent’s mind. The main
objective of this chapter is to determine the optimal reward the Principal should oﬀer the
Agent to exert higher eﬀort levels, and how the Principal takes into account the Agent’s
unawareness through the oﬀered reward.
We ﬁrst present a baseline model, where both parties may have diﬀerent risk prefer-
ences, and are completely aware about the Agent’s second task’s impact on the distribution
of the performance. Contrary to Sinclair-Desgagne (1999); Chaigneau et al. (2017) and
Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018) who partially make the same analysis, we attribute
two tasks to the Agent. In a second step, we present our ‘possible unawareness model’ by
considering the case of a risk neutral Principal and a risk averse Agent. We assume that
the Principal knows the Agent’s degree of awareness with respect to her second task. To
solve the models, we make the assumption of a strictly increasing and concave likelihood
ratio. This means that a small increase of performance in overall low performance levels
gives more information about the eﬀort level exerted by the Agent than a small increase
of performance in overall high performance levels. Contrary to Von Thadden and Zhao
(2012, 2014) and Auster (2013) who study principal-agent models with unawareness, we
do not intend to make the Agent aware, but rather to determine the Agent’s unawareness’
impact on the optimal contract structure.
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We point out that the Agent’s degree of prudence (also called aversion to downside risk)
is determinant in the curvature of the optimal reward the Principal oﬀers her. Moreover,
our contribution shows that the Principal strategically takes the Agent’s awareness level
into account to adapt the structure of the reward. He will increase the unaware Agents’
payoﬀ for lower ﬁnal performance levels (in order to increase the incentive to work harder),
and decrease her reward for performance levels she could only reach when exerting high
eﬀorts on both tasks. Indeed, since she is unaware about the consequences of her second
task, she will neglect it.
Finally, the experimental analysis (Chapter 3) presents a real-eﬀort lab experiment in
which we compare, in a within-group design, individual-based and group-based incentives
to coordinate on high eﬀort levels. The originality of the experiment is that it gathers
"real" craftsmen from the construction sector where coordination is essential given the
weak-link property of their tasks (i.e. if one worker fails to achieve his goal, all the
work is spoiled). Furthermore, as a main contribution of this experience, we do not only
compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent incentives, but also look at the eﬀect of ‘coordination
training courses’ by comparing subjects having endogenously been trained to coordination
and others who have not. We thus aim at determining (1) if it is possible to incentivize
towards more coordination through a weakest-link contract (i.e. the group-based incentive)
and (2) whether this contract has the same incentive eﬀect on both subject groups (i.e.
trained and non trained to coordination). In other words, we want to determine if a
simple mechanism of exogenous training about coordination can be suﬃcient to achieve
coordination at high eﬀort levels.
The rationale for this analysis to contribute to better executed renovation works can
be found in determining eﬃcient contract types for multiple craftsmen intervening on
a building’s low energy renovation. A renovation site typically presents the weak-link
property: if at least one of the craftsmen does not correctly execute his task (for which
he is the only one to be specialized), the ﬁnal energy performance of the building is
at sake. We thus depart from the general assumption that implementing corresponding
incentives (where workers are all paid according to the worst performance of the members
of their team) may encourage workers to coordinate at high eﬀort levels. Moreover, having
speciﬁcally been trained and sensitized to eﬃcient coordination may be an additional
mechanism incentivizing to exert high eﬀort levels.
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In addition to be one of the ﬁrst (after Bortolotti et al., 2016) to provide joint evidence
of the eﬀect of individual and group-based weak-link incentives on eﬀort provision and
coordination when subjects have to exert a real eﬀort instead of choosing their action,
the novelty of our experiment is twofold. First, we speciﬁcally assign subjects’ individual
performance targets they should achieve. Brandts and Cooper (2007) show that allowing
communication between managers (i.e. the experimenter) and employees (i.e. the crafts-
men) leads to increased eﬃcient coordination and higher payoﬀs. They recommend that
managers request a speciﬁc eﬀort level. Second, we look at the impact of an exogenous
coordination training on group coordination. Our pool of subjects is composed of crafts-
men working, among others, on low energy renovation projects in the Region Grand Est
in northeastern France (9 trained craftsmen and 26 non trained craftsmen). The regional
authorities of the Grand Est region partially ﬁnancing this thesis, they gave us the pos-
sibility to meet and reunite craftsmen. They organized two information meetings in the
name of local energy renovation platforms (the Programme Habiter Mieux en Déodatie to
meet the non trained craftsmen in November 2018, and the Oktave platform to meet the
trained subjects in December 2018), where craftsmen were given information about ﬁnan-
cial aids and future energy renovations. At the beginning of each meeting, craftsmen were
invited to participate in our experiment, without being told the exact purpose of it. Those
having been trained endogenously participated in the DORéMI training course detailed
earlier, that is, where they learned (1) eﬃcient renovation techniques, (2) the importance
of eﬃciently coordinated works in the building’s ﬁnal energy performance and (3) how to
coordinate their (complementary) tasks with their co-workers.
Despite the diﬃculty we encountered to mobilize trained craftsmen to participate in
our experiment (which indicates to take the subsequent results "prudently"), our non-
parametric and parametric analysis of the experience’s results, suggest that individual-
based incentives have diﬀerent eﬀects on both subject groups. Indeed, trained sub-
jects seem to coordinate at higher eﬀort levels than non trained subjects when facing
an individual-based incentive. However, when facing a group-based incentive, trained sub-
jects do not coordinate signiﬁcantly diﬀerently, whereas it permits non trained subjects to
"catch up" trained subjects’ performance levels. Moreover, our results suggest that group-
based incentives are very eﬃcient to increase non trained subjects’ worst performance
levels.
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Chapter 1
How cognitive biases affect the Energy
Performance Gap in low energy
buildings
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CHAPTER 1. COGNITIVE BIASES AND THE ENERGY PERFORMANCE GAP
sectionIntroduction
A growing debate in the energy literature is whether energy eﬃciency measures ac-
tually reduce individual households’ energy consumption, and, thus, make it possible to
signiﬁcantly achieve the energy policy objectives. It has been widely recognized in the
literature on energy eﬃciency that there is an important diﬀerence between actual and
predicted energy consumption (called the Energy Performance Gap), which may lead to
counter-eﬀects and thus deterring investments in energy eﬃciency technologies (Jaﬀe and
Stavins, 1994; Koopmans and te Velde, 2001a; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Delzendeh
et al., 2017; Gerarden et al., 2017; Gram-Hanssen and Darby, 2018).
The Energy Performance Gap (EPG) may be attributed to the divergence among (1)
the energy simulation (i.e. theoretical predictions from energy audits) in the design phase,
(2) the workmanship and installation during the construction phase, and (3) the energy be-
havior of occupants during the utilization phase (Delzendeh et al., 2017). Although, many
attempts have been made to close the EPG, as, for instance, the integration of energy
design processes, the accountancy of workmanship installation errors and the improve-
ment of inaccuracies in the energy simulation, the impact analysis of occupants’ energy
behavior has been neglected by this strand of literature. This shortcoming is all the more
pronounced by the fact that energy simulation tools rarely take into account static or dy-
namic behavioral patterns, causing signiﬁcant errors in the energy consumption prediction
of the building energy use (Tetlow et al., 2015).
In an eﬀort to improve this situation, scholars attribute more and more attention to
the impact of households’ energy behavior (e.g. the use of electricity appliances, tempera-
ture control, ventilation habits) on energy consumption (Seligman et al., 1978; Van Raaij
and Verhallen, 1983a; Haas et al., 1998; Lindén A. Carlsson-Kanyama A., 2006; Guerra
Santin, 2010; Tatiana De Meester Anne-Françoise Marique, 2013).1 However, far less is
known about the psychological and social parameters driving a given energy behavior, and
the relationship between energy behaviors and the EPG (Frederiks et al., 2015a; Tetlow
et al., 2015; Delzendeh et al., 2017; Blasch and Daminato, 2018). As an example of a
psychological factor impacting household electricity consumption, we may cite Blasch and
Daminato (2018), who study the status quo bias as a behavioral anomaly, with respect
keeping energy-consuming appliances. They ﬁnd that households presenting such a bias
consume 5.7% more electricity than the others.
1An extended literature review can be found in Section 1.1.
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To ﬁll this void, this chapter analyzes the impact of households’ cognitive biases on
the EPG2 after renovation works. Cognitive biases are thinking errors when processing
information. When receiving information, the brain starts a mental process to understand
this information, which allows us to make decisions or judgments. However, in an attempt
to simplify these information processes, we unconsciously take mental shortcuts, that do
not always lead us to make optimal decisions. These biases may lead households to adopt
behaviors, which are not necessarily in adequacy with those taken into account by the
prediction models. They may thus partly explain the EPG. This chapter thus contributes
to the extensive nergy literature by considering the impact analysis of occupant’s cognitive
biases as an integrated component of the EPG analysis, and by triggering the debate on
the improvement of simulation models through accounting for occupants’ energy-related
behaviors. We seek to better understand which cognitive biases play a signiﬁcant role in
explaining systematic variations of the EPG after renovation.
Drawing on recent theoretical advances of the energy behavior literature, we select
four prevalent cognitive biases which may aﬀect the EPG: the (i) Status Quo Bias with
respect to manual ventilation, the (ii) Optimism Bias, the (iii) Attitude-Behavior Gap and
the (iv) Intention-Behavior Gap. To verify how these cognitive biases inﬂuence EPG, we
collect information on households’ socio-demographic characteristics, self-reported energy
behaviors, self-reported environmental attitudes and motives, thermal audits (for the pre-
dicted energy consumption) and consumption billing (for the actual energy consumption)
through a self-administrated questionnaire between April 2015 and February 2017, based
on the energy conservation program Je Rénove BBC presented in the General Introduc-
tion of the thesis. We apply a multiple linear regression analysis by using a sample of
129 households. An early version of this database has been used by Lampach (2016) to
analyze various determinants aﬀecting the Energy Saving Gap, including households’ ex-
ante energy consumption. We are rather interested in the impact of cognitive biases in
the EPG, with respect to solely ex-post consumption.
To do this, we focus on two potential outcomes of the EPG: (i) Net Losing Energy
Savings (i.e. when households consume more than predicted) and (ii) Net Gaining Energy
Savings (i.e. when households consume less or equal than predicted). The latter has been
mostly disregarded by the energy literature. Studying both scenarios provides a clearer
picture of the determinants aﬀecting the EPG, and gives the opportunity to get key insights
2The total actual energy consumption includes heating, hot water, ventilation and auxiliaries.
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into the capacity of households to achieve higher energy savings than predicted.
Nevertheless, our relatively small sample comprises approximately 7% of missing val-
ues, making data modeling more challenging (e.g. overﬁtting problem, lower statistical
power, violating distributional assumptions). Moreover, relying the cognitive biases on
self-reported energy behaviors, motivations and attitudes may be prone to endogeneity
(i.e. omitted variable bias).
To overcome these data modeling challenges, we use a multiple imputation method to
replace missing values with predicted ones, based on information available in the database
(Graham et al., 2007; Azur et al., 2011; Grund et al., 2016). Since the application of
recently developed ‘predictive modeling’ tools helps to substantially reduce the problem
of overﬁtting by selecting the most relevant variables aﬀecting the EPG, we perform and
compare a set of most widely used supervised machine learning algorithms: the (i) Random
Forest (RF), the (ii) Gradient Tree Boosting (GTB), and the (iii) Non-Linear (Radial)
Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithms (Breiman, 2001; Ye et al., 2009; Pal and Foody,
2010; Ganjisaﬀar et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2015). To rule out potential endogneity problems
and to validate our measurement of cognitive biases (i.e. the self-reported behaviors,
attitudes and motivations), we implement the ‘inverse probability weighting’ approach
(Austin, 2011; Stuart et al., 2014).
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the presence of the four studied cognitive biases (i.e. ‘status quo
bias’ and ‘optimism bias’ only for certain households consuming more than predicted, and
the ‘attitude-behavior gap’ and ‘intention-behavior gap’ for certain households consuming
more or less than predicted). We show that keeping the status quo on the manual ventila-
tion behavior negatively aﬀects the EPG for households consuming more than predicted.
Still for occupants consuming more than predicted, our results indicate the presence of
an optimism bias associated with their energy consumption behavior. Moreover, these
empirical ﬁndings suggest evidence for an attitude-behavior gap from occupants with high
pro-environmental attitudes: households do not have a signiﬁcantly smaller EPG than
those with low pro-environmental attitudes. This is also the case for households reporting
ecological motives, who thus present an ‘intention-behavior gap’. We show that our main
empirical results are not aﬀected by endogeneity, apart from the intention-behavior gap
revealing that occupants reporting high ecological motives do not yield signiﬁcantly higher
EPG than others. We thus suggest that self-reported energy behaviors and attitudes to-
ward the environment can to some extent be a valid instrument to measure cognitive
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biases.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 brieﬂy presents existing literature studying
the EPG. Section 1.2 outlines the main relevant cognitive biases discussed in the energy
literature and proposes a testable set of hypotheses. Section 1.3 shows the survey design
and explains how the database has been created. Section 1.4 displays descriptive statistics
about the households of the database. Section 1.5 presents the analyzed EPG and the
measurement variables selected to test the cognitive biases. Furthermore, Section 1.6
selects control variables using learning models, and presents the econometric model and
the multiple imputation method that is applied. Section 1.7 reports the empirical results.
Finally, Section 1.8 tests the presence of potential endogeneity related to the variables
used to analyze the biases, and Section 1.9 discusses the implications of these ﬁndings for
energy policy in the residential sector.
1.1 Related literature
The literature studying the Energy Performance Gap (EPG) has been growing over the
last decade. As mentioned in the introduction, the eﬃciency of energy measures in the
residential sector has been questioned. So far, researchers have pointed out that the
gap between the predicted and the actual energy consumption can have opposite eﬀects,
and thus alleviate energy achievements (Koopmans and te Velde, 2001a). In addition,
evaluating energy eﬃciency programs is diﬃcult due, among others, to intertwined factors.
Broadly speaking, the root causes of the EPG are still partly unclear. A systematic and
eﬀective identiﬁcation of the causes, and how to manage them, may become more and
more accurate with further research on this important issue.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the deﬁnition of the buildings’ energy related gaps studied in the
literature. It is understandable that some variation will always exist, and that a gap will
always be present due to uncertainties in energy consumption predictions and inaccurate
measurements. It might however be possible to decrease certain uncertainties. Causes for
the gap can appear at diﬀerent stages of the building renovation process (de Wilde, 2014;
Khoury et al., 2017). They might occur at the design stage (e.g. it is diﬃcult to fully
predict the future use of the building), at the construction and execution stages (e.g. the
quality of the execution), at the operational stage after renovation (e.g. non-optimal user
behavior of the building), but it can also be due to either inaccuracies in the calculation
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method of the theoretical energy consumption, model limitations or non-optimal choice
of input variables by the model operator. Note that in most cases, a combination of
these factors might determine the gap. The literature distinguishes between the EPG and
the Energy Saving Gap (ESG): the former considers only ex-post consumption, whereas
the latter also takes into account ex-ante energy consumption. The deﬁnition of the
EPG has still not been clearly deﬁned until today. For instance, by reviewing literature
on it, de Wilde (2014) was able to point out three main deﬁnitions: (1) the diﬀerence
between predicted (from thermal energy auditors) and actual energy consumption, (2)
the diﬀerence between predicted (with models using machine learning) and actual energy
consumption, and (3) the diﬀerence between "energy ratings provided by compliance test
methods and energy display certificates as [embedded] in regulation". Galvin (2014) deﬁnes
the EPG as the ratio of the diﬀerence between the ex-post actual (EAex-post) and predicted
(EPex-post) energy consumption, and the predicted energy consumption: EPGGalvin2014 =
(EAex-post−EPex-post )
EPex-post
. In the present chapter, we deﬁne the EPG in a similar way. We analyze
the ratio of the actual and the predicted energy consumption: EPG∗ =
EAex-post
EPex-post
. The
distribution of the EPG in our chapter is thus the same as with Galvin (2014)’s deﬁnition.
An advantage of these ex-post EPG deﬁnitions is that they can be used as well on new as on
renovated buildings, where ex-ante information on consumption is not available. Although
it does not take the ‘ex-ante dimension’ into account, it permits to make an evaluation
of the building’s energy performance. A further advantage mentioned by Galvin (2014)
is that they can help scientists and renovation programs to identify households needing
advice and help in controlling their energy consumption after renovation. Now, when ex-
ante actual and predicted consumption are available, it becomes possible to analyze the
Energy Saving Gap (ESG). An energy saving is the diﬀerence between the ex-post and
the ex-ante energy consumption. Galvin (2014) calls the ESG the Energy Saving Deficit,
and deﬁnes it as the ratio of the actual energy savings, and the predicted energy savings:
ESG=
EAex-post−EAex-ante
EPex-post−EPex-ante
. Note that a confusion can be found in the literature, such that
some authors claim to analyze the EPG, while they actually analyze the ESG (for example
Khoury et al., 2017). It is thus important to relate on how the dependent variable has
been deﬁned. In the present chapter, it was not possible to analyze the ESG because of
too few available information on the ex-ante consumption3. We thus decided to consider
only ex-post energy consumption and analyze the EPG.
3About 50% of the households in our database did not live in the renovated building before renovation.
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Let us now explore the various aspects analyzed in the literature that were shown
to aﬀect the EPG. Three main categories have been studied: (1) technical components
(e.g. heating system, insulation), (2) households’ characteristics (e.g. household size,
income, age, education level) and (3) households’ actual behaviors (e.g. temperature
setting, ventilation behavior, occupancy time).
A number of scholars studied how technical components of energy systems and insu-
lation aﬀect energy consumption savings (see for example Hewett et al., 1986; Bell and
Lowe, 2000; Sanders and Phillipson, 2006; Hens et al., 2010; Rosenow and Galvin, 2013,
for more details about these features). Van den Brom et al. (2017) recently conﬁrmed that
the building’s physical characteristics impact the EPG. They, among others, show that the
EPG highly impacts elderly households’ actual energy consumption (maybe because they
are more often at home and heat for longer hours during the day). This indicates that
these technical characteristics may be closely related to occupants’ behavior. Thus, they
recommend policy makers to focus on energy renovation of houses inhabited by elderly
occupants. Khoury et al. (2017) conclude in their paper that it is possible to contribute
closing the EPG through building optimization, associated with a responsible behavior
from households. As stated by Visscher et al. (2016), it is crucial to understand occu-
pants’ behavior to correctly predict buildings’ energy performance.
Regarding households’ characteristics, many studies show their impact on the EPG.
For instance, Van den Brom et al. (2017) ﬁnd that electricity consumption increases with
the income and the number of occupants. With regard to gas consumption and based on
a 127 183 dutch households from the SHAERE database, they ﬁnd that those with higher
income make more gas savings (from heating) than those with lower income. Yet, the
household size does not signiﬁcantly impact the ESG in their study. This latter ﬁnding is
in contradiction with Majcen et al. (2013) who study the gas consumption gap of 193 859
dutch households from databases issued by the AgentschapNL and the CBS (Statistics
Netherlands). They ﬁnd that the households’ size actually has an impact on the gap.
Now regarding individuals’ behaviors, their inﬂuence on the energy consumption of ex-
isting buildings has been highlighted by many authors (see, for instance, Seligman et al.,
1978; Van Raaij and Verhallen, 1983a; Guerra Santin, 2010; Haas et al., 1998; Lindén
A. Carlsson-Kanyama A., 2006; Majcen et al., 2013; Tatiana De Meester Anne-Françoise
Marique, 2013; Khoury et al., 2017). Some authors even stress that the EPG may primar-
ily be caused by households’ behaviors (Aydin et al., 2017; Gram-Hanssen, 2011). Indeed,
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while it may partially be due to the renovation works and the insulation performance
(Sanders and Phillipson, 2006), it may also be due to consumer behaviors like indoor tem-
perature (Hens et al., 2010), occupancy time (Van den Brom et al., 2019) or ventilation
behaviors (Guerra Santin, 2013). Moreover, Khoury et al. (2017) pointed out that heat-
ing more than predicted and opening windows more than recommended increased global
energy consumption.
Since behavioral factors impact consumption, some authors question the use of standard
calculation methods to determine the predicted energy consumption that consider normal-
ized conditions of utilization (i.e. conventional instead of real behaviors from the occu-
pants) (see, for instance, Khoury et al., 2017). The ability of these methods to perform
accurate predictions is indeed questionable. In this sense, Delzendeh et al. (2017) pointed
out that theoretical simulation tools fail to include dynamic occupant behaviors, since only
"fixed and scheduled patterns of behavior" beside technical components of the building are
considered. Similarly, by analyzing the heating consumption gap in a low energy dwelling
in Switzerland, Branco et al. (2004) observed that real conditions of utilization like room
temperature or ventilation rate was not considered by the predicted energy consumption
calculations. To conﬁrm the important inﬂuence of these latter behaviors, Majcen et al.
(2013) ﬁnd that they largely aﬀect the predicted gas consumption. Still in the Netherlands,
Van Raaij and Verhallen (1983b) determined ﬁve energy-related behavioral patterns based
on self-reported behaviors of 145 households in the Netherlands: conservers, spenders, cool
households, warm households and average households. They found signiﬁcant consump-
tion diﬀerences among these ﬁve clusters. A last example we may cite here emerges from
the study of Van den Brom et al. (2017). They analyzed occupants’ electricity consump-
tion of 1 431 019 households in the Netherlands (by using the national SHAERE database
of 2014) and highlighted that predictions did not take into account electrical appliances
and lighting, yet daily manipulated by individuals.
By reviewing the literature on the EPG, it becomes clear that household-dependent
characteristics and behaviors may play a signiﬁcant role in the observed discrepancy. Nev-
ertheless, very few authors consider the notion of households’ cognitive biases, which can
however have an important inﬂuence too. Such biases may indirectly inﬂuence occupants’
energy related behavior and thus the EPG. Frederiks et al. (2015a) intend to highlight
the relationship between cognitive biases and energy related behavior in the literature.
They list biases and motivational factors that could explain why energy behaviors may
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not always correspond to personal values or material interests of occupants. Blasch and
Daminato (2018) empirically study the impact of the status-quo bias as a behavioral bias
making households delay their energy eﬃciency investment decisions. Their study is based
on a total of 4 899 households from the Netherlands, Switzerland and Italy. The survey
had been administrated in the context of the EU H2020 Project PENNY. They propose
to measure households’ bias toward the status quo through creating an index based on
six items capturing preferences for the status quo and loss aversion in diﬀerent situations.
They show that households having the general tendency to be biased toward the status
quo consume more electricity than the others. Still regarding households’ investment de-
cisions to buy new appliances, Stadelmann (2017) discuss in a review, how behavioral
anomalies might explain the energy performance gap, through their impact on house-
holds’ purchase decisions of durables. They discuss more particularly limited attention,
reference-dependent preferences, hyperbolic time discounting, biased beliefs and decision
heuristics.
The main reason biases have rarely been considered for an analysis of the EPG is that it
is very diﬃcult to construct a reliable measurement capturing occupant’s cognitive biases.
In this chapter, we intend to determine their inﬂuence on the EPG based on self-reported
energy behaviors, motivations and attitudes.
The following section deﬁnes the notion of ‘cognitive bias’ and explains those studied
in this chapter.
1.2 Cognitive biases related to energy behavior
Various factors explain the observed EPG: technical failures, non-optimal renovation works,
harsh weather conditions, etc. However, behavioral factors seem to play a signiﬁcant role,
as pointed out in previous literature. These behaviors often emerge due to cognitive biases.
Cognitive biases refer to individuals’ mistakes occurring when reasoning and making
decisions. They are generally induced by mental shortcuts (i.e. heuristics), emerging when
the brain tries to process and simplify information it is receiving. These shortcuts do not
always lead us to make optimal decisions, and can event unconsciously alter someone’s
behavior. A number of these cognitive biases can directly impact energy consumption
behaviors and indirectly impact energy savings of renovated buildings. In this study, we
focus on four biases, namely (1) the Status Quo Bias, (2) the Optimism Bias, (3) the
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Attitude-Behavior Gap and (4) the Intention-Behavior Gap.
Our analysis applies these cognitive biases to energy consumption related behaviors,
because they can intuitively induce occupants to consume more and save less energy than
initially predicted. They were selected in order to analyze a combination of largely studied
cognitive biases that could be applied to energy consumption behaviors (1 and 2), and often
studied pro-environmental related behaviors (3 and 4). We consider the two behavioral
gaps as cognitive biases: as stated by Frederiks et al. (2015b), attitudes and intentions (i.e.
a motivation toward a goal-directed behavior) are psychological factors, which potentially
aﬀect occupant’s energy behavior, and thus their energy consumption.
Note that the literature recognizes that it is diﬃcult to exactly measure cognitive
biases, even though the concept behind them seems clear. It has mostly been studied
through experiments in controlled environments. In this chapter, we propose to measure
cognitive biases through self-declarations. These self-reported behaviors are only possible
indicators, measuring cognitive biases indirectly. We present the selected self-declarations
in Section 1.5. In the following, we deﬁne the concept of the fours above mentioned biases
and deduce testable hypotheses from psychology and the theory of behavior.
The status quo bias: It refers to the behavioral tendency of preferring to do nothing, or
to exert no eﬀort to adapt a behavior (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), although doing
nothing may lead to a change (Baron and Ritov, 2004). This tendency might arises due
to people’s general loss aversion (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Samuelson
and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1991). Individuals perceive losses as being bigger
than the potential gains they can obtain by adapting their behavior.
It has been recognized that a person perceives the present state as a reference point
(Baron, 2011). The shift from this point towards a more energy friendly behavior induces
the perception of losses even when beneﬁts are oﬀset by gaining energy savings (Baron
and Ritov, 2004; Rabin, 1998). In other words, individuals are more negatively aﬀected by
the occurrence of a change, in light of this reference point, than by the potential beneﬁts
to save energy (Helson, 1964).
In the context of renovating individual buildings, the status-quo bias may occur as follows.
Before renovation, occupants experienced speciﬁc daily habits. Having to change their
behaviors might appear too restrictive to them, compared to the expected beneﬁts of
energy savings. Thus, a majority of individuals may ﬁnd it more convenient to not adapt
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its behavior to the low energy building. This means that they keep the status quo (on their
‘previous’ behavior). Yet, in a renovated building, occupants should adapt their manual
ventilation habits and open their windows less than before. Otherwise, the eﬃciency of the
new ventilation system may be deteriorated, and electricity consumption may increase.4
We can thus formulate our ﬁrst hypothesis about the status quo bias as follows:
Hypothesis 1 Occupants keeping the status quo on their window opening habits are less
likely to achieve the predicted energy consumption, and thus tend to have a larger
Energy Performance Gap (than those changing their manual ventilation habits com-
pared to before renovation).
The optimism bias: It is the tendency to overestimate positive outcomes, and underesti-
mate negative outcomes (Sharot, 2011b). It is thus the diﬀerence between what a person
expects and the subsequent outcome (Sharot, 2011a). In an early work, this bias has been
studied by Rosenhan and Messick (1966) and is also known as the unrealistic optimism.
This phenomenon has been revisited and interpreted as the main driver against anxi-
ety (Lund, 1925; Kirscht et al., 1966). Conducting psychological experiments, Weinstein
(1980) demonstrated that people are generally convinced that they are less likely to expe-
rience a bad event compared to others. They determined the presence of two conditions
entailing this phenomenon. First, the situation has to appear controllable, and second,
the result has to be strongly associated with personal investment or motivation from the
person.
Knowing this, we may explain the presence of an optimism bias in our sample as follows.
In general, studies have demonstrated that the predicted energy consumption of renovated
buildings are erroneous and inaccurate (Herbig et al., 1994). Before beginning the reno-
vation of their houses, households participating in the energy conservation program were
informed about the predicted ex-post energy consumption. It is natural to assume that
they may have been inﬂuenced by these predictions. Scholars recognized that individu-
als’ expectations tend to match with their preferences and perceptions (Weinstein, 1980;
Sharot, 2011b). It seems plausible that theoretical predictions may match households’
predictions. Hence, they may be over-optimistic when ‘deciding’ how to live on a daily
4In our sample, all the renovated houses have been equipped by mechanical ventilation systems (i.e.
single or double ﬂow ventilation system). Predicting the energy consumption after renovation measures
often involves set points in conventional simulation scenarios. It is assumed that occupants should pursue
manual ventilation no more than 5 to 10 minutes each time, according to the ADEME agency.
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basis, and adopt behaviors that are less likely to end up in the expected returns (Kah-
neman, 2011). For example, the interrogated households may react to the optimism bias
by paying less attention to their daily energy consumption. The second hypothesis about
optimism bias can thus be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 2 Occupants having the tendency to pay less attention to their energy con-
sumption may be more likely to have a larger Energy Performance Gap (than those
paying equally attention to their energy consumption than before). This may be due
to an optimism bias.
The attitude-behavior gap: It is the discrepancy between attitudes and beliefs toward
something, or can more generally be expressed as the adoption of a particular behavior
matching both (Frederiks et al., 2015b). Attitudes are deﬁned as “enduring positive or
negative feelings about a person, object, or an issue” (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). In
other words, this gap points to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between how people declare to act
and how they actually behave. One of the ﬁrst psychologists highlighting this phenomenon
is LaPiere (1934) by conducting experiments in the United States, when strong prejudices
existed against Asians. The author accompanied a random selected Chinese couple to
more than 200 restaurants and reported that, from all of those, only one did not accept
the couple. Thereupon, a questionnaire was sent out to all restaurants to ask the managers
the question “Will you accept members of the Chinese race in your establishment?”. They
could answer “yes”, “no”, or “depends on circumstances”. 90% of respondents answered
with “no”. The ﬁndings of the experiment manifest that individuals are highly inconsistent
and often do not act in the way they declare in a questionnaire.
The presence of an attitude-behavior gap in the context of energy renovation, may appear
as explained hereafter. Contradictory ﬁndings persist in the energy literature. While some
scholars ﬁnd a positive relationship between pro-environmental attitudes and sustainable
behaviors (Gadenne et al., 2011; Hines et al., 1987; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; Seligman
et al., 1978; Becker et al., 1981; Samuelson and Biek, 1991; Sapci and Considine, 2014),
others report no link between pro-environmental attitudes and reduction of energy use
(Anker-Nilssen, 2003; Poortinga et al., 2004; Ozaki, 2011; Valkila and Saari, 2013). A pos-
sible explanation for this latter ﬁnding could be that old habits are very diﬃcult to change
and constitute a strong challenge to pro-environmental behavior (Kollmuss and Agyeman,
2002). Another reason could be that people are more likely to act pro-environmentally
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according to their attitudes, when such a behavior demands low eﬀort costs. On the con-
trary, if a sustainable behavior is too costly in terms of eﬀort, and subsequently induces
a loss in comfort, the adoption of the behavior is likely to be lessened (Diekmann and
Preisendörfer, 1992). In general, individuals have the tendency to make selﬁsh choices
(i.e. paying less attention to their energy consumption, increasing their comfort, imple-
menting less eﬀort to adopt their behavior, etc.) rather than acting in a way that would
be most beneﬁcial for the environment (Becker et al., 1981; Samuelson and Biek, 1991).
Our third hypothesis concerning the attitude-behavior gap can thus be stated as:
Hypothesis 3 Occupants who declared to have adopted a (higher) pro-environmental atti-
tude do not have a lower Energy Performance Gap than those who did not change
their attitude.
The intention-behavior gap: It displays the diﬀerence between the intention of a person
to pursue a goal, and his actual behavior following such an intention. An intention is
a motivation inducing people to adopt a goal-directed behavior (Frederiks et al., 2015b).
While a range of scholars suggest that individuals with higher intrinsic motivation5 tend to
exhibit more sustainable and pro-environmental behavior (Deci, Edwards and Ryan, 1985;
De Young, 2000; Pelletier et al., 2002; Pelletier and Sharp, 2008), others like Kollmuss
and Agyeman (2002) however point to the fact that there exist two types of motivations:
(i) the selective motives and (ii) the primary motives. Selective motives can for instance
be the driver for a given action to sustain environmental beneﬁts, and primary motives
induce actions and behavior to maintain or increase personal comfort. When primary
motives outweigh selective motives, an intention-behavior gap may appear in the energy
conservation ﬁeld. The hypothesis related to an intention-behavior gap can be expressed
as follows:
Hypothesis 4 Occupants who declared high sustainable motivations do not have a smaller
Energy Performance Gap than the others.
5Deci, Edwards and Ryan (1985) deﬁne ‘intrinsic motivation’ as the motivation that comes from indi-
viduals’ personal interest without being stimulated neither by social pressure nor by incentives.
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1.3 "Je rénove BBC" renovation program: survey, questionnaire
and database
In this section, we explain the survey design, the elaboration of the questionnaire and the
elaboration of the database used for our analysis.
1.3.1 The survey
In many European countries, scarce information is available on the total energy consump-
tion –including heating, hot water, lighting, cooling, ventilation and auxiliaries of low
energy buildings owing to the high costs or absence of smart metering, complex calcula-
tion method of the total energy consumption and lacking knowledge about the share of
electronic appliances from total electricity consumption.
As explained in the General Introduction of the thesis, the collaboration of EDF and
the regional authorities aimed to carry out a large pilot project, named "Je Rénove BBC"
(JRBBC)6, between 2010 and 2014, to renovate nearly 500 individual houses up to the
level of low energy in the region Alsace located in northeastern France.
The motivation of conducting a survey among households having renovated their house
with the JRBBC program was initiated by EDF. They were initially interested in getting
a feedback about the program and gathering information about the renovation works,
household’s satisfaction, and their ex-post behaviors. Thereafter, we undertook a large
data collection eﬀort to gather information on occupants’ energy bills, audits, energy-
related behaviors and socio-demographic characteristics.
The survey started in April 2015, as part of my masters’ thesis, and ended in February
2017, during three consecutive waves.7 Collecting information about households’ actual
energy consumption was essential to evaluate the renovated houses’ energy performance
compared to the initially predicted energy consumption. To obtain an whole season of
consumption information, only households whose home renovation ended at least one year
earlier could be interrogated. In March 2015, 432 home renovations had been initiated,
among which 187 met the latter mentioned condition (i.e. 43%). Invitations to participate
in the survey were thus sent from EDF to these 187 households. Having signed a chart
of acceptance to answer to any solicitation from EDF during the two years following the
6More information on the JRBBC program can be found in the General Introduction.
7We thank Nicolas Lampach, Debora Zaparova, Leila Cheriﬁ and Maryline Delsart for their help in the
questionnaire administration, especially during the second and third wave.
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end of the works, a majority of them replied positively to this invitation. A total of 139
households accepted to participate. This represents 74% of the invited households and
32% of all the households of the program. All occupants living in an at most 3-dwelling
building constructed before 2005 had the possibility to participate in the survey. The
selected households came from all over the Alsace region. The sample’s distribution across
the Alsace region is mapped in Figure 1.1.
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? ? ? ?
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???
Note: The darker the circle in the map, the higher the density of households having participated in the
project.
Figure 1.1: Households participating in the "Je Rénove BBC" renovation program
Most households are located in the two main urban agglomerations (i.e. Strasbourg and
Mulhouse). Our sample is not national representative, as the Alsace region presents some
particular diﬀerences from other regions in France: there are relatively higher revenues, it
is the most urbanized region of France, and the population is sensitive to the environment
due to cultural aspects (Héraud, 2011). The region Alsace is fostering cross-border co-
operation with Germany and Switzerland, and there are also divergences between Alsace
and other regions in its legal and historical character. Comparing the regional statistics
from the national INSEE institute with our sample characteristics, we see that our sample
is representative for the residential sector in the region Alsace.
The households of the program were interviewed in situ and on the phone. We tried
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to meet the majority of them, and accepted phone interviews only in case they did not
have time for face-to-face interviews. The oral interaction was important to get the most
precise feedback possible. Households could express themselves more freely, and we could
clarify questions which seemed unclear to them, which limited possible response biases.
To guide the interviews and collect quantitative information from the households, we used
a questionnaire, detailed below.
1.3.2 The questionnaire
A ﬁrst questionnaire had already been elaborated by EDF for the survey of the "50
chantiers pionniers" (50CP) program. We entirely restructured it for the needs of our
analysis, and completed it with questions necessary for EDF’s program feedback. In the
following subsection, we explain how we structured the questionnaire to limit possible
response biases. Indeed, depending on how a question is formulated, biases can occur
following psychological reactions from the respondent. These reactions are generally un-
conscious defense mechanisms, where the respondent wishes to give a certain image of
himself.
Elaboration of the JRBBC questionnaire
The questionnaire8 is divided into ten distinct parts (i.e. Parts A to J), with an addi-
tional appendix (i.e. Part K) about households’ appliances and lighting equipment. This
appendix was only intended for households having an electric heating system9.
The questionnaire’s introduction and the survey invitations sent to the households
explain the purpose of the JRBBC survey in comprehensible words, without going too
much into detail. We thus avoid an expectation effect that inﬂuences respondents’ answers
and behaviors (Oliver, 1977). Indeed, if respondents know the entire purpose of the survey,
they might select the answer they consider to be "right" to meet the expectations of the
survey. We specify that all the answers will remain anonymous according to the legal
obligations from the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).10
8A table with all the questions in English is available in Appendix A.1. The original questionnaire in
French is available in Appendix A.2.
9This information should enable us to better determine the part of the electricity consumption used for
heating, and the part used for other usages.
10Since 25 May 2018, the GDPR on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, has come into force.
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The entire questionnaire has been structured according to the chronology of the ren-
ovation works to avoid the respondents’ resistance to sudden change of theme. Fear of
change is a systematic resistance when a modiﬁcation or an abrupt change occurs, which
can bring the respondent to not answer a question (Aktouf, 1987). Oral transitions have
thus been made between the diﬀerent themes.
The ﬁrst four parts of the questionnaire (i.e. Parts A to D) concern households’
motivations to renovate, the renovation process and households’ satisfaction.
Part A, about households’ deep-renovation motivations and their interest towards the
JRBBC program, addresses questions about how they learned about the program and why
they chose it. These questions typically introduce the subject and project the respondents
to the pre-renovation period. From the ﬁrst question, we have been cautious to avoid the
following response biases: (1) the central tendency bias, and (2) the anchoring effect.
Figure 1.2: Extract from question A.1. of the JRBBC questionnaire
Figure 1.2 shows an extract from the ﬁrst question of the questionnaire. Introducing
a pair number of possible answers permits to avoid the problem of a median answer, also
known as central tendency bias. Payne (2014) advises against proposing a central answer,
because respondents generally have the tendency to avoid "extreme" answers and converge
to the median one. A median answer would thus lead to information loss in our ﬁnal results.
By orally administrating the questionnaires, we paid attention to the anchoring effect
(closely related to the spatial bias, the dominance effect and the order effect): respondents
have the tendency to answer what they were proposed ﬁrst. Psychologists noticed that
answers to a same survey were strongly inﬂuenced, and thus biased, by the order of the
proposed answers in close questions. This is also true for orally spoken questions: the
respondent has the tendency to recall and answer what he heard ﬁrst (Nairne and Crowder,
1982; Ganassali and Moscarola, 2004). To avoid this bias, we changed the order of possible
answers from one respondent to another, while keeping the orders unchanged for a given
respondent.
Thereafter, part B mentions the ﬁnancial aids obtained and the encountered diﬃculties
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to receive them, while part C addresses the choice of the project manager and the impor-
tance paid to quality by selecting the renovation materials. Part D focuses on households’
satisfaction towards the program and the project manager. A general satisfaction question
as shown in Figure 1.3 hereafter is asked. This is one of the only binary questions of the
questionnaire where an opinion of the respondent is asked.
Figure 1.3: Question D.1.1. of the JRBBC questionnaire about general satisfaction
Binary questions have been limited as much as possible to avoid the bias towards ‘yes’,
also known as the tendency to agree. This tendency to be attracted by the positive answer
is well-known in social psychology (Watson, 1992; Moss, 2009). Reasons can be multiple:
politeness, sympathy, convenience, not upset the investigator or simply not wanting to
justify a negative answer. The bias can be ampliﬁed for leading questions (Aktouf, 1987).
This is why we were careful in the neutral formulation of the questions11. The remaining
binary questions are not opinion, but simple fact questions12.
Parts E to I were essential for our database and empirical analysis. The post-renovation
period is now addressed.
Trying to be as intuitive as possible for the respondent, part E covers questions about
households’ energy consumption before and after energy renovation: the installed heating
and sanitary hot water systems, and consumption details for electricity, heating and sani-
tary hot water13. Furthermore, multiple-choice questions concerning the installed heating
system comprise the option to answer "other" to avoid non-responses in case of a non-
exhaustive list of choices.
In part F, about households’ habits before and after renovation (e.g. heating, occupa-
tion, attitudes), we voluntarily avoided the term "behavior" since it could have a pejorative
connotation for the respondent. A conformism bias could otherwise emerge if he thinks
that a "right" behavior (and answer) exists. In other words, to reﬂect a social and moral
11As mentioned earlier, the respondent should not feel that an answer is better than another.
12For example: "Did you already lived in the renovated house before the works?".
13Asked when the energy used for heating and sanitary hot water was not electricity.
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ideal in his answers, the respondent might try to comply with a social norm14.
Part G, addressing pre- and post-renovation comfort, and part H covering households’
proﬁles and characteristics, were voluntarily placed at the end of the questionnaire to avoid
boredom and discouragement that could occur with these types of questions. Beginning
with them could give the respondent the feeling that his characteristics and proﬁle are
more important than his opinion or renovation experience. Besides, these questions being
easy to answer, they are adapted to end a questionnaire15.
Part I, with respect to the occupants’ revenues, asks the amount of net resources of the
whole household. For more precision, we ﬁrst ask it as an open question, and then propose
a close question16. We do not give the choice to answer "I do no wish to answer." to avoid
the respondent to directly selecting this answer. Indeed, adding this answer choice can
make the question sound less important, which is not the case since it is often used as a
control variable in empirical studies.
Finally, we have to keep in mind that the hardly detectable "social desirability bias" can
occur when the respondent wants to idealize himself and give a positive image. Despite
the anonymity of the answers, he could for example be tempted to increase his revenues
in part I.
1.3.3 A new database on deep energy renovation in France
The survey and its questionnaire led to the elaboration of a database. This section explains
how it has been compiled and how theoretical energy consumption were calculated.
To minimize missing observations on actual energy consumption, we asked households
to prepare their energy bills (e.g. electricity, gas) in advance. During the interviews, the
investigators ﬁlled out paper questionnaires to discuss more ﬂuently with the respondents.
They should feel comfortable to answer honestly.
The compilation of the collected data into an Excel ﬁle was done with Adobe Acrobat
Pro. The PDF version of the questionnaire was transformed into an interactive ‘PDF form’,
where every button was programmed under the needed form (e.g. binary, categorical, text,
14The psychologist Roger Mucchielli (1919-1981) deﬁnes conformism as "the social attitude of submitting
to and making one’s own, the opinions, rules, norms and models that represent the collective mentality or
value system of the group one has joined."
15Note that the survey lasts between 25 minutes and 1 hour depending on how much the respondents
had to say about their experience. Indeed, in addition to answering the questions, they should feel free to
express their opinion and feelings. In case of any issues following the renovation, we communicated these
information to EDF, who could then intervene when necessary.
16It proposes diﬀerent categories of revenue.
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single answer) and with an appropriate variable name. This form being ﬁllable on the
computer, we manually copied the completed paper questionnaires. After gathering all
the electronic PDF forms, the software creates a corresponding Excel ﬁle. This method
has two advantages: (1) the number of transcription errors are drastically decreased and
limited, and (2) the time needed to elaborate the Excel ﬁle containing the entire database
is remarkably reduced.
The predicted energy consumption
Households’ predicted energy consumption were calculated through energy audits by ex-
ternal energy consultation ﬁrms during the planning of the renovation works.
The energy audits are made with the TH-C-E ex standard calculation method based on
the French thermal Regulation entered into force in 2012 (Centre scientiﬁque et technique
du bâtiment (CSTB), 2008)17. The method predicts the energy consumption of existing
buildings after renovation measures. It takes into account speciﬁc set points, standard
building characteristics and real values for all the replaced and renovated elements. On
the household side, standard behavioral and occupants’ characteristics are considered:
any evolution or change of the household are not included. It thus represents a static
prediction where real conditions of use are not considered. Concerning heating habits,
a standard heating temperature of 19°C during occupation times (i.e. 16 hours per day
during weekdays, and 24 hours per day during weekends), and 16°C otherwise are taken
into account. These temperature settings are optimal in terms of comfort in isolated
buildings, but are low enough to permit energy savings.
1.4 Descriptive statistics of the "Je rénove BBC" panel
To gain some insights about the characteristics, consumption, renovation and habits of the
interviewed JRBBC households, this section presents a number of descriptive statistics.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent, behavioral and potential
control variables18. To brieﬂy describe the variables used as proxies to test the cognitive
biases (BEH_WO, BEH_CONS, TEMP.N, BEH_ENV, M.ECOLO, EDUC), occupants
have not changed their behaviors related to window opening and are paying similar at-
17A detailed (but non-exhaustive) list of the main elements taken into account by this calculation method
is available in Section A.3 of the Appendix.
18Their deﬁnitions are available in Section A.5 of the Appendix.
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tention to their energy consumption as before renovation measures. The average tem-
perature setting at night is 18.36◦C with a standard deviation of 1.75◦C. Occupants’
pro-environmental attitudes did mostly not alter after renovation (BEH_ENV), however
94% of the households exhibit (strong) motivation to live in an environmental friendly
building (M.ECOLO) and the majority (59%) is higher educated (i.e. obtained at least a
bachelor’s degree).
Furthermore, respondents were asked to report their perceived comfort in the renovated
building on a scale from one to ten, yielding an average rating of 8.66 with a standard
deviation of 1.14. Half of the households installed a room thermostat to adapt their
indoor temperature according to their occupation habits. Occupants, on average, set the
temperature during the day at 20.38◦C with a standard deviation of 1.13◦C and 32% of the
households heat a higher number of rooms than prior renovation. The hours of occupation
are on average 15.32 hours per day and a large majority of occupants spend more than
three weeks per year on holidays.
Table 1.1: Statistics on the outcome variable and selected covariates
Variable N Mean SD Min Max Range SE
Dependent Variable
Energy Performance Gap (EA/EP ) 95 −0.118 0.436 −1.252 0.843 2.095 0.045
Net losing energy savings (NLS) 36 1.410 0.361 1.017 2.324 1.307 0.060
Net gaining energy savings (NGS) 59 0.709 0.177 0.286 0.984 0.698 0.023
Cognitive Biases and Energy-Related Behaviour
Behavior w.r.t. window opening (BEH_WO) 128 1.633 0.651 1 3 2 0.057
Paying attention to energy cons. (BEH_CONS) 128 0.062 0.243 0 1 1 0.021
Temp. set. gap night [declared vs. 19◦C] (TEMP.N) 118 −0.644 1.754 −6 5 11 0.161
Pro-environmental attitudes (BEH_ENV) 128 0.297 0.459 0 1 1 0.041
Environmental sensitivity (M.ECOLO) 124 0.935 0.247 0 1 1 0.022
Higher education (EDUC) 126 0.595 0.493 0 1 1 0.044
Potential Control Variables
Heating system (SYST) 127 0.496 0.502 0 1 1 0.045
Motiv. to reduce energy costs (M.ECON.FIN) 124 2.548 0.642 1 3 2 0.058
Motiv. to reduce energy cons. (M.ECON.NRJ) 125 2.776 0.437 1 3 2 0.039
Age of respondent (AGE) 128 0.445 0.499 0 1 1 0.044
Profession (PROF) 128 0.477 0.501 0 1 1 0.044
Presence of children (CHILD) 129 0.535 0.501 0 1 1 0.044
Perceived comfort (COMFORT) 125 8.664 1.136 1 10 9 0.102
Presence of room thermostat (THERM) 128 0.508 0.502 0 1 1 0.044
Temp. set. gap day [declared vs. 19◦C] (TEMP.D) 121 1.382 1.129 −1 5 6 0.103
Additional rooms heated (ROOM) 116 0.319 0.468 0 1 1 0.043
Hours of occupation (OCCUP) 126 15.322 5.864 3 24 21 0.522
More than three weeks in holidays (VACATION) 122 0.533 0.501 0 1 1 0.045
Size of the household (HSIZE) 119 3.328 1.513 1 9 8 0.139
High income (REV) 115 0.522 0.502 0 1 1 0.047
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1.4.1 Socio-demographic characteristics
From the 139 households having participated in the survey, about 89% live as a couple
(married or not), and an average of 3.38 persons live per renovated house. Indeed, 90%
of the households have children under the age of 18 living with them. No couples aged
between 18 and 24 were interrogated: young people generally do not have the ﬁnancial
capacity to become landlord, and on top of that, ﬁnance a deep energy renovation. How-
ever, 16% of the respondents are between 25 and 34 years old, which shows that deep
energy renovation can also be accessible to younger landlords. The vast majority of the
households are between 35 and 59 (71%), and only 13% are older. Nearly half of the re-
spondents (i.e. 47%) work as an executive, liberal or executive intellectual. Interestingly,
higher educated households seem predominant in the JRBBC program: 83% of the panel
have a higher education, among which 39% have a Master’s degree or more. Only 1%
have no diploma at all. Figure 1.4 shows that a majority (53%) of the households have a
monthly net revenue lying between 3 000e and 5 000e.
Number of observations: 119
Figure 1.4: Net monthly revenues of the households
On average, we estimate the monthly revenues to be around 4 168e (in particular for
the 119 respondents of this question). This shows that the panel is on average ﬁnancially
comfortable. However, the fact that 21% earns less than 3 000e per month for the entire
household, indicates that, partially due to the public ﬁnancial aids and tax beneﬁts, deep
renovation can be accessible even to households with lower income, and that thermal
comfort is not exclusively dedicated to rich households.
The above descriptive statistics concern all the households having participated in the
JRBBC survey (i.e. 139 households), regardless whether they consumed more or less than
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predicted. As a comparison and to gain further insight on the interrogated households, Ta-
ble 1.2 shows a summary of these information for (1) households which consumed less than
predicted, and (2) households which consumed more than predicted. We have complete
and exploitable energy consumption data for 95 households, among which 36 consume
more than predicted (38%) and 59 consume less than predicted (62%).
Table 1.2: Household’s socio-demographic characteristics
Socio-demographic (1) Consume less (2) Consume more
characteristic than predicted than predicted
Proportion of households 62% 38%
Family status: as a couple 89% 97%
Average household size 3.24 3.35
Average net revenues 3 980e 5 032e
Average age of respondents between 35 and 44 between 35 and 44
High educated 84% 88%
Work as an executive, liberal 46% 40%
or executive intellectual
Source: "Je rénove BBC " program ; Number of observations: 95
1.4.2 Importance of financial aids and tax benefits
92% of the survey respondents estimate that the ﬁnancial aids proposed by the JRBBC
program is clearly an advantage of the program, even though 25% of them found the
administrative procedures not very simple and clear. 20% of the households could also
beneﬁt of ﬁnancial aids from their municipality or territory. However, as can be seen on
Figure 1.5, tax beneﬁts have been largely asked by the owners.
Number of observations: 138 ; "other": aids for using speciﬁc materials or for low-income households.
Figure 1.5: Tax beneﬁts and other perceived ﬁnancial aids
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1.4.3 Renovation motivations
Four main motives were identiﬁed, with respect to households’ actual motivations to engage
in deep energy renovations: (1) owning an environmental friendly house, (2) make energy
savings, (3) make ﬁnancial savings, and (4) increase inside comfort. However, we notice
that owning an environmental friendly house is often only a motive of second importance,
and that it seems more to be a positive side eﬀect of the renovation works. Increasing
personal comfort (being considered as a primary motive) is a much stronger motive than
making something that is good for the environment (which is considered as a selective
motive). This observation can be seen on Figure 1.6 and was the initiator to test the
presence of an "intention-behavior gap".
Number of observations: 139
Figure 1.6: Households’ renovation motivations
1.4.4 Households’ satisfaction
As depicted in Figure 1.7, a large majority of the households feels satisﬁed about the
general services of the JRBBC program.
Number of observations: 138
Figure 1.7: Households’ general satisfaction
A slightly lower but still high percentage of satisfaction concerns the ﬁrms, craftsmen
and the project manager’s intervention. Even though 85% are globally satisﬁed about the
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project manager’s work, Figure 1.8 shows that there is still place for improvement, as the
percentages of not very satisﬁed and not satisﬁed households at all vary between 10% and
23%.
Number of observations: 133
Figure 1.8: Satisfaction toward the project manager
The 23% level corresponds to the respect of the planned work deadlines. More im-
portantly, 19% of the households not very satisﬁed about the global quality of the work
coordination, that is, the task coordination among the ﬁrms and craftsmen. When a
project manager is present on a construction or a renovation site, his main task is to
coordinate all the interventions and task of the craftsmen, and to be the intermediary
between the client (i.e. the project owner, that is, the household) and the craftsmen. He
has the technical knowledge to ensure an eﬃcient chronology of the interventions, so that
the building’s performance ends at its best. The fact that some households are unsatisﬁed
about this coordination has to be analyzed seriously because it can lead among others to
a ﬁnal energy performance loss of the renovated (or new) building and contribute to the
EPG19.
1.4.5 Habits in the renovated houses
Households’ habits and behaviors can play a signiﬁcant role in a low-energy house. In
low-energy buildings equipped with mechanical ventilation systems (as it is the case for all
the households of the program), opening windows too long and often can impact electricity
consumption (cf. the status quo bias justiﬁcation in Section 1.5). As the main ventilation
method before renovation was opening windows for about 76% of the households, a "good"
behavior consists in ventilating less manually than before renovation. This latter habit
19This issue is addressed in Chapter 3. We determine whether better and adapted contracts (i.e. better
incentives) could lead craftsmen to better coordinate their tasks, and if speciﬁcally trained craftsmen
perform better in general. In other words, to encourage task coordination, should we work on improve
training programs or incentives? This issue, analyzed with the help of an economic experiment with
craftsmen, is however addressed in cases without the presence of a project manager.
37
CHAPTER 1. COGNITIVE BIASES AND THE ENERGY PERFORMANCE GAP
modiﬁcation has been declared by 44% of them as depicted in Figure 1.9. However, 46%
declare not having changed their ventilation habits, and 10% even declare to open their
windows more often. This can be problematic to achieve the predicted energy consumption.
Number of observations: 129
Figure 1.9: Households’ habits compared to before renovation
Observing further habits and behavior evolution, an important percentage declares to
feel more concerned about the environment (and thus make more daily green gestures
as for instance making compost, switching the light oﬀ, unplug chargers, ...) (30%) and
having the tendency to pay more attention to energy consumption than before renovation
(44%). The deep-energy renovation process might for a fact have increased households’
environmental consciousness, even though an initial positive consciousness was certainly
already present. It is also important to keep in mind that during surveys, people generally
have the tendency to wanting to give a positive self-image, the so-called "social desirability
bias" mentioned in Subsection 1.3.2. These environmentally positive declarations might
thus also be partly over-estimated. This is why we analyzed the presence of an "attitude-
behavior gap" in this Chapter. We ﬁnd that for higher educated households consuming
more than predicted, those declaring to feel more concerned about the environment than
before do not have a smaller ex-post EPG than the others. This can suggest an attitude-
behavior gap from high educated households declaring to be ecological.
1.4.6 Households’ energy consumption
As mentioned in the previous Subsection, a predicted ex-post energy consumption has
been calculated before the renovation works to illustrate households their potential energy
savings by undertaking speciﬁc modiﬁcations. The predictions have not always been met
as can be clearly seen on Figure 1.10.
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Number of observations: 95
The ratio measures the actual over the predicted energy consumption in primary energy.
Note: Under the gray line they consume less than predicted, otherwise they consume more than predicted.
Figure 1.10: Ex-post energy consumption ratios for each household
As mentioned in Section 1.5, we note that 62% of the households consume less than
predicted and 38% consume more than predicted one year after the energy renovation
works. If we include households consuming only approximately up to 10 kWhPE/m2.year
less or more than predicted in those "meeting the predictions", we make the following
observation: 23% meet the predictions, 50% consume less, and 27% still consume more
than predicted. The 27% consuming more than predicted are the most "problematic",
because they might need more time to pay back the contracted credit loans, or will have
more diﬃculties to pay energy performance related insurances if they subscribed some.
Their return on investment will also take longer.
Furthermore, recall that the objective of the program was to permit households to
renovate their houses to low-energy buildings. The maximum consumption in Alsace to
have a low-energy building is 104 kWhEP/m2.year. Figure 1.11 shows that about 79%
of the renovated houses meet the criteria. The remaining 21% cannot be qualiﬁed as
low-energy buildings. It is important to mention here that 38% of them did not change
their heating system. These buildings might meet the low-energy performance level when
changing the heating and sanitary hot water system. Moreover, while most households
have a heating system depending on fossil fuel energy (i.e. gas, electricity or fuel), solely
11% of them installed a heating system supplied with renewable energies (i.e. wood, pellets,
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heating pump, solar energy or photovoltaic). The high ﬁxed cost of installing renewable
energy heating systems and the scanty ﬁnancial support may have discouraged many
households to invest in renewable systems during a ﬁrst renovation stage. Supposing that
households who did not change their heating system will do it in the future, the JRBBC
program could reach up to 87% (i.e. + 8%) of low-energy buildings20.
Number of observations: 109
Note: Buildings under the gray line meet the low-energy performance criteria.
Figure 1.11: Ex-post actual energy consumption in primary energy (kWhP E/m2.year)
1.5 Energy Performance Gap and proxies for the cognitive biases
In this section, we present the variable of interest and the proxy variables used to test the
cognitive biases.
Our dependent variable is the Energy Performance Gap (EPG) of the individual house-
hold measured as the logarithmic ratio of the ex-post actual and predicted total energy
consumption. Actual energy consumption is normalized by heating degree days, altitude
and location of the individual building.21
Figure 1.12 depicts the relationship between the EPG and actual energy consumption
of our sample. A positive and increasing relationship between both measures can be
observed. This means that the higher the actual energy consumption of a household, the
20In the 50CP program, were changing the heating system was mandatory, 95% of the houses became
low-energy buildings.
21A detailed description about the calculation of the actual energy consumption in primary energy is
given in Section A.4 of the Appendix.
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more likely is the underestimation of the predicted energy consumption. An EPG greater
(lower) than zero represents the Net Losing (Gaining) Energy Savings of the individual
household (Sunikka-blank and Galvin, 2012). This observation is in line with the one made
by Raynaud (2014). The likelihood of achieving at least the required energy performance
is approximately 62% as a relatively large percentage of households of our sample actually
consume lower levels of energy than predicted. However, 38% of the sample reveals an
over-consumption pattern.
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The dotted line denotes the presence of no energy performance gap: actual energy consumption matches
perfectly the predicted energy consumption.
Figure 1.12: Relationship between Energy Performance Gap and Actual Energy Consump-
tion
If we consider that a success would be to consume as predicted, by allowing an error
margin of only 10 kWhP E/m2.year in the EPG, the likelihood of success would dramat-
ically decline from 62% down to 23%.
Which are the key determinants driving the EPG? What explains the divergence of the
EPGs among individual households? Derived from our theoretical insights, we suggest a
number of proxy variables measuring individuals’ cognitive biases which might explain the
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EPG. In doing so, we focus on two potential outcomes of the EPG, namely the Net Losing
and Net Gaining Energy Savings. Although the latter has been mostly disregarded by the
energy literature, it constitutes the opportunity to get key insights into the capability of
occupants to achieve higher energy savings than prior predicted.
We measure the status quo bias (Hypothesis 1) on manual ventilation habits by com-
paring occupants who did not change their ventilation habits (i.e. status quo on manual
ventilation) and those who adapted their window opening habits by opening them less
(or more) than before renovation. Low energy buildings are furnished with a mechan-
ical ventilation system to control air circulation. Energy engineers plead to nearly not
open the windows in a low energy building (or only ﬁve minutes at a time), otherwise it
deteriorates the energy eﬃciency of the building. We use a categorical variable manual
ventilation behavior22, where occupants report their behavioral change of window opening
(i.e. less, equally, more) compared to prior renovating the building. As the theoretical
predictions consider that occupants do nearly not open their windows anymore, we expect
that those who do not adapt their behavior will have larger Net Losing Energy Savings
than the other groups.
The optimism bias (Hypothesis 2) is measured by the interaction term paying atten-
tion to daily energy consumption23 and temperature setting difference at night24. In our
questionnaire, occupants report their behavior by indicating on a scale to pay less, equally
or more attention to their energy consumption than prior renovation. As explained in
Section 1.2, we assume that occupants are conﬁdent about the theoretical predictions, and
thus tend to be over-optimistic about the energy performance of the refurbished building
(Williamson, 2012). This excessive trust may imply an optimistic behavior by paying less
attention to their energy consumption. Nishant et al. (2014) ﬁnd that although there is a
positive eﬀect of technology on the energy eﬃciency, there is also a negative eﬀect of the
rebound eﬀect, which can compensate each other. Mitchell (2012) calls this a "technophilic
optimism". The intuition behind the optimism bias is similar: while households can be
over-optimistic about the energy performance of the building, a rebound eﬀect can appear
and incentivize them to unconsciously adopt a more energy-consuming behavior. This phe-
22See question F.7. of the survey in Section A.1 of the Appendix, about how they open their windows
prior to renovation.
23See question F.7. We re-code the categorical variable into a dummy variable, where "paying equally or
more attention" (BEHCONS.Same)isthebaselinewithwhich”payinglessattention”(BEHCONS.less)iscomparedto.
24Recall that the temperature setting during night is 19 ◦C in the theoretical predictions. We thus
deduct the declared temperature setting in question F.2.1.2. from the prescribed 19 ◦C.
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nomenon could even be more visible from households setting higher temperature at night
than the threshold of 19 ◦C assumed in conventional simulation scenarios. We base our
intuition on the ﬁnding of Guerra Santin (2010), who reveals that the default temperature
at night and in the evening has more impact on total energy use than the default temper-
ature setting during the day. Moreover, it is natural to argue that households paying less
attention to their energy consumption, also tend to less reduce their temperature setting
at night. For these reasons, we compare households who report to pay less attention and
setting higher temperature than 19 ◦C at night with those who report not having changed
their attention to their energy consumption prior to renovation and also heating above 19
◦C at night. We aim to set up interaction terms to account for non-linear eﬀects in the
model. Explaining variations of EPG are highly complex and inﬂuenced by many factors.
The interaction term allows us to measure the direct eﬀects of our independent variables
on the outcome.
As a proxy for the attitude-behavior gap (Hypothesis 3), we employ the categorical
variable pro-environmental attitudes25. This variable contains information on occupants’
pro-environmental attitudes and is quantiﬁed by asking households about their behavioral
change on the degree of daily sustainable actions (i.e. less, equally or more) prior to
renovation. We compare households who report to seek more sustainable actions with
those who have not changed their habits. The presence of an attitude-behavior gap would
mean that households who exhibit greater pro-environmental attitudes do not yield a lower
EPG compared to others.
The intention-behavior gap is measured by the interaction term pro-environmental
sensitivity26, high education27 and high revenue28. Recall from Section 1.2 that an in-
tention is a motivation toward both a goal-directed behavior and change. The variable
pro-environmental sensitivity is dichotomous and provides us information on occupants’
motivation to live in a environmental-friendly building. However, may be biased to only
test the impact of this variable on the EPG. First, Hines et al. (1987) ﬁnds a positive cor-
relation between environmental behavior and education level. Belaid and Garcia (2016)
25See question F.7. about the tendency to be concerned about ecological and environmental issues prior
to renovation. We re-code the categorical variable into a dummy variable, where "being equally or less
concerned" (ENV.Low) is the baseline with which "being more concerned" (ENV.High) is compared to.
26See question A.1. on how important it is to own an environmental friendly house. We re-code the
categorical variable into a dummy variable, where "ﬁnding it not important or not important at all" (Non-
Ecolo) is the baseline with which "ﬁnding is important or very important" (Ecolo) is compared to.
27See question H.8.
28See question I.
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thereupon state that "households with a higher education level [are] more receptive to en-
vironmental friendly ideas or [are] better informed about issues related to global warming,
exhibiting better behaviors". In accordance, a report by the United Nations Educational,
Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (Benavot et al., 2016) emphasizes that higher edu-
cated individuals tend to be more sensitive to environment. Second, it is well known that
there exists a signiﬁcant positive correlation between education and revenue level (see, for
instance, Blaug, 1972; Polachek and Siebert, 1993). Hence, we interact the three variables,
since the variable pro-environmental sensitivity alone may otherwise be too correlated with
the error term of the regression. The presence of an intention-behavior gap would mean
that higher educated and ‘richer’ households with a pro-environmental sensitivity would
not yield a lower EPG compared to those being less educated, less ‘rich’, and reporting no
pro-environmental sensitivity.
1.6 Control variables and modeling approach
In this section, we discuss our data-driven approach to select the most relevant control
variables. We then explain our modeling approach. To deal with the problem of missing
values, we assess the nature of missingness in order to apply multiple imputation method.
1.6.1 Selecting control variables using learning models
To curb adverse eﬀects from confounding variables and to control for observed heterogene-
ity among occupants, we have a wide range of socio-demographic and technical covariates
available as controls.
However, our sample size is small, which might lead to the problem of overﬁtting in
the subsequent estimation model, especially when the number of parameters is too large
for a particular dataset. While there exists no exact rule about the number of covariates
to be included in a model, we apply the thumb rule in accordance with Koebel et al.
(2016) by using 10 observations per covariate. To prevent the problem of overﬁtting, we
seek to select a restricted number of control variables constituting a common classiﬁcation
problem.
Instead of using a forward selection method to select covariates, we apply a more
data-driven approach, by employing machine learning and predictive modeling. These are
powerful tools helping to identify strong predictors of the EPG, and therefore to select
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most relevant variables aﬀecting the Net Losing Energy Savings (NLS) on the one hand,
and the Net Gaining Energy Savings (NGS) on the other hand. Data-driven approaches
are receiving widespread attention from scholars in diﬀerent ﬁelds, and the success of
their application is due to the eﬀective use of models capable of detecting complex data
dependencies and capturing non-linear or non-monotonic data patterns (Breiman, 2001;
Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017; Varian, 2014). To this purpose, we apply a set of most
widely used supervised machine learning algorithms: (i) random forest (RF), (ii) gradient
tree boosting (GTB), and (iii) non-linear (radial) support vector machine (SVM).
The basic procedure of machine learning can be summarized as follows. First, the
data is split into ‘training sets’ (to train the model) and ‘test sets’ (to evaluate/validate
the trained model). Various validation methods are available to divide the data. We
use the Leave One Out Cross Validation (LOOCV) method, because it constitutes an
eﬀective internal validation method when the sample size is relatively small. It uses one
single observation from the original sample as a validation data (i.e. ‘test set’) and the
remaining are used as training data (i.e. ‘training set’). This is repeated N-times, such
that every single observation from the sample is used as a ‘test set’. Second, the algorithm
of the LOOCV attempts to predict the value of interest Y (the outputs NLS and NGS
in our case) given an input of a feature set X (variables). The aim is to develop a ﬁnely
tuned function h(X) that maps input data into the output of interest. The algorithm
optimizes this function, given the input data, to accurately predict the target value Y ,
by using the ‘training set’. For each ‘training set’, we evaluate the diﬀerence between the
predicted value h(X) and the output Y from the ‘test set’. By doing so, the algorithm can
learn from the ‘training set’ in order to measure and minimize the wrongness of h(X).
Once the data is divided, we apply a machine learning algorithm. We implement the
three algorithms (i.e. learning models) mentioned earlier, to ﬁnally select the one with the
highest performance, using the Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE). This method compares
forecasting errors of diﬀerent models for one particular dataset (Hyndman and Koehler,
2006). Hence, a lowest RMSE indicates the best model.
Let us ﬁrst explain how these learning algorithms work.
RF and GTB are decision learning methods using recursive binary partitioning of the vec-
tor space. Instead of growing a single decision tree, the RF method searches for the best
feature (i.e. relationship among the data) among a random subset of features. The gen-
eral bootstrap technique is applied to the ‘training set’, by repeatedly choosing a random
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sample with replacement of the ‘training set’, which leads to better model performance
(Breiman, 2001). A similar approach is the GTB method, computing a sequence of sim-
ple trees, where each tree is constructed for the prediction residuals of previous trees,
also called additive weighting expansions. At each iteration, a simple tree is determined
through recursive partitioning and the variances of the observed values from the means
are computed. The next tree will then be ﬁtted only to those residuals, that will continue
partitioning to reduce the variance of the data (Chen et al., 2015; Ganjisaﬀar et al., 2011;
Ye et al., 2009).
Alternatively, the SVM method maps the data into high dimensional space with the value
of each feature as the value of a speciﬁc coordinate. It uses a linear and non-linear hyper-
plane to segregate best two classes. A powerful characteristic of SVM is the kernel function
used for non-linear separation. Low-dimensional input space is transformed into high-
dimensional space through the kernel function, allowing to convert non-separable problems
into separable problems. Generally, SVM performs better with a low sample size, since
the required training time is higher compared to alternative machine learning algorithms
(Pal and Foody, 2010).
To eﬀectively improve the model performance, we tune speciﬁc parameters in our
algorithms (see Table 1.3). The choice of the tuning parameters is based on standard
recommendation.29 Tuning plots are displayed in Section A.6 of the Appendix.
Table 1.3: Tuning Parameters of Machine Learning Algorithm
Parameters RF GTB SVM
Number of trees {500,1000,1500,2000,2500}
Number of random variables [1,16]
Boosting iterations {1000,5000,10000}
L2 Regularization (Ridge) Default {0,0.0001}
L1 Regularization (Lasso) Default {0,0.0001,0.1}
Step size shrinkage Default {0.3}
Number of cost values {0.25,0.50,1}
Caret (Kuhn and Others, 2008), party (Hothorn et al., 2006; Zeileis et al., 2008), randomForest (Liaw and
Wiener, 2002) and xgboost (Chen et al., 2015) package in R are used to run predictive modeling.
We divide our data based on households’ achievement of the EPG for the following
reason. One could argue that, for a given household, distinct factors are responsible for
29We do not know what the optimal design should be for a given model in the ﬁrst place, but we want
the model to be ‘ﬂexible’ by examining a range of possibilities. By ‘ﬂexible’, we mean that the model is
not tied to strong assumptions like, for instance, normality of the distribution, or homogeneous standard
errors.
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either Net Losing or Net Gaining Energy Savings. Cause and eﬀect relationships between
individual characteristics and EPG might be substantially diﬀerent in both situations. Our
data-driven approach allows us to identify the most useful features (i.e. used as control
variables) to predict the variable of interest. Figures 1.13 to 1.15 portray the variable
ranking based on the contribution of predictors made to the learning models in both situ-
ations, Net Losing and Net Gaining Energy Savings. The variable importance is measured
by the mean decrease of node impurity (i.e. reduction of misclassiﬁcation) when split by
variable. A simple explanation would be that variables with the highest importance scores
are those giving the best predictions and thus contributing most to the model. Leaving
out the top predictors would dramatically decrease the overall predictive power of the
model, while removing the one from the bottom would not much impact prediction. It
can been seen from Figures 1.13 to 1.15 that the variable ranking varies within the energy
performance situation (i.e. NLS or NGS) and between the learning models. In most of the
models, the variable temperature setting difference during the day (i.e. diﬀerence between
the prescribed 19◦C and the actual temperature setting) (TEMP.D) and temperature set-
ting gap at night (TEMP.N ) are ranked as the top predictors. Other strong predictors are
household size (HSIZE) in the situation of Net Losing Energy Savings, while the hours
of occupation (OCCUP) and motivation to reduce energy costs (M.ECON.FIN ) are most
dominant for households exhibiting Net Gaining Energy Savings.
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(b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Figure 1.13: Feature Ranking using Decision Tree Classiﬁer (Random Forest)
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Figure 1.14: Feature Ranking using Decision Tree Classiﬁer (Gradient Tree Boosting)
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(b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Figure 1.15: Feature Ranking using Support Vector Machine (Non-Linear)
The comparison of the three model performances with the RMSE is displayed in Figure
1.16. In both situation (i.e. NLS and NGS), SVM is the best model with, respectively,
a median of 0.2805799 (i.e. variance of 1.27 kWhEP /m2y) and 0.253127 (i.e. variance
of 1.36 kWhEP /m2y). Based upon the ranking displayed in Figure 1.15 and the degrees
of freedom, we thus choose HSIZE and TEMP.N in the situation of Net Losing Energy
Savings, and TEMP.N, TEMP.D, M.ECON.NRJ and COMFORT in the situation of Net
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Gaining Energy Savings.
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Figure 1.16: Comparison of Model Performance
1.6.2 Modeling approach
To explain the systematic variations of the EPG, we apply a multiple linear regression
analysis by running eight diﬀerent model speciﬁcations (i.e. four for Net Losing and Net
Gaining Energy Savings, respectively). The econometric model for a household i is:
log
(
EAi
EPi
)
= α+ γZi + βKX
′
iK + εi
where the logarithmic ratio between EAi and E
P
i is the dependent variable (with E
A
i the
actual, and EPi the predicted ex-post energy consumption), α represents the intercept,
γ is the estimated coeﬃcient of the independent variable Z, βK captures the estimated
coeﬃcient for the vector XK which includes K exogenous control variables and εi the error
term. Since we restrict the data analysis to NLS and NGS, we run four model speciﬁcations
for each to assess our hypotheses independently. For each model speciﬁcation, control
variables have been selected based on the feature ranking of predictive modeling.
It is very challenging to accurately model the eﬀect of individuals’ cognitive biases on
the EPG due to low sample size occurring from missing values. Complete information
about the variable of interest is available for a total of 95 households (73.64% of the
interrogated households), and missing values account for less than 7%. Missing values are
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ubiquitous in surveys and stem from multiple sources. Respondents may have left items
blank because they were not able or did not want to answer the questions. Concerning
observations about energy consumption, there may be missing values about the predicted
energy consumption due to the prediction method30 or on the actual consumption due
to missing energy bills. They account for nearly 30% of the missing values. The bias
associated with the occurrence of missing values can dramatically reduce the explanatory
power and may lead to biased and ineﬃcient estimates (Barnes et al., 2006; Graham et al.,
2007; Roderick and Fraser, 2008; Higgins et al., 2008; Azur et al., 2011; Grund et al.,
2016). Omitting missing values is only an eﬃcient approach when these values are Missing
Completely At Random (MCAR). We conduct Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988) with all
our selected variables, which rejects the null hypothesis that missing values are missing
completely at random (pvalue < 0.01). We thus assume that the missing values are missing
at random (MAR)31: the probability that a variable is missing only depends on observed
variables.
Hence, we perform the predictive mean matching method, which is a multiple imputa-
tion method to replace missing values with the observed value close to the predicted mean
of the missing values (Vink et al., 2014; Morris et al., 2014). This imputation method
is the most popular imputation algorithm.32 The main idea is that the predictive values
are calculated by using a regression model. It then picks the ﬁve closest elements based
on Euclidean distance to the predictive value. These ﬁve elements are named the ‘donor
pool’, from which the ﬁnal value is randomly chosen (Morris et al., 2014). We provide
additional information about the missing data pattern and distribution of imputed and
original values in Appendix A.7.
30Predicted energy consumption may be missing because, for the JRBBC renovation program, owners
and project managers had the choice between calculating the predictions with the TH-C-E ex software
(which is a regulatory thermal analysis), or use a technical benchmark (speciﬁc to the program). We
only used the predictions stemming from the thermal analysis. The issue with the technical benchmark
predictions is that the assumption was made of the installation of a condensing boiler. However, the owners
did not necessarily changed their existing heating system for a condensing boiler. Predictions may thus be
biased.
31Using data alone does not allow to prove or falsify MAR assumption.
32Interested readers can ﬁnd in Lampach et al. (2017) a small tutorial elucidating the main idea of
multiple imputation method.
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1.7 Empirical analysis
1.7.1 Parametric and non-parametric statistical tests
Figure 1.17 presents the relationship between individuals’ cognitive biases and the EPG.
At ﬁrst glance, our four hypotheses tend to point in the direction of the results given by
Figure 1.17, for households having an EPG greater than zero (i.e. NLS).
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Figure 1.17: Relationship between Cognitive Biases and Energy Performance Gap
However, performing non-parametric tests (i.e. Mann Whitney U test, Moods median
test) and parametric statistical tests (i.e. student’s t-test) yield no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
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between groups (pvalue > 0.1).33 For households who consume less than predicted (i.e.
NGS), almost no divergence is found between groups34.
1.7.2 Results
Figures 1.18-1.21, hereafter, plot the mean estimates and the 95% conﬁdence intervals35
of the regression analysis in the situations of Net Losing and Net Gaining Energy Savings
respectively.36 We compute bootstrap standard errors by re-sampling the data 10,000
times for (1) NLS without imputed values, (2) NLS with imputed values, (3) NGS without
imputed values, and (4) NGS with imputed values. It has been shown that bootstrapping
is an eﬃcient method to calculate accurate and valid conﬁdence intervals after multiple
imputation (Efron, 1994). In comparison, the conﬁdence intervals of the estimates obtained
by applying the predictive mean matching method (i.e. (2) and (4) with imputed values)
are smaller than those for (1) and (3) without imputes values. This makes sense, since the
variability decreases with a larger sample size, implying more narrow conﬁdence intervals.
33Detailed information on the parametric and non-parametric statistical tests are in Appendix A.8.
34For instance, by testing the cognitive bias ‘status quo on manual ventilation’, there is nearly no
diﬀerence between households declaring to open less, equally or more than before renovation.
35For those which are not familiar with the interpretation of plots using mean estimates and conﬁdence
intervals, variables are signiﬁcant when the conﬁdence intervals are not crossing the vertical dotted line in
Figure 1.18-1.21.
36We provide tables and more information about the estimation results in Appendix A.9. The estimations
were conducted with the open source software R (R Core Team, 2015).
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Status Quo Bias Let us ﬁrst analyze the empirical results with respect to the Status Quo
bias, displayed in Figure 1.18.
(a) Net Losing Energy Savings (b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Note: Solid C.I. = model without imputation ; Dotted C.I. = model with imputation
Figure 1.18: Mean Estimates and 95% Conﬁdence Interval: Status Quo Bias
Considering the model with imputation for households consuming more than predicted
(see Panel 1.18a), results indicate that those who did not change their window opening
behavior (i.e. Status Quo) consume signiﬁcantly more than predicted, and more precisely
26.74% (= 1 − eβStatus Quo=0.237) more than predicted. However, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between occupants opening less and more their windows, and those keeping the
status quo.
The status quo bias thus substantially deters the achievement of the predicted ex-post
energy consumption for households yielding NLS after renovation. However, households
realizing NGS are not impeded by the status quo effect (see Panel 1.18b). In other words,
the fact that these households consume less than predicted is not due to keeping the
status quo on manual ventilation, since these households have a signiﬁcantly smaller EPG
(−71%) ventilating more and less than before. This means that they make more savings
than the others. This eﬀect may be explained by other factors.
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This brings us to a ﬁrst result, corroborating Hypothesis 1 for households consuming
more than predicted.
Result 1 The ‘status quo bias’ related to manual ventilation behavior positively affects Net
Losing Energy Savings, and thus negatively impacts the Energy Performance Gap.
Prevention eﬀorts were made through the distribution of leaﬂets by the EDF (i.e. the
energy utility company involved in the renovation program), explaining the occupants how
to modify their behavior in a low energy dwelling. Unfortunately, the basic information
communication had no important impact, since the majority of the occupants (85%) re-
ported no behavioral change of their manual ventilation behavior. Their preference toward
comfort37 and the power of their habits (Maréchal, 2009) may play a role in this behavioral
inertia. Addressing the excessive energy consumption due to long window opening peri-
ods is thus key in preventing the EPG, especially in presence of a mechanical ventilation
system.
3794% of the households found it important or very important to increase their comfort as a renovation
motive. See question A.1.
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Optimism Bias Let us now analyze the empirical results with respect to the Optimism
bias, displayed in Figure 1.19.
(a) Net Losing Energy Savings (b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Note: Solid C.I. = model without imputation ; Dotted C.I. = model with imputation
Figure 1.19: Mean Estimates and 95% Conﬁdence Interval: Optimism Bias
For households heating at the prescribed 19◦C at night, those reporting to pay less atten-
tion to their energy consumption after renovation (BEH.CONS.Less) exhibit much higher
NLS than those keeping in mind their energy consumption (BEH.CONS.Same)38 (thus a
larger EPG). Moreover, the estimated parameter for the interaction term (Interaction ≡
BEH.CONS.Less·TEMP.N) is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that the eﬀect of paying
less attention to energy consumption is distinct for diﬀerent values of temperature setting
at night: heating, at night, under the 19◦C used in the prediction, lowers the negative eﬀect
of paying less attention to energy consumption, and thus of the optimism bias (see Panel
1.19a)39. In other words, while occupants’ behavioral patterns are not fully considered
in current energy analysis tools and thermal studies (Delzendeh et al., 2017), our ﬁnding
38+343% according to the model without imputation, and +58.25% according to the model with impu-
tation.
39
−35.34% per degree less, according to the model without imputation, and −12.63% per degree less,
according to the model with imputation.
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shows that the presence of an optimism bias leads to increase the EPG for households
consuming more than predicted.
This brings us to a second result corroborating Hypothesis 2 for households consuming
more than predicted.
Result 2 There is an ‘optimism bias’ from households reporting to pay less attention to
their energy consumption than before renovation and heating at the prescribed 19◦C
at night, such that it has a negative effect on the EPG. Heating less lowers this effect.
We cannot conﬁrm thus result for households consuming less than predicted (i.e. NGS).
They are not impacted by an optimism bias, in the sense that the fact of paying less at-
tention to energy consumption does not explain their NGS (see Panel 1.19b). However,
those paying equally attention to their energy consumption than before achieve 75.37%
higher savings (thus a larger EPG) than those paying less attention. This ﬁnding is very
encouraging since higher energy savings in low energy buildings could be achieved by rais-
ing awareness about the attenuating eﬀect of paying attention to its energy consumption
behavior.
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Attitude-Behavior Gap Let us now analyze the empirical results with respect to the
Attitude-Behavior Gap, displayed in Figure 1.20.
(a) Net Losing Energy Savings (b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Note: Solid C.I. = model without imputation ; Dotted C.I. = model with imputation
Figure 1.20: Mean Estimates and 95% Conﬁdence Interval: Attitude-Behavior Gap
It can be seen from Panels 1.20a and 1.20b that occupants with higher pro-environmental
attitudes (ENV.High) do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those with lower pro-environmental
attitudes (ENV.Low). In other words, those declaring high pro-environmental attitudes do
not consume signiﬁcantly less than the others. This is true regardless whether households
consumes more or less than predicted.
This brings us to a third result, conﬁrming Hypothesis 3.
Result 3 There is evidence for an ‘attitude-behavior gap’ related to households declaring
high pro-environmental attitudes.
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Intention-Behavior Gap Let us ﬁnally analyze the empirical results with respect to the
Intention-Behavior Gap, displayed in Figure 1.21.
(a) Net Losing Energy Savings (b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Note: Solid C.I. = model without imputation ; Dotted C.I. = model with imputation
Figure 1.21: Mean Estimates and 95% Conﬁdence Interval: Intention-Behavior Gap
Recall that the Interaction term includes the revenue level (REV=1 if >4000€, REV=0
otherwise), such that Interaction≡M.Ecolo·EDUC·REV.40
Let us ﬁrst analyze the results for households consuming less than predicted (see NGS
on Panel 1.21b). We notice that whether "rich" and more educated, or not, environmentally
motivated41 households do not have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent EPG compared to non envi-
ronmentally motivated households. This indicates the presence of an intention-behavior
gap for these households.
Now regarding households consuming more than predicted (see NLS on Panel 1.21a).
On the one hand, for lower educated and "less rich" households, we observe that there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between occupants stimulated by sustainable motives and those who
40We do not include REV as a control variable since it did not appear among the top predictors in the
SVM ranking.
41Recall that an intention is a motivation toward a goal-directed behavior. This is why we account for
an intention-behavior gap through analyzing occupants’ sustainable motivations.
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are not, when considering the model with imputation (i.e. Ecolo vs. Non-Ecolo), such
that the EPG decreases by 23.13%, all other variables held constant. This result rejects
Hypothesis 4 for these households. On the other hand, we see that higher educated and
"richer" households reporting pro-environmental motivations (i.e. Interaction) manifest a
signiﬁcantly higher EPG than others (+7%). This manifests the presence of an intention-
behavior gap for these households. Moreover, it tends to corroborate a former result
of Belaid and Garcia (2016), who ﬁnd that occupants having a higher social status (i.e.
occupying at a socio-professional position42 requiring higher education, and thus being paid
more) seem to have stronger desire for comfort than for making energy related savings.
Belaid and Garcia (2016) call this phenomenon a "social status effect".
This brings us to a last result, corroborating Hypothesis 4 for households consuming
less than predicted, and higher educated and "richer" households consuming more than
predicted.
Result 4 There is evidence for an ‘intention-behavior gap’ related to occupants consuming
less than predicted, and to high educated and wealthier occupants consuming more
than predicted, expressing ecological motives.
1.7.3 Model selection
Let us now, for every model speciﬁcation we run, select the most eﬃcient model (between
the one without and the one with imputed values), in terms of explanatory power. The
log-likelihood used on our endogenous variable is not well suited to easily compare model
performance of diﬀerent sample sizes, through the adjusted R2. We thus have to ﬁnd a
diﬀerent way to compare our model speciﬁcations. One possibility would be to use the
information criterion (AIC and BIC) to provide means for model selection. However, they
also depend on a likelihood function and are sensitive to the number of observations. An
alternative way for model selection is thus to use cross-validation method by comparing the
corresponding Root-Mean-Square Errors (RMSE) (Myung et al., 2009). A lowest RMSE
indicates the best model. Table 1.4, hereafter, reports RMSE based on the Leave One Out
Cross Validation method (LOOCV).
42Note that only 33% of the lower educated households in our database have a managerial or higher
intellectual professional position, compared to 58% of the higher educated ones.
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Table 1.4: Model Comparison based on LOOCV
Cognitive Bias Without Imputed Values With Imputed Values Without Imputed Values With Imputed Values
Net Losing Energy Savings Net Gaining Energy Savings
Status Quo 0.297 0.275 0.264 0.328
Optimism 0.338 0.361 0.255 0.348
Attitude-Behavior Gap 0.283 0.270 0.258 0.324
Intention-Behavior Gap 0.289 0.278 0.272 0.332
Note: The lowest RMSE (corresponding to the best model) are indicated in bold.
Based on the computed LOOCV-RMSE, the model with imputed values represents
the best absolute model ﬁt in the situation of NLS, except for the optimism bias. This
conﬁrms our results.
On the other hand, the multiple imputation method does not yield better absolute
model ﬁt in the situation of NGS, though the empirical results do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
between the models without and with imputed values. However, in this case, the model
without imputed values is preferred as the corresponding LOOCV-RMSE are the lowest
for these models.
1.8 Robustness Analysis
A self-reported energy-behavior (or attitude, or motivation, ...) – as a measurement for a
cognitive bias – might potentially suﬀer from an ‘omitted variable bias’. This is problematic
to some extend: households’ energy behavior might indeed be aﬀected by cognitive biases,
yet, this behavior also constitutes a choice from them, conditional on observable and
unobservable factors. For instance, the presence of a thermostat in the renovated building
might increase the likelihood to adopt an optimism bias, and therefore pay less attention to
their energy consumption. This is problematic with respect to the identiﬁcation strategy,
as the presence of thermostat would aﬀect not only our independent variable (i.e. the
proxy related to ‘optimism bias’), but also the dependent variable (i.e. the EPG). This
problem is known as an endogeneity bias.
To validate this measurement method and to rule out potential endogeneity problems,
we implement the inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) strategy (Austin,
2011; Stuart et al., 2014), a method estimating causal eﬀects.
To obtain the predicted probability, for a given household, to be assigned in the treat-
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ment43 (i.e. propensity score) conditional on observed characteristics, we used predictive
modeling tools (i.e. the Random Forest algorithm) instead of using a logistic regression
(as is usually done). Aside from relaxing basic assumptions, these methods have demon-
strated greater accuracy than logistic regression (Lee et al., 2010; Westreich et al., 2010).
Applying the Random Forest algorithm permitted to obtain a classiﬁcation of the variables
(and thus the characteristics) having the highest inﬂuence on the treatment group.44 The
relative importance of the various characteristics per bias are displayed in Section A.10 of
the Appendix.
Once the propensity scores obtained, we implemented the IPTW strategy. The main
intuition of this approach is to compare groups having the same characteristics, where
the ﬁrst group (i.e. treatment group) declares a behavior corresponding to the analyzed
bias, and the second group (i.e. control group) declares the opposite behavior. The IPTW
assigns greater weights45 to households in the control group which resembles those in the
treatment group (Austin, 2011). Since these groups have now more weight, running our
regressions with the "new" database permits to obtain more robust results and less likely
to suﬀer from an endogeneity bias. Indeed, the fact of declaring a given behavior or the
opposite cannot anymore be suspected to be caused by the common characteristics.
A further advantage of the IPTW method is that it does not eliminate observations in
our database46, compared to the propensity score matching method. This latter approach
indeed forms matched sets of treated and control units sharing a similar propensity score,
and eliminates the remaining observations. As our original sample is relatively small, this
method was not appropriate.
To shorten this section, we present solely the robustness of the empirical results ob-
tained in the situation of Net Losing Energy Savings and rely on the imputed data set.
Recall that the RMSE based on the LOOCV indicates that the data set with imputed
43‘Treatment assignment’ refers to the assignment of a household in a group where all the households
reported a speciﬁc energy behavior related to a cognitive bias. For example, for measurement of the
optimism bias, households declaring to pay less attention to their energy consumption than before, are
assigned to the treatment.
44The bagging approach in the random forest algorithm solves the problem of overﬁtting more eﬀectively
than the support vector machine or the gradient boost algorithms.
45In case of a binary endogenous variable, the IPTW can be expressed as: wi =
1
psi
Ei +
1
(1−psi)
(1−Ei),
where Ei denotes the treatment assignment of household i, and psi the propensity score of the treatment
assignment.
In the case of categorical endogenous variable, the weight for a household i can be written: wi =
ps1(Xi)
psg(Xi)
,
where ps1(Xi) is the probability of being in the pre-treatment group, and g denotes the group that
household i was actually in.
46This method just assigns greater weight on the groups of interest.
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values represents the best absolute model ﬁt in the situation of NLS.
Due to our relatively small sample size, we bootstrap the standard errors by re-sampling
10 000 times the data for each imputed data set (m=100). The results of the weighted
regression with inverse probabilities on the imputed data set, in the situation of NLS, are
depicted in Figure 1.22.
(a) Status Quo Bias (b) Optimism Bias
Note: Mean estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals
Figure 1.22: Regression with Inverse Probability Weighting on imputed dataset in Net
Losing Energy Savings situation (part 1)
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(c) Attitude-Behavior Gap (d) Intention-Behavior Gap
Note: Mean estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals
Figure 1.22: Regression with Inverse Probability Weighting on imputed dataset in Net
Losing Energy Savings situation (part 2)
These empirical results are similar than those obtained without IPTW for the status
quo bias, the optimism bias and the attitude-behavior gap. The declarations measuring
these biases may thus not be aﬀected by an endogeneity problem: Results 1 to 3 are robust.
However, the empirical results analyzing the intention-behavior gap yield a loss of
signiﬁcance for the coeﬃcient capturing higher pro-environmental motivations and the
interaction term. The present results being more robust than before, we now ﬁnd the
following. First, regarding less wealthier and less educated households, the results show
that pro-environmentally motivated households do not have a signiﬁcantly lower EPG than
non pro-environmentally motivated ones. Second, regarding wealthier and more educated
households, pro-environmentally motivated households do not have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
EPG then non pro-environmentally motivated ones. This indicates that, regardless of
being "rich" and educated or not, pro-environmentally motivated households may present
an intention-behavior gap. However, concerning the wealthier and more educated ones,
contrary to before, we ﬁnd that they may not suﬀer from a ‘social status eﬀect’.
Globally, the robustness of our previous results may indicate that self-reported energy-
behavior can be a valid measurement for households’ cognitive biases.
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1.9 Policy implications and conclusion
We explore the eﬀect of individual’s cognitive biases on the Energy Performance Gap
(EPG) – ratio of the actual and predicted total energy consumption – of buildings reno-
vated up to the level of low energy performance. Using self-collected survey data, energy
bills and audits of 129 households, from a pilot energy conservation program located in
northeastern France, we assess four hypotheses stemming from the behavioral energy and
psychology literature. To avoid the problem of overﬁtting, we apply learning models to
select most relevant covariates as control variables. We run a multiple regression analysis
for households consuming more energy than predicted (i.e. Net Losing Energy Savings)
and for those consuming less than predicted (i.e. Net Gaining Energy Savings). Our
database having 7% of missing values, we run each regression with the original database
in the ﬁrst place, and with the database where missing values have been imputed (with
the multiple imputation method) in the second place. We controlled for a potential en-
dogeneity bias from our proxy variables by applying the Inverse Probability of Treatment
Weighting approach. The empirical results conﬁrm our four hypotheses. An important
contribution of our analysis may thus be the fact that self-reported energy behaviors and
attitudes can actually represent a valid measurement instrument to analyze household’s
cognitive biases.
Furthermore, our ﬁndings suggest that the status quo bias related to manual ventilation
behaviors negatively aﬀect the EPG (i.e. the gap increases) of households consuming more
than predicted. It became apparent that leaﬂets may not be very eﬀective instruments in
preventing the excessive energy consumption through window opening.
A second result shows signiﬁcant diﬀerences for occupants reporting to pay less at-
tention to their energy consumption in the renovated building compared to others and
consuming more than predicted. This corroborates the hypothesis of an optimism bias.
Our results indicate, however, that heating less than 19°C at night decreased the gap,
and thus lowers the negative eﬀect of the optimism bias. This ﬁnding stresses the rel-
evance of full automatic temperature control, setting lower temperatures at night. The
energy conservation program may have neglected to inform participants about the eﬃ-
cient temperature settings during the day or at night in low energy buildings. Occupants’
knowledge acquisition on managing eﬃciently the temperature settings during and beyond
occupation time might be suitable to achieve higher energy performance.
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The idea behind the optimism bias is closely associated with the "technological op-
timism" of Mitchell (2012): the direct rebound eﬀect experienced by occupants may be
stronger than the positive eﬀect of the technological improvement achieved by renovating
the dwelling. It would be beneﬁcial to further elaborate whether the optimism bias drives
the direct rebound eﬀect. In this study we have so far neglected the existence of rebound
eﬀects as we do not have fully available information on all energy prices, and not enough
information about ex-ante consumption. The main problems are twofold. First, occu-
pants have no energy bills for speciﬁc combustible (e.g. wood, pellets and fuel). Second,
there are multiple data sources with heterogeneous deﬁnitions on energy prices at regional,
national and supranational level, which may produce noise in the analysis.
Our last results show evidence for an attitude-behavior gap related to occupants report-
ing a high pro-environmental attitude, and an intention-behavior gap referring to occupants
expressing ecological motivations to renovate. In other words, pro-environmental attitudes
and motivations did not permit households to achieve a smaller EPG than the others.
What are the lessons learned from the energy conservation program "Je Rénove BBC"
and to what extent are the gained insights relevant to design and foster eﬀective policy
measures? Key policy implications can be deduced from our ﬁndings and can be classiﬁed
into two categories.
First, our ﬁndings point out the importance to design eﬀective tools to inform occu-
pants about the risk that can emerge when not adapting their energy related behaviors in
low energy buildings. Raising awareness about cognitive biases is key to narrow the EPG
in low energy buildings. How can occupants be incentivized to adopt "optimal" energy
behaviors? One possibility to inform occupants about the risk related to cognitive biases
would be through the engagement of the prime contractor who is in a close relationship
with the occupants during the renovation period. During our discussion with participants
of the energy conservation program, we noticed that a large majority of occupants strongly
trust the prime contractor, for instance, by using their advice to modify the heating sys-
tems. The role of the prime contractor might be signiﬁcant to spur occupants to adopt
diﬀerent behaviors in low energy buildings in order to reduce the risk of not achieving the
required energy performance. An alternative instrument to incentivize occupants to adapt
their energy behavior would be to introduce energy conservation nudges. The use of de-
scriptive, injunctive messages (i.e. emoticons) or instructive energy-saving tips represent
helpful tools to sustain and encourage pro-conservation behavior (see, for instance, Rasul
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and Hollywood, 2012). These nudges might be most eﬀective directly after the renovation
works as many occupants expressed their motivation to pay more attention to their energy
consumption during the interviews, but that this ambition diminishes after a year.
Second, our ﬁndings provide valuable insights to improve the predicted energy con-
sumption by integrating underlying occupant habits that inﬂuence the EPG. As such, we
recommend energy consulting ﬁrms, operating in the assessment of the feasible improve-
ment of the energy performance through renovating measures, to include information based
on a general behavior proﬁle that could be established before calculating the savings pre-
dictions. For instance, at an individual project level, thermal energy auditors could meet
the households before estimating a savings prediction, to ask them about their habits
(e.g. heating, airing, attention to energy consumption). However, as we detected an
Attitude-Behavior Gap and an Intention-Behavior Gap, information about the tendency
to be concerned about environmental issues, or the willing to live in an environmental
friendly house, may not be an indicator about a less energy consuming household. Further
eﬀorts would be needed to determine to what extent these behaviors may impact the en-
ergy consumption. Yet, such information could make the energy consumption predictions
more reliable, and consequently reduce the risk of non-achievement of the predicted energy
performance. For banks and insurance companies to be able to rely on predictions would
allow them to avoid ethical issues that could arise by using household information to esti-
mate the risk per individual behavior proﬁle, which may be considered as "discriminating".
Better rely on predictions and taking into account the average likelihood to consume more
than predicted (based on our database, the likelihood of attaining Net Losing Energy Sav-
ings is 38%) will permit them to improve and develop insurance contracts and leverage
bank loans.
Although our empirical results are valid and robust, our sample size is relatively small.
To validate the formulated policy implications, our ﬁndings should be replicated and ex-
tended by using a national representative and large sample. Nevertheless, our empirical
approach and the resulted ﬁndings ground a baseline setting for the elaboration of the
impact of cognitive biases on the EPG at sub-national level. While our results hold for
the region Alsace located in northeastern France, it might be beneﬁcial to identify the
determinants aﬀecting the EPG in low energy buildings on large national or EU wide
scale.
Future research should also aim to gather homogeneous energy prices for diﬀerent
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types of energy sources such as wood and pellets. This would allow to measure the direct
rebound eﬀect and assess its relationship with the optimism bias. Our result indicates that
self-reported behavior on energy behavior (as, for instance, declaring to pay less attention
to daily its energy behavior, to measure an optimism bias) can be an eﬃcient metric to
capture and quantify cognitive biases.
Nowadays, a range of other initiatives have emerged to convince people to undertake
energy eﬃciency measures. For instance, the common platform Oktave47 established in
the Region Alsace reﬂects the relationship between certiﬁed renovation ﬁrms and govern-
mental services helping households to access relevant information for thermal renovation.
Similar than in our energy conservation pilot program, a contractor is assigned to house-
holds’ willing to carry out renovation works on their house. The role of the contractor
is twofold: supporting households throughout the renovation works and helping them to
apply for available ﬁnancial aids. An important question, however, is how eﬃcient are
these platforms, and do such initiatives suﬃciently incentivize households to renovation
their individual buildings? Further research is necessary to answer these questions and to
ﬁll the void. Meanwhile, Chapter 3 of the thesis gives an idea about the global eﬃciency
of the craftsman intervening in the context of the Oktave platform.
47For further information, refer to Oktave (Oktave).
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A.1 "Je rénove BBC" survey questions in English
Table A.1: Part A - Motivation
A.1. What motivated you to participate in Own an environmentally friendly house 1. not important at all
an energy renovation project? Make energy savings 2. little important
Make ﬁnancial savings 3. quite important
Increase comfort 4. very important
Facilitate resale / renovate a recently ac-
quired house
Rehabilitate an uninhabitable house
Enhance the value of your assets
Enter the JRBBC program
A.2. You have heard about the advertisement 1. yes
"Je rénove BBC" program thanks to... presence of the JRBBC stand at an exhibi-
tion / open house
2. no
other recommendations
internet
local community / town hall
information booklet
Region Alsace / Energivie / energy info
EDF / ES
architect / project manager / craftsman /
client in the building industry
other
A.3 What beneﬁts have you gained from ﬁnancial assistance from the program 1. yes
the "Je rénove BBC" program? engineering to achieve ﬁnal performance 2. no
other
A.4.1. Would you have done all this work without the "Je rénove BBC" program? 1. yes; 2. no
A.4.2. If yes, would you have gone to BBC level in energy performance? 1. yes; 2. no
A.4.3. If no, what would have stopped you? lack of funds 1. yes
lack of energy performance expertise 2. no
lack of assistance and advice
lack of knowledge of providers
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Table A.2: Part B - Renovation ﬁnancing
B.1. With regard to obtaining ﬁnancial aid from the "Je rénove BBC " program, 1. yes
according to you, were the administrative formalities simple and clear? 2. no
B.2.1. What other ﬁnancial assistance tax credit 1.yes
did you receive outside the program? ﬁnancial support from the municipality 2. no
zero-rate loan
other
B.2.2. Did you have any problems getting these aids? 1. yes; 2. no
Table A.3: Part C - Choice of companies and materials/equipment and prime contractor
C.1 Have you chosen the project Among several proposed by EDF/ES 1. yes
manager among several proposed or Suggested by an acquaintance/ 2. no
has he been suggested to you? your own choice
C.2 How important were the energy renovation mastery / quality of work 1. yes
following criteria for you in choosing its price 2. no
the project manager on a scale of 1 to 5? seniority / notoriety
knowing the project manager
its proximity
C.3 How important were the following performance and quality 1. not important at all
criteria in the choice of materials for you? price 2. little important
environmental friendliness 3. quite important
4. very important
C.4 If you were advised in the EDF/ES 1. yes
choice of materials, who advised you? project manager 2. no
ﬁrms
acquaintance
thermal engineering oﬃce
other
has not been advised
Table A.4: Part D - "Je Rénove BBC" program satisfaction
D.1.1. Are you satisﬁed... of the global work of the project manager? 1. yes
of the global work of the companies? 2. no
of the JRBBC program in general?
of the ﬁnal works?
D.2 Did you live in your house during the renovation work? 1. yes; 2. no
D.3.2. Are you satisﬁed with client-trade relationship 1. not at all
your project manager’s performance? quality of global coordination 2. a little
total cost of the delivery 3. quite
adequacy between estimate and invoice 4. very
respect of work deadlines
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Table A.5: Part E1 - Energy consumption before renovation
E.1.1. Indicate your total electricity consumption on a bill dated before the renovation (in kWh).
E.1.2. What is the period covered by the invoice used above?
E.1.3. Heating system BEFORE renovation condensing gas 1. yes
(to complete with consumption units and heating period atmospheric gas 2. no
if "yes") oil-ﬁred boiler
pellet boiler
pellet stove
wood boiler
wood stove
heating network
electric boiler
electric radiators
air/water heat pump
water/water heat pump
geothermal heat pump
E.1.4. How old was the heating system before renovation? 1. 0-5 years
2. 6-10 years
3. 11-15 years
4. more than 15 years
E.1.5. Sanitary hot water consumption before renovation thermodynamic water heater 1. yes
(to complete with consumption in kWh and heating electric water heater 2. no
period if "yes") solar system
heating network
other
E.1.6. Fully electric system before renovation? 1. yes 2. no
Table A.6: Part E2 - Energy consumption after renovation
E.2.1. Indicate your total electricity consumption on a bill dated after the renovation (in kWh).
E.2.2. What is the period covered by the invoice used above?
E.2.3. Did you change your heating system during the renovation? 1. yes; 2. no
E.2.4. Heating system after renovation condensing gas 1. yes
(to complete with consumption units and heating period atmospheric gas 2. no
if "yes") oil-ﬁred boiler
pellet boiler
pellet stove
wood boiler
wood stove
heating network
electric boiler
electric radiators
air/water heat pump
water/water heat pump
geothermal heat pump
E.2.5. Did you change your domestic hot water (DHW) system during the renovation? 1. yes; 2. no
E.2.6. Sanitary hot water consumption after renovation thermodynamic water heater 1. yes
(to complete with consumption in kWh and heating electric water heater 2. no
period if "yes") solar system
heating network
other
E.2.7. Fully electric system after renovation? 1. yes; 2. no
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Table A.7: Part F - Habits and behaviors in the dwelling
F.1.1 What type of temperature control Before: thermostatic valve 1. yes
did you have before renovation and Before: room thermostat 2. no
what type do you have after renovation? Before: nothing
Before: other
After: thermostatic valve
After: room thermostat
After: nothing
After: other
F.2.1.1. At what temperature did you ...during daytime with occupation ? answer
usually heat before renovation... ...during daytime without occupation? answer
...during the night? answer
I don’t know
F.2.1.2. At what temperature do you ...during daytime with occupation ? answer
usually heat since renovation... ...during daytime without occupation? answer
...during the night? answer
I don’t know
F.3.1.1.1. Were there any unused rooms in your house before renovation? 1. yes; 2. no
F.3.1.1.2. If yes, were they heated like the others? 1. yes; 2. no
F.3.1.2.1. Are there any unused rooms in your house since renovation? 1. yes; 2. no
F.3.1.2.2. If yes, are they heated like the others? 1. yes; 2. no
F.4.1. What was your occupancy time of the house on an average weekday before renovation?
F.4.2. What is your occupancy time of the house on an average weekday since renovation?
F.5.1. Were you often in the renovated house during the weekend before renovation? 1. yes 2. no
F.5.2. Are you often in the renovated house during the weekend since renovation? 1. yes 2. no
F.6. On average, how many weeks per year are you away from your home (holidays, etc.)? 1. < 1 week
2. 1-2 weeks
3. 2-3 weeks
4. 3-4 weeks
5. > 4 weeks
F.7. Compared to before renovation you open [...] your windows. 1. less
have the tendency to consume [...] d. hot
water.
2. same/equally
have the tendency to pay [...] attention to
your energy consumption.
3. more
are [...] concerned about ecol. and env. is-
sues.
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Table A.8: Part G - Comfort before and after renovation
G.1. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the comfort inside your home before renovation?
G.2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the comfort inside your home after renovation?
G.3.1 Were there sources of discomfort in your home before renovation? 1. yes; 2. no
G.3.2. If yes, in your opinion, what caused the discomfort? Sensation of drought 1. yes
Cold wall feeling 2. no
Indoor temperature too
low during winter
Indoor temperature too
high during summer
Lack of air renewal
Presence of dust in the air
Water inﬁltration / molds
G.4.1. Are there still sources of discomfort in your home after renovation? 1. yes 2. no
G.4.2. If yes, in your opinion, what causes the discomfort? Sensation of drought 1. yes
Cold wall feeling 2. no
Indoor temperature too
low during winter
Indoor temperature too
high during summer
Lack of air renewal
Presence of dust in the air
Water inﬁltration / molds
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Table A.9: Part H - Client
H.1. Name and surname of the respondent
H.2. Gender of the respondent 1. man; 2. woman
H.3. Family status 1. couple; 2. divorced; 3. single; 4. widow
H.4. How many people live in the house girl 0-5 years old 1. 0
on a daily basis? girl 6-9 years old 2. 1
girl 10-17 years old 3. 2
woman 18+ 4. 3
boy 0-5 years old 5. 4
boy 6-9 years old
boy 10-17 years old
man 18+
H.5. Are there the same number of people living in the house on a daily basis before and after 1. same number
renovation? 2. more inhabitants
3. less inhabitants
H.6. How old are you and your spouse? 18-24 years old 1. respondent?
25-34 years old 2. spouse?
35-44 years old
45-59 years old
60-69 years old
70+
H.7. What is your and your spouse’s Farmer operator 1. respondent?
socio-professional situation? Craftsman, trader, company manager 2. spouse?
Executive, liberal/intellectual profession
Intermediate occupation
Employee
Worker
Retired
At home (nursery assistant, home work, . . . )
No professional activity, student
other
H.8. What is your and your spouse’s Without diploma 1. respondent?
education level? Certiﬁcate, CAP, BEP 2. spouse?
Baccalaureate
Bac+1, +2
Bac+3, +4
Bac+5 et +
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Table A.10: Parts H and I - Client
H.9. The renovated dwelling is your... main residence 1. yes
vacation home 2. no
rented residence
other
H.10. You are... landlord 1. yes
tenant 2. no
I.1.1. What are the monthly resources of your entire household?
I.1.2. If you do not want or cannot give a precise amount of the net resources 1. <= 1000
of the whole household, how much do you estimate them to be for an ordinary 2. 1000-2000
month (in Euros)? 3. 2000-3000
4. 3000-4000
5. 4000-5000
6. 5000-6000
7. 6000-7000
8. 7000-8000
9. 8000-9000
10. 9000-10000
11. > 10000
Were you already living in the house before renovation? 1. yes; 2. no
In what department do you live? 1. Bas-Rhin
2. Haut-Rhin
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A.2 "Je rénove BBC" original questionnaire in French
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire à l!attention des propriétaires ayant rénové  
leur maison dans le cadre du programme « Je rénove BBC » 
 
Ce questionnaire a pour objectif de réaliser un retour d!expérience sur le programme « Je rénove BBC » 
auquel vous avez participé, ainsi que d!étudier les habitudes des ménages vivant dans une maison BBC.  
 
Cette étude est menée conjointement par EDF et l!Université de Strasbourg. Nous souhaitons encore 
améliorer l'évaluation de la performance énergétique qu'un ménage peut attendre de la rénovation de sa maison. 
Votre participation à cette enquête nous permettra de récolter des données précieuses, et anonymisées, sur 
l'avant-après rénovation.  
  
EDF, ES et l!Université de Strasbourg s'engagent à ce que vos réponses restent entièrement anonymes et 
soient utilisées dans les seuls buts expliqués ci-dessus. 
  
EDF, ES et l!Université de Strasbourg vous remercie pour votre participation. 
 
Lucie, étudiante en master, et Nicolas, étudiant en doctorat à l'Université de Strasbourg. 
 
A. MOTIVATIONS de rénovation et du choix du programme « Je rénove BBC » 
A.1. Qu!est ce qui vous a essentiellement motivé à vous lancer dans des travaux de rénovation BBC? 
 Laisser le client répondre spontanément : 
 _______________________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________________ 
 S!il ne sais pas trop, lui proposer les motifs suivants en demandant l!importance qu!il y accorde : 
 
 
 
?? Posséder une maison respectueuse   ?  ?  ?  ?  
de l!environnement 
?? Réaliser des économies d!énergies   ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Réaliser des économies financières   ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Avoir un meilleur confort    ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Rénover une maison récemment acquise/  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Faciliter la revente de mon bien 
?? Réhabiliter une maison inhabitable,   ?  ?  ?  ?  
voire insalubre  
?? Valoriser mon patrimoine immobilier   ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Entrer dans le programme « Je rénove BBC »  ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Autre : ___________________________________ ?  ?  ?  ? 
 
Très 
important 
Assez 
important 
Peu  
important 
Pas du tout 
important 
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2 
 
A.2. Vous avez eu connaissance du programme « Je rénove BBC » grâce à" 
Plusieurs réponses possibles 
 
? Une publicité dans la presse     ? La présence du stand JRBBC à un salon 
? Un spot radio / spot télé     ? Recommandation (Qui ?___________) 
? Internet (Quel site ? __________________________) ? Collectivité locale 
? La plaquette d!info (récupérée où ?_______________)  ? Région Alsace 
? Autre : _______________________________________ 
A.3. Quels avantages vous a apporté le programme « Je rénove BBC » ? 
 Plusieurs réponses possibles 
 
? Les aides financières du programme 
? L!ingénierie pour l!atteinte de la performance finale 
? Autre:_________________________________________________________________________ 
A.4.1. Auriez-vous réalisé tous ces travaux sans le programme « Je rénove BBC » ?  
? Oui  (Répondre à A.4.2.)   ? Non (Répondre à A.4.3.) 
A.4.2. Si oui, seriez-vous allé jusqu!au niveau BBC dans la performance énergétique ?            ? Oui           ? Non 
A.4.3. Si non, qu!est ce qui vous en aurait empêché ? 
 Plusieurs réponses possibles 
 
? Manque de moyens financiers    ? Manque d!expertise BBC 
? Manque d!assistance et de conseils    ? Méconnaissance des prestataires 
? Autre : __________________________________________________________________ 
B. FINANCEMENT DE LA RENOVATION 
B.1. Concernant l!obtention d!aides financières du programme « Je rénove BBC », d!après vous " 
 
?? Les formalités administratives étaient-elles simples et claires ?             ? oui  ? non 
 
Si non, pourquoi ? 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
B.2.1. De quelles autres aides financières avez-vous pu bénéficier en dehors du programme ? 
 
?Crédit d!impôt  ?Aides financières de la communauté d!agglomération (commune, ") 
?Prêt à taux zéro  ?Autre aide financière : ____________________________________ 
B.2.2. Avez-vous rencontré des difficultés (obtention d!un prêt bancaire, formalités administratives, délais 
            d!obtention, ") pour l!une ou l!autre aide ? 
        ? oui  ? non 
B.2.3. Si oui, pourquoi ? 
       ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
       ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
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3 
 
C. CHOIX DES ENTREPRISES ET DES MATERIAUX/EQUIPEMENTS 
C.1. Avez-vous choisi le maître d'#uvre parmi plusieurs proposés ou vous a-t-il été suggéré? 
 
? Parmi plusieurs proposés par EDF/ES ? Suggéré par une connaissance/votre propre choix 
C.2. Quelle a été l!importance pour vous des critères suivants dans le choix du maître d!"uvre ? 
 Classer les critères suivants de 1 à 5 (1 étant le critère le plus important). 
 
?? Sa maîtrise des techniques BBC / Qualité du travail : ________ 
?? Son prix :       ________ 
?? Son ancienneté / sa notoriété :    ________ 
?? Connaissance du maître d!#uvre :    ________ 
?? Sa proximité :      ________ 
 
C.3. Quelle a été l!importance pour vous des critères suivants dans le choix des matériaux ? 
 
 
?? Leur performance / qualité     ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Leur prix       ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Leur respect de l!environnement    ?  ?  ?  ? 
 
C.4. Si vous avez été conseillé pour le choix des matériaux, qui vous a conseillé ? 
 
? EDF / ES       ? Maître d!#uvre  
? Entreprises (corps de métier)    ? Connaissance 
? Bureau d!étude thermique     ? Autre : __________________________ 
? Je n!ai pas été conseillé 
D. SATISFACTION du programme « Je rénove BBC » 
D.1.1. Etes-vous satisfait" 
 
?? du travail général de la maîtrise d!#uvre ?    ? oui    ? non 
?? du travail général des entreprises ?     ? oui    ? non 
?? du programme « Je rénove BBC » ?     ? oui    ? non 
?? du résultat final des travaux ?      ? oui    ? non 
D.1.2. Si vous avez répondu non à l!un des points ci-dessus, pouvez-vous indiquer pourquoi ? 
             ______________________ ___________________________________________________________________ 
             _________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D.2. Habitiez-vous dans votre maison lors des travaux de rénovation ?    ? oui   ? non 
 
D.3.1. Quel est le nom du maître d!"uvre qui a encadré l!ensemble de vos travaux de rénovation ? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
D.3.2. Etes-vous satisfait de sa prestation ?  
 
?? Relation client-corps de métier :   ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Qualité de la coordination en général :   ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Coût total de la prestation :    ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Adéquation devis-facture :    ?  ?  ?  ? 
?? Respect des délais de travaux :    ?  ?  ?  ? 
Très  
satisfait 
Assez  
satisfait 
Peu  
satisfait 
Pas  du tout 
satisfait 
Très 
important 
Assez 
important 
Peu  
important 
Pas du tout 
important 
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E. CONSOMMATION D!ENERGIE avant et après les travaux de rénovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.1.1. Indiquez votre consommation d!électricité totale indiquée sur une facture datant d!AVANT la rénovation : 
 
____________kWh 
E.1.2. Quelle est la période concernée par la facture utilisée ci-dessus ?  
 _____________________________________________________________________________ 
E.1.3. Complétez les informations suivantes et cochez le système de chauffage concerné AVANT RENOVATION : 
             
Système  
(cocher) 
U
n
it
é
 (à
 t
it
re
 
in
d
ic
a
ti
f)
 
Energie  
(à titre 
indicatif) 
Période 
(MM/AA à MM/AA)  
ou (MM à MM) 
Consom- 
mation 
Unité 
So
u
s-
co
m
p
te
u
r?
 
(c
o
ch
e
r 
si
 o
u
i)
 
Gaz condensation m
3
 GAZ 
Gaz atmosphérique m
3
 GAZ 
Chaudière fioul litres FIOUL 
Chaudière granulés kg, t GRANULES 
Poêle à granulés kg, t GRANULES 
Chaudière bois stères BOIS 
Poêle à bois stères BOIS 
Réseau de chaleur kWh EAU CHAUDE 
Chaudière électrique kWh ELECTRIQUE 
Radiateurs électrique kWh ELECTRIQUE 
 
Pompe A Chaleur 
(PAC) air/eau 
kWh ELECTRIQUE 
    
PAC eau/eau kWh ELECTRIQUE 
PAC géothermie kWh ELECTRIQUE 
Autre 
 
E.1.4. Quelle était l!ancienneté du système de chauffage AVANT rénovation ? 
 
? 0-5 ans ? 6-10 ans ? 11-15 ans ? Plus de 15 ans : Pouvez-vous préciser ? _________ 
  
E.1.5. Complétez les informations suivantes et cochez le système d!eau chaude sanitaire (ECS) concerné 
            AVANT RENOVATION : 
 
Système 
(cocher) 
U
n
it
é
 (
à
 t
it
re
 
in
d
ic
a
ti
f)
 
Energie  
 (à titre 
indicatif) 
Période 
(MM/AA à MM/AA)  
ou (MM à MM) 
Consom- 
mation 
Unité 
So
u
s-
co
m
p
te
u
r?
 
(c
o
ch
e
r 
si
 o
u
i)
 
  
Chauffe-eau 
thermodynamique 
kWh ELECTRIQUE 
        
  Chauffe-eau électrique kWh ELECTRIQUE       
  
Système Solaire  
(Panneau solaire) 
m
3
 EAU CHAUDE 
        
  Réseau de chaleur kWh EAU CHAUDE         
  Autre           
 
REMARQUE : Si vous avez un système entièrement électrique, répondez également à l!annexe s.v.p. 
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5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.2.1. Indiquez votre consommation d!électricité totale indiquée sur une facture datant d!APRES la rénovation : 
              
____________kWh  
E.2.2. Quelle est la période concernée par la facture utilisée ci-dessus ?  
 _____________________________________________________________________________ 
E.2.3. Avez-vous changé de système de chauffage lors de la rénovation ??? ? oui  ? non 
E.2.4. Complétez les informations suivantes et cochez le système de chauffage concerné APRES RENOVATION : 
            
Système  
(cocher) 
U
n
it
é
 (à
 t
it
re
 
in
d
ic
a
ti
f)
 
Energie  
 (à titre indicatif) 
Période 
(MM/AA à MM/AA)  
ou (MM à MM) 
Consom- 
mation 
Unité 
So
u
s-
co
m
p
te
u
r?
 
(c
o
ch
e
r 
si
 o
u
i)
 
  Gaz condensation m
3
 GAZ         
  Gaz atmosphérique m
3
 GAZ         
  Chaudière fioul litres FIOUL         
  Chaudière granulés kg, t GRANULES         
  Poêle à granulés kg, t GRANULES         
  Chaudière bois stères  BOIS         
  Poêle à bois stères  BOIS         
  Réseau de chaleur kWh EAU CHAUDE         
  Chaudière électrique kWh ELECTRIQUE         
  Radiateurs électrique kWh ELECTRIQUE         
  
Pompe A Chaleur 
(PAC) air/eau 
kWh ELECTRIQUE 
        
  PAC eau/eau kWh ELECTRIQUE         
  PAC géothermie kWh ELECTRIQUE         
  Autre             
 
 
E.2.5. Avez-vous changé de système d!eau chaude sanitaire (ECS) lors de la rénovation ??? ?oui        ?non 
E.2.6. Complétez les informations suivantes et cochez le système d!eau chaude sanitaire (ECS) concerné 
            APRES RENOVATION : 
            
Système 
(cocher) 
U
n
it
é
 (à
 t
it
re
 
in
d
ic
a
ti
f)
 
Energie  
 (à titre indicatif) 
Période 
(MM/AA à MM/AA)  
ou (MM à MM) 
Consom- 
mation 
Unité 
So
u
s-
co
m
p
te
u
r?
 
(c
o
ch
e
r 
si
 o
u
i)
 
  
Chauffe-eau 
thermodynamique 
kWh ELECTRIQUE 
        
  Chauffe-eau électrique kWh ELECTRIQUE       
  
Système Solaire  
(Panneau solaire) 
m
3
 EAU CHAUDE 
        
  Réseau de chaleur kWh EAU CHAUDE         
  Autre           
 
REMARQUE : Si vous avez un système entièrement électrique, répondez également à l!annexe s.v.p. 
E.2. CONSOMMATION D!ENERGIE APRES RENOVATION 
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F. HABITUDES avant et après rénovation 
F.1.1. Quel type de contrôle de température possédiez-vous avant rénovation et quel type possédez- vous après 
           rénovation ? 
 
 AVANT rénovation :      APRES rénovation : 
? Robinet thermostatique     ? Robinet thermostatique  
? Thermostat d!ambiance (répondre à F.1.2.)   ? Thermostat d!ambiance (répondre à F.1.2.) 
? Aucun       ? Aucun 
? Autre : _____________________________   ? Autre : _____________________________ 
 
F.1.2. Si vous aviez un thermostat avant rénovation ou en avez un maintenant après rénovation, dans 
           quelle pièce se situait ou se situe-t-il ? 
 
 AVANT rénovation :  ______________________________________ 
 APRES rénovation : ______________________________________ 
F.2.1. A quelle température aviez-vous l!habitude de chauffer avant rénovation" 
 
a.? " en journée lorsque vous étiez dans la maison ?    _____________°C 
b.? " lorsque vous n!étiez pas dans la maison ?   _____________°C 
c.? " la nuit ?        _____________°C 
? Je ne sais pas 
F.2.2. A quelle température avez-vous l!habitude de chauffer depuis la rénovation" 
 
a.? " en journée lorsque vous êtes dans la maison ?    _____________°C 
b.? " lorsque vous n!êtes pas dans la maison ?    _____________°C 
c.? " la nuit ?       _____________°C 
? Je ne sais pas 
F.3.1.1. Y avait-il des pièces non utilisées dans votre maison avant rénovation ?  ? oui  ? non 
 
F.3.1.2. Si oui, étaient-elles chauffées comme les autres pièces ?   ? oui  ? non 
 
F.3.2.1. Y a-t-il des pièces non utilisées dans votre maison après rénovation ?   ? oui  ? non 
 
F.3.2.2. Si oui, sont-elles chauffées comme les autres pièces ?    ? oui  ? non 
 
F.4.1. Quel était environ votre temps d!occupation de la maison pendant une journée ordinaire en semaine 
           avant rénovation? Marquer les heures où la maison était occupée 
  
6h 7h 8h 9h 10h 11h 12h 13h 14h 15h 
 
16h 17h 18h 19h 20h 21h 22h 23h 00h 
 
F.4.2. Quel est environ votre temps d!occupation de la maison pendant une journée ordinaire en semaine 
            depuis la rénovation? Marquer les heures où la maison est occupée 
  
6h 7h 8h 9h 10h 11h 12h 13h 14h 15h 
 
16h 17h 18h 19h 20h 21h 22h 23h 00h 
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F.5.1. Etiez-vous souvent dans la maison rénovée pendant le weekend avant rénovation ? ? oui            ? non 
 
F.5.2. Etes-vous souvent dans la maison rénovée pendant le weekend après rénovation ?  ? oui               ? non 
 
F.6. En moyenne, combien de semaines par an êtes-vous absents de votre maison (vacances, ") ? 
 
 ? moins d!1 semaine par an     ? de 1 à 2 semaines par an 
 ? de 2 à 3 semaines par an     ? de 3 à 4 semaines par an 
 ? plus d!1 mois par an : Pouvez-vous préciser ? ________________________________ 
F.7. Par rapport à avant la rénovation : 
                   Moins          Autant             Plus 
?? Ouverture des fenêtres :      ?  ?  ? 
?? Tendance à consommer de l!eau chaude :    ?  ?  ? 
?? Tendance à porter attention à la consommation d!énergie :  ?  ?  ? 
?? Soucieux des problèmes écologiques et environnementaux :  ?  ?  ? 
(p.ex. en réalisant des éco-gestes) 
 
G. CONFORT avant et après rénovation 
G.1. Sur un barême de 1 à 10, comment évalueriez-vous le confort à l!intérieur de votre maison AVANT rénovation ? 
        
? 1 ? 2 ? 3 ? 4 ? 5 ? 6 ? 7 ? 8 ? 9 ? 10 
 
G.2. Sur un barême de 1 à 10, comment évalueriez-vous le confort à l!intérieur de votre maison APRES rénovation ? 
        
? 1 ? 2 ? 3 ? 4 ? 5 ? 6 ? 7 ? 8 ? 9 ? 10 
 
G.3.1. Y avait-il des sources d!inconfort dans votre maison avant rénovation ?     ? oui            ? non 
 
G.3.2. Si oui, à votre avis, par quoi était-il provoqué? 
                     Oui             Non 
?? Sensation de courant d!air      ?  ? 
?? Sensation de paroi froide      ?  ? 
?? Température intérieure trop basse en hiver    ?  ? 
?? Température intérieure trop élevée en été    ?  ? 
?? Manque de renouvellement de l!air     ?  ? 
?? Présence de poussière dans l!air     ?  ? 
?? Infiltration d!eau / moisissures      ?  ? 
 
G.4.1. Y a-t-il encore des sources d!inconfort dans votre maison après rénovation ? ? oui              ? non 
 
G.4.2. Si oui, à votre avis, par quoi est-il provoqué? 
                 Oui             Non 
?? Sensation de courant d!air      ?  ? 
?? Sensation de paroi froide      ?  ? 
?? Température intérieure trop basse en hiver    ?  ? 
?? Température intérieure trop élevée en été    ?  ? 
?? Manque de renouvellement de l!air     ?  ? 
?? Présence de poussière dans l!air     ?  ? 
?? Infiltration d!eau / moisissures      ?  ? 
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H. CLIENT 
H.1. Veuillez s.v.p. indiquer vos nom et prénom : 
 
        NOM :______________________________________________________________________________ 
        Prénom :____________________________________________________________________________ 
H.2. Vous êtes"    ? un homme   ? une femme 
 
H.3. Situation familiale : 
 
? En couple (marié(e), en concubinage, PACS, ")   ? Divorcé(e)  
? Célibataire        ? Veuf/veuve 
H.4. Combien de personnes vivent au quotidien dans la maison rénovée BBC ? 
 
?? Filles (0-5 ans) :   ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
?? Filles (6-9 ans) :   ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
?? Filles (10-17 ans) :  ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
?? Femmes (18 ans et plus) :  ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
 
?? Garçons (0-5 ans) :  ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
?? Garçons (6-9 ans) :  ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
?? Garçons (10-17 ans) :  ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
?? Hommes (18 ans et plus) :  ? 0  ? 1         ? 2         ? 3 et plus 
 
H.5. Y a-t-il le même nombre de personnes vivant au quotidien dans la maison avant et après rénovation ? 
 
? oui   ? non, il y a plus de personnes   ? non, il y a moins de personnes  
H.6. Dans quelle tranche d!âge vous et votre conjoint vous situez-vous ? 
 
Vous   Votre conjoint                Vous   Votre conjoint 
 ?  ?     18-24 ans    ?     ?      45-59 ans 
   ?  ?     25-34 ans   ?  ?      60-69 ans 
 ?  ?     35-44 ans   ?  ?      70 ans et plus 
H.7. Quelle profession vous et votre conjoint exercez-vous ? 
 
Vous   Votre conjoint  
 ?  ?       Agriculteur exploitant 
 ?  ?       Artisan, commerçant, chef d!entreprise 
 ?  ?       Cadre, profession libérale/ intellectuelle supérieure 
 ?  ?       Profession intermédiaire 
 ?  ?       Employé 
 ?  ?       Ouvrier 
 ?  ?       Retraité 
 ?  ?       Au foyer (assistante maternelle, travail à domicile, ")  
 ?  ?       Sans activité professionnelle, étudiant(e) 
 ?  ?       Autre :_____________________________________ 
82
A.2. "JE RÉNOVE BBC " ORIGINAL QUESTIONNAIRE IN FRENCH
9 
 
H.8. Quel est votre niveau d!étude, ainsi que celui de votre conjoint ? 
 
Vous   Votre conjoint                              Vous    Votre conjoint 
 ?  ?     Sans diplôme                  ?     ?     Bac+1, +2 
   ?  ?     Brevet, CAP, BEP, certificat d!étude    ?  ?     Bac+3, +4 
 ?  ?     Baccalauréat    ?  ?     Bac+5 et + 
 
H.9. Le logement que vous avez rénové dans le cadre du programme « Je rénove BBC » est" 
 
? votre résidence principale   ? une résidence que vous louez 
? votre résidence secondaire   ? autre : _________________________ 
H.10. Vous êtes" 
?
? propriétaire du logement BBC  ??locataire du logement BBC 
    
I. RESSOURCES DU MENAGE 
I.1.1. Quelles sont les ressources de l!ensemble de votre ménage ? 
 
 ___________________________ 
I.1.2. Si vous ne souhaitez ou ne pouvez pas donner un montant précis des ressources nettes de l!ensemble  
          du ménage, à combien environ les estimez-vous pour un mois ordinaire ? 
 
??jusqu!à 1000$     ??entre 6000$ et 7000$?
??entre 1000$ et 2000$    ??entre 7000$ et 8000$?
??entre 2000$ et 3000$    ??entre 8000$ et 9000$ 
??entre 3000$ et 4000$    ??entre 9000$ et 10000$ 
??entre 4000$ et 5000$    ??plus de 10000$?
??entre 5000$ et 6000$ 
J. REMARQUES éventuelles 
J.1. Avez-vous des suggestions d!amélioration du programme « Je rénove BBC » ou des remarques sur le 
       programme ? 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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10 
 
K. ANNEXE # Appareils électroménagers 
K.1. Complétez les informations correspondantes aux appareils électroménagers que vous possédez : 
 
Appareils électroménagers 
(cocher) 
Quantité 
Classe 
énergétique 
(A++, A+, A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G) 
Capacité 
[W] 
Temps 
d!utilisation 
pendant une 
journée [h] 
Âge 
approximatif 
de l!appareil 
[a] 
 
Réfrigérateur 
     
 
Congélateur 
     
 
Lave-vaisselle 
     
 
Cuisinière/four 
     
 
Lave-linge 
     
 
Sèche-linge  
     
 Equipement de bureau (PC, 
ordinateur portable) 
     
 
Electronique de loisirs (TV, ") 
     
 
Autre  
     
 
K.2. Complétez les informations correspondantes aux équipements d!éclairage que vous possédez : 
 
Type 
(cocher) 
Quantité 
Classe 
énergétique 
(A++, A+, A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G) 
Capacité 
[W] 
Temps 
d!utilisation 
pendant une 
journée [h] 
Âge 
approximatif 
de l!appareil 
[a] 
 
Ampoule électrique 
     
 
Lampe fluorescente  
     
 
Tube fluorescent (néon) 
     
 
Ampoule à basse consommation 
     
 
Lampe halogène  
     
 
Autre 
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A.3 Conventional data in energy audits: the TH-C-E ex software
Table A.11: Conventional data used for generating consumption predictions in case of a
dwelling equipped with a mechanical ventilation system
Data used Additional information
Occupancy time 16h/day during week-days
24h/day during weekend
Temperature 19◦C
temperature reduction for less than 48h: 16◦C
temperature reduction for more than 48h: 7◦C
Vacation time (where same temperature than February: 15 days ; April: 15 days ;
during weekends is taken into account) July: 31 days ; August: 31 days ;
November: 8 days ; December: 15 days
Ventilation (takes into account the ﬂow 24h/7
reduction (Coeﬀ. rdb=1) because a HygroB
ventilation system is installed)
Artiﬁcial lighting (except outdoor lighting, 5h/day during week-days,
parking lot lighting, emergency lighting and 15h/day during weekend
lighting to highlight objects) at 2W/m2
Domestic hot water (DHW) needs and Hourly energy requirements for (DHW),
distribution Gross DHW distribution losses,
Recovered losses from DHW distribution,
Consumption of DHW distribution aids
Heat loss and input Losses through the walls, losses by air change,
Solar and internal supplies
Heat and cold emission Spatial and temporal variations of the set-point
temperature, Losses at the back of transmitters
integrated in the walls
Distribution of heat and cooling: hydraulic Distribution losses and consumption for hydraulic
networks and refrigerant ﬂuid networks, refrigerant distribution,
Heat transfer between rooms
Air treatment and distribution
Thermal behavior of a group and coupling
with the system broadcasting and distribution
Energy required for the production of energy
for the heating, cooling and DHW
Generation, storage and transfer of heat,
cold for the heating, cooling and DHW
Solar photovoltaic system
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A.4 Actual ex-post energy consumption
Households’ actual (EA) and predicted (EP ) energy consumption, calculated in primary
energy (PE) are measured in kWhP E/m·year. The households’ total actual and predicted
energy (Etot) includes four components in Alsace: heating, sanitary hot water, lighting and
auxiliaries. Billing data of actual energy consumption are expressed in ﬁnal energy units.
However, the predicted energy consumption is expressed in primary energy units. In order
to compare both consumption, we need to convert the actual energy consumption data into
primary energy. We also need to correct consumption according to the geographic position
of the building and heating period, to standardize consumption among all the households.
While no data on the share of electricity of total consumption is available at national level,
we use a proxy of 21% of total energy consumption based on a study conducted from the
Local Agency in the French department Indre-et-Loire. The share of electricity of total
consumption corresponds mainly to lighting and auxiliaries (Elighting+auxiliaries). Actual
energy consumption can be converted in primary energy as follows:
EA =
Etot −Elighting+auxiliaries
SHONRT
·
HDD30years
HDDperiod
· c+
Elighting+auxiliaries
SHONRT
· c,
with
HDD30years: annual heating degree days for a period of 30 years, in ◦C.year,
HDDperiod: heating degree days for the consumption period, in ◦C.year,
HDD30years
HDDperiod
: climate correction per period by geographic location,
SHON RT : thermal surface1, in m2,
c: transformation coeﬃcient from ﬁnal to primary energy consumption2.
The heating degree days (HDD) are calculated monthly by the national weather service
Météo France.
1For further information:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃchTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022959397\&categorieLien=id
22.58 for electricity, 1 for gas, fuel and coal, 0.6 for wood, 0 for solar energy
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A.5 Variable Definitions
Table A.12: Deﬁnition of the variables used in the analysis
Variables Definitions Nature
Ex-post energy consumption
Y Energy Savings (Ratio of real and predicted energy con-
sumption)
continuous
Technical variables
SYST Ex-post heating system (1 if conventional (≡ reference level),
2 if mixed, 3 if renewable energy)
category
THERM Presence of room thermostat in the dwelling ex-post (1 if
yes, 0 otherwise)
dummy
Socio-demographic variables
HSIZE Number of inhabitants in the dwelling continuous
CHILD Presence of children in the dwelling (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) dummy
AGE Respondent is more than 45 years old (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) dummy
EDUC Bachelor’s degree and above (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) dummy
PROF Liberal profession or top manager (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) dummy
REV Net monthly household income of at least 4000 EUR (1 if
yes, 0 otherwise)
dummy
Energy related behavior and determinants of behavior
BEH_WO Window opening habits with respect to the ex-ante situation
(1 if less, 2 if equally (≡ reference level), 3 if more)
category
BEH_ENV Level of environmental concern with respect to the ex-ante
situation (1 if more, 0 otherwise)
dummy
BEH_CONS Tendency to pay attention to energy consumption with re-
spect to the ex-ante situation (1 if less, 0 if equally)
dummy
TEMP.N Household’s temperature setting gap at night
with the recommended 19◦C (0 if heated at 19◦C )
continuous
TEMP.D Household’s temperature setting gap during the day with
the recommended 19◦C (0 if heated at 19◦C )
continuous
M.ECOLO Renovation motivation: Have an environmental friendly
dwelling (1 if important or very important, 0 otherwise)
dummy
M.ECON.NRJ Renovation motivation: Save energy (1 if not important at
all, 2 if not important, 3 if important, 4 if very important)
continuous
M.ECON.FIN Renovation motivation: Save money (1 if not important at
all, 2 if not important, 3 if important, 4 if very important)
continuous
OCCUP Number of hours of occupation per day in a weekday continuous
VACATION 4 weeks or more of absence per year dummy
COMFORT Perception of comfort after renovation (from 1 to 10, where 0
means ’no comfort at all’, and 10 means ’very high comfort’)
continuous
ROOMS Presence of unheated rooms in the dwelling (1 if yes, 0 oth-
erwise)
dummy
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A.6 Tuning Plots
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(a) Net Losing Energy Savings
?
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???? ???? ????
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??
??
???
??? ???? ???? ???? ????
(b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Figure A.1: Random Forest Model Performance with a Sequence Number of Trees
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(b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Figure A.2: Gradient Boost Tree Model Performance 89
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(a) Net Losing Energy Savings
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(b) Net Gaining Energy Savings
Figure A.3: Support Vector Machine Model Performance90
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A.7 Missing values imputation
???????????????
??
??
???
???
???
???
?? ?? ? ?
(a) Energy Performance Gap
???????????????
??
??
???
???
???
???
???
???
???
?? ? ? ? ? ?
(b) Motivation to Save Energy Costs
Figure A.4: Distribution of original and imputed values (part 1)
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???????????????
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(c) Motivation to Reduce Energy Consumption
???????????????
??
??
???
???
???
???
???
???
??? ? ?? ??
(d) Perceived Comfort
Figure A.4: Distribution of original and imputed values (part 2)
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???????????????
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(e) Temperature Setting During Day
???????????????
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???
???
??? ?? ? ? ??
(f) Temperature Setting at Night
Figure A.4: Distribution of original and imputed values (part 3)
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???????????????
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(g) Additional Rooms Heated
???????????????
??
??
???
???
???
???
???
???
???
??? ? ?? ?? ?? ??
(h) Hours of Occupation
Figure A.4: Distribution of original and imputed values (part 4)
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???????????????
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? ? ??
(i) Household Size
Figure A.4: Distribution of original and imputed values (part 5)
A.8 Statistical Tests
Table A.13: Comparison of Group Diﬀerences Using Non-Parametric and Parametric Sta-
tistical Tests
Cognitive Bias Mann Whitney U Mood Median Student’s t-test
Net Losing Energy Savings
Status Quo W = 98 pValue = 0.463 Z = −.147 pValue = 0.883 t= −1.105 pValue = 0.278
Optimism W = 45 pValue = 0.444 Z = −.178 pValue = 0.859 t= 0.608 pValue = 0.650
Attitude-Behavior Gap W = 136 pValue = 0.491 Z = −.160 pValue = 0.873 t= 0.323 pValue = 0.749
Intention-Behavior Gap W = 42 pValue = 0.760 Z = −.175 pValue = 0.861 t= −0.096 pValue = 0.925
Net Gaining Energy Savings
Status Quo W = 354 pValue = 0.666 Z = 0.000 pValue = 1.000 t= 0.046 pValue = 0.963
Optimism W = 67 pValue = 0.569 Z = 0.000 pValue = 1.000 t= −0.542 pValue = 0.637
Attitude-Behavior Gap W = 375 pValue = 0.818 Z = 0.000 pValue = 1.000 t= −0.385 pValue = 0.702
Intention-Behavior Gap W = 113 pValue = 0.787 Z = −.414 pValue = 0.678 t= 0.359 pValue = 0.741
Non-Parametric Tests: Mann Whithney U and Mood Median ; Parametric Test: Student’s t-test
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A.9 Regression Results
A.9.1 Status quo bias
Table A.14: Status Quo Bias - Regression results for Net Losing Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
Status Quo 0.203 0.164 -0.066 0.472 Without Imputation
BEH.WO.less 0.050 0.095 -0.106 0.206 Without Imputation
BEH.WO.more -0.034 0.179 -0.329 0.261 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.031 0.029 -0.017 0.078 Without Imputation
HSIZE 0.028 0.041 -0.040 0.095 Without Imputation
Status Quo 0.237 0.097 0.076 0.397 With Imputation
BEH.WO.less 0.058 0.077 -0.068 0.185 With Imputation
BEH.WO.more -0.001 0.173 -0.285 0.283 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.031 0.024 -0.009 0.071 With Imputation
HSIZE 0.010 0.026 -0.033 0.054 With Imputation
Table A.15: Status Quo Bias - Regression results for Net Gaining Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
Status Quo -1.244 0.485 -2.194 -0.294 Without Imputation
BEH.WO.Less 0.083 0.073 -0.061 0.227 Without Imputation
BEH.WO.More 0.099 0.116 -0.129 0.327 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.020 0.027 -0.032 0.073 Without Imputation
TEMP.D 0.023 0.054 -0.084 0.129 Without Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.188 0.136 -0.078 0.454 Without Imputation
COMFORT 0.034 0.031 -0.028 0.096 Without Imputation
Status Quo -1.041 0.392 -1.810 -0.273 With Imputation
BEH.WO.Less 0.008 0.078 -0.144 0.160 With Imputation
BEH.WO.More 0.089 0.112 -0.131 0.308 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.003 0.025 -0.047 0.052 With Imputation
TEMP.D -0.007 0.052 -0.109 0.095 With Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.114 0.115 -0.112 0.339 With Imputation
COMFORT 0.038 0.029 -0.019 0.095 With Imputation
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A.9.2 Optimism bias
Table A.16: Optimism Bias - Regression results for Net Losing Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
BEH.CONS.Same 0.124 0.123 -0.077 0.326 Without Imputation
BEH.CONS.Less 1.488 0.738 0.274 2.702 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.024 0.027 -0.020 0.069 Without Imputation
HSIZE 0.053 0.035 -0.005 0.111 Without Imputation
Interaction -0.436 0.047 -0.513 -0.358 Without Imputation
BEH.CONS.Same 0.261 0.058 0.166 0.356 With Imputation
BEH.CONS.Less 0.459 0.146 0.219 0.698 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.032 0.014 0.009 0.055 With Imputation
HSIZE 0.011 0.015 -0.014 0.036 With Imputation
Interaction -0.135 0.056 -0.227 -0.044 With Imputation
Table A.17: Optimism Bias - Regression results for Net Gaining Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
BEH.CONS.Same -1.401 0.505 -2.391 -0.411 Without Imputation
BEH.CONS.Less 0.009 0.252 -0.485 0.503 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.017 0.025 -0.032 0.066 Without Imputation
TEMP.D 0.028 0.048 -0.067 0.122 Without Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.263 0.145 -0.020 0.546 Without Imputation
COMFORT 0.031 0.031 -0.030 0.092 Without Imputation
Interaction 0.257 0.060 0.140 0.373 Without Imputation
BEH.CONS.Same -1.120 0.406 -1.915 -0.325 With Imputation
BEH.CONS.Less -0.036 0.245 -0.515 0.443 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.004 0.025 -0.045 0.053 With Imputation
TEMP.D 0.005 0.051 -0.096 0.106 With Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.136 0.121 -0.100 0.373 With Imputation
COMFORT 0.040 0.029 -0.017 0.096 With Imputation
Interaction 0.049 0.136 -0.217 0.316 With Imputation
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A.9.3 Attitude-Behaviour gap
Table A.18: Attitude-Behaviour Gap - Regression results for Net Losing Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
ENV.Low 0.194 0.410 -0.480 0.868 Without Imputation
ENV.High 0.100 0.247 -0.307 0.507 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.030 0.106 -0.144 0.205 Without Imputation
HSIZE 0.030 0.081 -0.103 0.164 Without Imputation
ENV.Low 0.243 0.129 0.031 0.455 With Imputation
ENV.High 0.076 0.081 -0.057 0.208 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.034 0.019 0.004 0.065 With Imputation
HSIZE 0.014 0.032 -0.039 0.067 With Imputation
Table A.19: Attitude-Behaviour Gap - Regression results for Net Gaining Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
ENV.Low -1.282 0.832 -2.650 0.087 Without Imputation
ENV.High -0.056 0.158 -0.317 0.204 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.021 0.072 -0.098 0.139 Without Imputation
TEMP.D 0.025 0.109 -0.154 0.203 Without Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.221 0.173 -0.065 0.506 Without Imputation
COMFORT 0.034 0.067 -0.077 0.145 Without Imputation
ENV.Low -1.063 0.381 -1.690 -0.437 With Imputation
ENV.High -0.063 0.077 -0.190 0.064 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.004 0.024 -0.037 0.044 With Imputation
TEMP.D -0.004 0.046 -0.080 0.072 With Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.124 0.109 -0.054 0.303 With Imputation
COMFORT 0.040 0.029 -0.007 0.088 With Imputation
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A.9.4 Intention-Behaviour gap
Table A.20: Intention-Behaviour Gap - Regression results for Net Losing Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
Non-Ecolo 0.551 0.863 -0.869 1.971 Without Imputation
Ecolo -0.263 0.797 -1.574 1.048 Without Imputation
EDUC -0.271 0.374 -0.886 0.344 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.014 0.167 -0.261 0.288 Without Imputation
HSIZE 0.018 0.087 -0.125 0.160 Without Imputation
Interaction 0.295 0.365 -0.305 0.894 Without Imputation
Non-Ecolo 0.545 0.082 0.409 0.680 With Imputation
Ecolo -0.148 0.029 -0.195 -0.100 With Imputation
EDUC -0.166 0.053 -0.253 -0.080 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.039 0.014 0.016 0.061 With Imputation
HSIZE -0.013 0.019 -0.044 0.017 With Imputation
Interaction 0.087 0.052 0.001 0.173 With Imputation
Table A.21: Intention-Behaviour Gap - Regression results for Net Gaining Energy Savings
Variable Coefficient SE Lower Upper Model
Non-Ecolo -1.378 0.902 -3.145 0.389 Without Imputation
Ecolo 0.115 0.296 -0.465 0.696 Without Imputation
EDUC 0.155 0.264 -0.362 0.671 Without Imputation
TEMP.N 0.026 0.084 -0.139 0.190 Without Imputation
TEMP.D 0.005 0.126 -0.242 0.251 Without Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.179 0.179 -0.172 0.530 Without Imputation
COMFORT 0.039 0.100 -0.157 0.236 Without Imputation
Interaction -0.028 0.161 -0.343 0.286 Without Imputation
Non-Ecolo -1.158 0.465 -2.069 -0.247 With Imputation
Ecolo 0.117 0.195 -0.265 0.498 With Imputation
EDUC 0.167 0.095 -0.020 0.355 With Imputation
TEMP.N 0.002 0.025 -0.048 0.052 With Imputation
TEMP.D 0.005 0.050 -0.093 0.102 With Imputation
M.ECON.NRJ 0.114 0.119 -0.120 0.347 With Imputation
COMFORT 0.032 0.032 -0.031 0.095 With Imputation
Interaction -0.136 0.092 -0.316 0.044 With Imputation
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A.10 Feature ranking
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Measurement variable: ‘declaring to open its windows as often as before renovation’.
Figure A.5: Relative Importance of Features: Status Quo Bias
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Measurement variable: ‘declaring to pay less attention to its energy consumption than before renovation’.
Figure A.6: Relative Importance of Features: Optimism Bias
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Measurement variable: ‘declaring to be more concerned about ecological and environmental issues than
before renovation’.
Figure A.7: Relative Importance of Features: Attitude-Behavior Gap
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Measurement variable: ‘declaring to renovate because of ﬁnding it (very) important to own an
environmental friendly house’.
Figure A.8: Relative Importance of Features: Intention-Behavior Gap
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CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL INCENTIVES FOR A POSSIBLY UNAWARE AGENT
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 analyzed ex-post (to renovation) cognitive and behavioral biases from house-
holds that are not taken into account in the energy consumption prediction models, thus
leading to the emergence of an Energy Performance Gap. However, factors inherent to
the renovation stage may also cause non optimally renovated buildings, resulting in inten-
sifying the gap. In Chapters 2 and 3 we thus focus on optimal contracts for craftsmen
permitting to enhance the quality of the renovation works.
In the present chapter, we aim at studying what we call the vertical problematic as
displayed in Figure 2.1.
Note: Both the project owner and the project manager can have the role of the Principal.
Figure 2.1: Vertical problematic between a project manager and a craftsman
We determine the optimal contract between a project manager (or a project owner)
and a craftsman which has two tasks to execute. The craftsman’s ﬁrst task can be seen
as the actual renovation of the building1. His associated eﬀort is the eﬀort level he puts
into his work: more conscientiously, or faster and without caution. His second task can be
considered as the participation in a low-energy training to learn new eﬀective renovation
techniques. Her associated eﬀort is the eﬀort level he puts into such a speciﬁc training2. We
assume, in this chapter, that if he exerts a positive eﬀort on his second task, he also actually
applies low-energy techniques during renovation works3. Optimally, the project manager
1He works only on her trade specialty. For example, if he is a drywall worker, he installs insulation
boards, if he is a carpenter, he installs windows, etc.
2A larger number of hours spent on the training and the review of its lessons, or a lower number of
hours on it.
3The case where he is trained but does not apply the new techniques is not considered.
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wants the craftsman to exert high eﬀort levels for both tasks: working conscientiously
and having spent many hours on the training (and thus applying the learned techniques
during work). Yet, the craftsman is not necessarily aware about the impact his second
task may have on the building’s ﬁnal performance. More speciﬁcally, craftsmen working
on renovation sites are nowadays more and more often trained to new eﬃcient renovation
techniques (mostly for competitive reasons), but they may underestimate how the rightful
application of these techniques actually aﬀect the energy performance of a building.
Let us analyze the optimal contract from a theoretical perspective, where the project
manager is a Principal, and the craftsman is an Agent, as mentioned in Figure 2.1.
The standard moral hazard problem seeks to determine the optimal compensation scheme
a Principal (he) should propose to an Agent (she) when she hides information about her
real eﬀort level. This optimal contract must give the right incentives to bring the Agent
to exert the optimal eﬀort level that maximizes the Principal’s expected utility. The
underlying assumption of the standard model is that both parties are completely aware
of all the possible outcomes of a given action, and that the Agent’s eﬀorts impact their
distribution.
However, this fully-awareness assumption may be challenged. One of the parties may
not necessarily be aware of every possible outcome so that (s)he conceives the world in
a simpliﬁed form. Galanis (2013) presents a model of unawareness where the Agent can
make errors, because she is unaware of certain dimensions of her surroundings. Namely,
the author’s unawareness of theorems says that the Agent may be aware of the activities
composing a given action, but be unaware of their consequences on performance (i.e.
outcome). Alternatively, as Auster (2013) explains it, there may be relevant contingencies
aﬀecting performance (and thus the Agent’s payoﬀ) that have never crossed her mind. The
Agent is also unaware of her unawareness, so that she believes to have in mind a true and
complete description of the world. As formally deﬁned by Modica and Rustichini (1994),
the Agent is unaware about something, and she ignores that she ignores it.
This chapter presents a static theoretical model in a stochastic approach, which in-
troduces possible asymmetric awareness in the moral hazard model with one Principal
and one two-task Agent. Asymmetric awareness means that both parties do not have the
same awareness level, such that the Agent underestimates the impact of her tasks on the
outcome’s distribution. The particularity of our model is the introduction of a parameter
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representing the Agent’s awareness level. The main objective of our research is to deter-
mine the optimal compensation the Principal should oﬀer the Agent. In other words, we
determine how the Agent’s compensation should vary with ﬁnal performance, and how it
is impacted by the Agent’s awareness level. Our research thus contributes to the literature
on contracting problems with unawareness of actions.
We ﬁrst present a baseline model considering a completely aware Agent (cf. Section
2.3). We determine the Agent’s optimal compensation for various risk preferences (i.e.
risk aversion and prudence) of both parties. We solve a standard contracting problem, but
with two tasks for the Agent. We see that the downside risk aversion (i.e. prudence), as
well as the assumption of a concave monotone likelihood ratio4, play a signiﬁcant role in
the determination of the optimal compensation, as previously demonstrated in a one task
setup by Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018). We show that for a two-task Agent with
additive tasks, their ﬁnding holds. When the Principal is not too prudent (i.e. too averse
to downside risk), an interesting point is that the more prudent the Agent, the less concave
the compensation structure. Indeed, a concave payment in performance is too variable in
bad states of natures, and thus too risky for a too downside risk averse Agent. A summary
of the optimal compensation schemes for diﬀerent risk preferences of both parties can be
found in Table 2.1.
We then present the possible unawareness model (cf. Section 2.4), which considers
a possibly unaware Agent, underestimating the impact of her second task on the per-
formance’s distribution.5 She may therefore believe in a smaller impact than it has in
reality (i.e. she has mistaken beliefs). We assume that the Principal knows the Agent’s
awareness level about some contingencies, and more particularly, about the impact of her
second task on the performance’s distribution. Moreover, when completely unaware, we
make the assumption that the Agent exerts no eﬀort on her second task, because she ﬁnds
it useless. Our analysis shows that the compensation scheme (concavity or convexity)
does not vary the with the degree of awareness, but the Principal takes the Agent’s lack of
awareness into account to adapt the level of her payment. Hence, he pays her less for high
performance levels when she underestimates her task’s impact on performance. Further-
more, the optimal compensation may less strongly with performance when the Agent has
4The concavity of the likelihood ratio entails that a given variation of the performance in its low levels
(i.e. in bad states of nature or the downside) procures more information about the Agent’s eﬀort levels
than the same variation of performance in its high levels (i.e. in good states of nature or the upside).
5For simpliﬁcation reasons, we talk about "the task’s impact on performance" in the rest of the chapter.
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mistaken beliefs. The interesting point is that the Agent will not refuse such a contract,
since she is not aware of the complete impact of her second eﬀort on performance. She
indeed believes that her payment rightfully corresponds to the actual impact her second
task has on ﬁnal performance.
In the Appendix, we brieﬂy present the particular case of a completely unaware Agent,
where the risk averse Agent’s second eﬀort level is observable by the risk neutral Principal
(cf. the unawareness model in Section B.2).
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a review about the
literature this work is related to. Section 2.3 analyzes the baseline moral hazard model,
with two task for the Agent. Optimal compensation schemes are determined according
to risk and downside risk aversion of the agents, with a completely aware Agent and
unobservable eﬀorts. In Section 2.4 we present a two-task moral hazard model which
introduces a measure of the Agent’s awareness level. She might be unaware that her second
action aﬀects the distribution of performance. We determine the optimal compensation
when the Principal is risk neutral and the Agent risk averse. We conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Related literature
A ﬁrst strand of literature related to our work concerns moral hazard in contracting prob-
lems, as explained at the beginning of the behavior. This problem has largely been studied
in the literature, among others by Holmstrom (1979); Grossman and Hart (1983); Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1991); Mirrlees (1999). It is well-known that optimal compensation
is a compromise between incentives and risk sharing. It should thus consider preferences
(i.e. risk aversion and prudence, also called downside risk aversion) of the involved par-
ties. Including the notion of prudence in an analysis has been proven essential in various
applications, as for instance in saving decisions (Leland, 1968; Sandmo, 1968; Kimball,
1990; Etner and Jeleva, 2014), background risk (Gollier et al., 2000; Ligon and Thistle,
2013), contingent monitoring (Fagart and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007), but also in classical
Principal-Agent models (Sinclair-Desgagné and Gabel, 1997; Sinclair-Desgagne, 1999; Hau,
2011; Chaigneau et al., 2017; Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter, 2018).
Moreover, the structure of the payment function is shaped by the assumptions on
the likelihood ratio of the density function in stochastic models. As stated by Sinclair-
Desgagne (1999), the monotonicity of the likelihood ratio is a necessary condition to obtain
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increasing payoﬀs in outcome, to incentivize the Agent to choose a high eﬀort level. It
allows, for instance, Chaigneau et al. (2017) (who consider a risk neutral Principal), to
determine that the optimal reward is convex in outcome, if and only if the Agent is
‘very prudent’ (in the sense deﬁned in our chapter). Reversely, the optimal reward is
concave if and only if the Agent is ‘non’ or ‘weakly prudent’. Our analysis permits to
conﬁrm this ﬁnding in a two-task setting. Yet, additionally assuming an either concave
or convex likelihood ratio may lead to diﬀerent results. In this chapter, we assume a
concave likelihood ratio, leading us to show that when the Agent is not or weakly averse
to downside risk (i.e. high wage variations in low outcomes), the optimal reward should
be concave in outcome. Yet, assuming a convex likelihood ratio does not allow to clearly
conclude on the reward scheme in this case.
Now, when the Principal turns out to be prudent too, both parties’ downside risk
aversion may enter in conﬂict. Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018) propose a model
treating this problematic. They determine the optimal compensation when the Principal
is ‘more downside risk averse’ than the Agent. By adapting the mathematical property of
approximate concavity developed by Páles (2003), they show that the Principal should oﬀer
the Agent a contract that is approximately concave in outcome, to transfer downside risk
towards the Agent. In particular, Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018) consider CRRA
utility functions for both parties and obtain convex-concave optimal incentive schemes.
This means that for moderate performances, the optimal compensation should be convex,
and become concave for higher performances. Our results indicate that their ﬁnding holds
in the case of multiple additive tasks.
A second strand of literature related to this chapter concerns the agents’ unawareness
of actions. The notion of unawareness of agents is quite intuitive to imagine: it is rather
unlikely that policy makers anticipate all the possible consequences their decisions and
implemented laws will generate. Yet, modeling unawareness is not so simple. It has been
studied in diﬀerent ﬁelds of economics and is formalized in hand of information structures.
Nermuth (1998) explains that they mathematically formalize the idea of imperfect (incom-
plete, uncertain, ...) information. Intuitively, the true states (i.e. reality) are transformed
into signals, which can be distorted images of reality. An Agent who only observes these
‘incomplete’ signals, such that her surrounding environment does not reﬂect reality (i.e.
her state-space is incomplete), is unaware of, for instance, some action choices, impacts or
consequences on outcome. In her mind, it is however the reality. In our model, the Agent
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perceives an incomplete signal about the impact of her second task on the distribution of
ﬁnal performance.
The most widely studied model introducing unawareness is the state-space model.
An earlier version of this model, commonly known as the "standard state-space model",
imposes that the Agent is either completely aware or unaware (see for instance Modica and
Rustichini, 1994, 1999; Dekel et al., 1998; Heifetz et al., 2006). Dekel et al. (1998) conclude
that it cannot correctly capture and model unawareness, because in these models, if an
Agent is unaware of something, then she is automatically unaware of everything and knows
nothing. Li (2009) generalizes the standard state-space model by allowing for non-trivial
awareness from the Agent. It means that although the Agent is unaware of something,
she may be aware of other aspects of the world.6
Our study applies the notion of unawareness directly on contracting problems with
moral hazard. It is based on the models presented by Von Thadden and Zhao (2012,
2014). In their paper of 2012, they present a stochastic one-task moral hazard model,
with an unaware Agent. In their follow-up paper of 2014, they consider two tasks, in a
deterministic approach. As in our paper, the Agent is unaware of her second eﬀort’s impact
on the distribution of the outcome. Contrary to us, they assume a linear compensation,
and thereupon seek to determine in what cases the Principal should make the Agent aware
through incentive pay (i.e. by giving the Agent an appropriate implicit incentive to exert
a high eﬀort, which is represented by the incentive constraint in the Principal’s program),
and thus avoid him an unnecessary cost if it is not in his best interest. They also go further
by determining when the Principal should make multiple Agents aware, when the ﬁrm is
composed of aware and unaware Agents.
Similarly, Auster (2013) intents to answer the same question for one Agent. By apply-
ing a very simpliﬁed version of the generalized state-space model introduced by Heifetz
6A wide range of literature studied how to further model the Agent’s unawareness, and its impact
on the information structures. This is not the subject of this chapter. Interested readers may relate to
Geanakoplos (1989) to see one of the ﬁrst attempts to model unawareness, to Modica and Rustichini (1999)
and Li (2008, 2009) who managed to bypass Dekel et al. (1998)’s above mentioned result, to Heifetz et al.
(2006) who where the ﬁrst to study interactive unawareness among multiple Agents, to Board and Chung
(2009) who implement a model that makes it possible to distinguish between what an Agent ‘does not
know’ and what she is ‘unaware of’, and apply it to the case of insurance contracts, to Heifetz et al. (2013)
who extend their former model to capture only the Agent’s probabilistic beliefs rather than ignorance and
knowledge, to Meier and Schipper (2014) who apply these latter belief structures to Bayesian games, to
Halpern and Rêgo (2014) who extend these games with awareness about unawareness of other players, to
Galanis (2015) who examine the value of information, to Li et al. (2016) who study information disclosure
from a ﬁrm and its disadvantages, and ﬁnally to Mengel et al. (2016) and Ma and Schipper (2017) who
study, in an economic experiment, how the Agents’ unawareness can aﬀect their risk preferences.
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et al. (2006), she presents a deterministic theoretical moral hazard model and asymmetric
awareness between a risk neutral Principal and a risk averse and unaware Agent. Same as
we do, she considers that the Principal knows the Agent’s unawareness level, and what she
is unaware of. Her main contribution is the characterization of a trade-oﬀ between a par-
ticipation effect (coming from the revelation of additional information and "new states")
and an incentive effect (coming from the presence of moral hazard), to determine in what
cases enlarging the Agent’s awareness. In other words, there is a trade-oﬀ between leaving
the Agent unaware and making her aware. She speciﬁes explicitly that making the Agent
aware (i.e. enlarging her state-space by adding new dimensions) and transmitting her
information in the contract (i.e. narrowing her state-space) have to be distinguished.
Zhao (2008) also studies when and how to enlarge the Agent’s awareness through the
contract. They extend the standard model by a model with unawareness of actions in
a deterministic approach, based on information structures. In contrast to Auster; Von
Thadden and Zhao and us, they assume that the Principal may be (partially) unaware
about the Agent’s awareness level.
In contrast to these papers, we do not intent to answer the question of when to enlarge
the Agent’s awareness. In our model, and by assumption, it is always better for the
Principal to leave the Agent unaware, so that we do not modify the Agent’s state-space
by adapting her information structure. Our contribution is focused on the determination
of the optimal compensation structure and level, given the Agent’s awareness level. We
show that our Principal adapts the Agent’s level of compensation by taking into account
her awareness level.
A last diﬀerence with the previous papers analyzing contracting problems with un-
awareness, concerns the default eﬀort level7 adopted by the Agent, on the contingency she
is unaware about. Hayek (1967); Mayr (1992); Vanberg (2002); Auster (2013) and Von
Thadden and Zhao (2012, 2014) assume that it is positive. This permits Von Thadden and
Zhao (2012, 2014) to show that the Principal should make the Agent aware if and only
if her default eﬀort level is too far away from the one he prefers. In contrast, we assume
that when completely unaware, she has a default eﬀort level equal to zero. We argue that
she ﬁnds it useless to exert any eﬀort when being unaware that this action impacts her
payoﬀ (through the outcome’s distribution). However, an important similarity with these
7The default eﬀort level is the one the Agent undertakes for the second task she is unaware of, without
having any incentive from the Principal. It corresponds to a routine eﬀort level. The Principal knows this
level.
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papers, is that the Agent optimizes over the ‘dimensions’ she is aware about.
2.3 A two-task Principal-Agent model with complete awareness
Before introducing the Agent’s unawareness, we ﬁrst present a baseline multi-task moral
hazard model with symmetric and complete awareness. We determine the optimal com-
pensation scheme for diﬀerent risk preferences of the Principal and the Agent.
2.3.1 The baseline model
The Principal earns a random proﬁt x˜, with realization x in [x,x], x 6 0, x > 0. The
Agent chooses two non observable eﬀorts t1 and t2 she has to exert, associated with two
diﬀerent tasks. Eﬀorts being non observable by the Principal, he pays a compensation to
the Agent which may only depend on the performance x. We denote it w(x). We assume
that the Agent’s eﬀorts are limited such that ti ∈ [0, ti] for i = 1, 2. The Principal’s net
proﬁt is, thus, given by x−w(x). The outcome x is correlated with the Agent’s eﬀorts
through a conditional probability distribution F (x|t1, t2). We denote the likelihood ra-
tio by ℓiF (x|t1, t2) ≡
fti (x|t1,t2)
f (x|t1,t2)
, i = 1, 2, with f(x|t1, t2) the probability density function.
To describe the optimal contract under the ‘ﬁrst-order approach’ (Rogerson, 1985; Je-
witt, 1988; Mirrlees, 1999; Sinclair-Desgagne, 1999; LiCalzi and Spaeter, 2003; Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005, ...), we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (CMLRP). The Concave Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property holds for
f(x|t1, t2): ℓix(x|t1, t2)> 0, ℓ
i
xx(x|t1, t2)6 0, i= 1, 2
The property of CMLR (nondecreasing concave likelihood ratio in x for all t1 and t2),
says that “(...) variations in output at higher levels are relatively less useful in providing
‘information’ on the [A]gent’s effort than they are at lower levels of output” (Jewitt, 1988,
p. 1181). Hence, as in Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018), but contrary to Chaigneau
et al. (2017) who assume a linear likelihood ratio, the likelihood ratio in this paper is
increasing and concave in x for any ti, i= 1, 2.
The Principal’s (respectively the Agent’s) risk preferences are given by v′(.) > 0, v′′(.)6
0 and v′′′(.)> 0 (respectively u′(.) > 0, u′′(.)6 0 and u′′′(.)> 0).
Finally, we assume for now that the Agent is aware about her eﬀorts’ impact on the
distribution of the outcome x, and that both parties consider the distribution F (x|t1, t2).
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The Agent knows that exerting higher eﬀorts increases the likelihood of achieving a higher
ﬁnal performance. The maximization program of the Principal is deﬁned as follows:
max
w
∫
v(x−w(x)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx (2.1)
subject to
(t1, t2) ∈ argmax
∫
u(w(x)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx−C(t1, t2) (2.2)∫
u(w(x)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx−C(t1, t2)> U0 (2.3)
We assume an increasing, strictly convex and twice-diﬀerentiable Agent’s cost-of-eﬀort
function in both eﬀorts, C(t1, t2) = 12 t
2
1 +
1
2c t
2
2, with c > 0. The higher c, the less costly
the second eﬀort is to the Agent compared to her ﬁrst eﬀort. From now on, t1 and t2
have been optimally chosen by the Principal (i.e. t1 ≡ t∗1 and t2 ≡ t
∗
2). Condition (2.2)
is the Incentive-Compatibility Constraint that gives the Agent an incentive to choose
eﬀorts t∗1 and t
∗
2 (by maximizing her utility function). Condition (2.3) is the Participation
Constraint, with U0 her reservation utility.
Applying the ﬁrst-order-approach and replacing the Incentive-Compatibility Constraint
(2.2) with the adequate ﬁrst-order conditions8, the Principal’s maximization program be-
comes:
max
w
∫
v(x−w(x)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx (2.4)
subject to∫
u(w(x)) · ft1(x|t1, t2)dx= t1 (2.5)∫
u(w(x)) · ft2(x|t1, t2)dx=
1
c
t2 (2.6)∫
u(w(x)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx−
1
2
t21 −
1
2c
t22 > U0 (2.7)
8 Because (2.2) has an inﬁnity of inequality constraints, we “relax” this constraint by replacing it with
a constraint where the Agent’s expected utility is stationary at the eﬀort levels t1 and t2 (i.e. ﬁrst-order
approach).
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The Lagrangian of the maximization problem is
L(w,λ,µ,γ) =
∫
v(x−w(x)).f(x|t1, t2)dx
+ λ[
∫
u(w(x)) · ft1(x|t1, t2)dx− t1]
+µ[
∫
u(w(x)) · ft2(x|t1, t2)dx−
1
c
t2]
+ γ[
∫
u(w(x)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx−
1
2
t21 −
1
2c
t22 −U0] (2.8)
where the Lagrange multipliers λ, µ and γ of the relaxed Incentive-Compatibility Con-
straints (2.5) and (2.6), and the Participation Constraint (2.7) are positive.
Computing ∂L∂w = 0 leads to the following Kuhn-Tucker condition:
v′(x−w(x))
u′(w(x))
= γ+ λ
ft1(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+µ
ft2(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
, ∀x. (2.9)
This condition must be satisﬁed for any level of x. Computation of Equation (2.9) is
detailed in Appendix B.1.
Equation (2.9) (i.e. the Kuhn-Tucker Condition) permits to characterize the optimal
compensation w∗(x) the Principal should oﬀer the Agent. The positive Lagrange multipli-
ers and Assumption 1 entail that the right-hand-side term of Equation (2.9) is increasing
and concave in the performance signal x. The left-hand-side term of Equation (2.9) must
have the same properties at the optimum for the Kuhn-Tucker Condition to be satisﬁed
for any x.
Proposition 1 Consider that at least one agent (i.e. Principal or Agent) is risk averse.
The optimal compensation scheme w∗(x) is strictly increasing in the performance
signal x.
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
Proposition 1 is valid when both parties are risk averse, but also when either the Principal
or the Agent are risk neutral (not both). Making an eﬀort increases the likelihood of a
high performance x. Thus, the Principal rewards the Agent better in good performance
states.9
9When both the Principal and the Agent are risk neutral, the optimal compensation scheme may have
any curvature. Only the mean reward will be meaningful for risk neutral agents.
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Result of Proposition 1 is well-known in the one-task agency problem (Milgrom, 1981;
Grossman and Hart, 1983; Rogerson, 1985; Jewitt, 1988; Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter,
2018; Chaigneau et al., 2017). In a multi-task setup, as Sinclair-Desgagne (1999) stated,
the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property is essential to ﬁnd that the monetary compen-
sations are increasing in performance signals. The author considers selective audits to
show that they permit higher incentives, even though the ﬁnal performance is diﬃcult to
measure. In our model, under the assumptions made, adding tasks with additive prop-
erties to the Agent, always leads to the same needed characteristics of Equation (2.9)’s
right-hand-side term (i.e. it must be increasing and concave in the performance signal x).
In what follows, we analyze the structure of the optimal contract w∗ for diﬀerent
preferences of the Principal and the Agent.
2.3.2 Optimal compensation with a risk neutral Principal
Consider a risk neutral Principal (i.e. v′(.) > 0, v′′(.) = 0). The Agent is risk averse
and may be prudent (i.e. u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0, u′′′(.) > 0). Let us denote the measures of
the absolute risk aversion as Ru = −
u′′(.)
u′(.)
(Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971), and the absolute
prudence10 as Pu = −
u′′′(.)
u′′(.)
(Kimball, 1990).
To determine the curvature of the optimal compensation w∗, we complete the second
derivative of the left-hand-side term of Equation (2.9). It has to be negative to satisfy the
characteristics of the Equation’s right-hand-side term (i.e. increasing and concave in x):
∂2
∂x2
(
1
u′(w(x))
)
=(2Ru −Pu) ·
[
w′(x)
]2
+w′′(x)6 0 (2.10)
See Appendix B.1 for the details of the computation.
We are looking for the sign of w′′, knowing that w′ > 0 (cf. Proposition 1). From
Equation (2.10), it is easy to see that the results depend on the sign of 2Ru − Pu. In
other words, if the Agent’s prudence (i.e. downside risk aversion) is suﬃciently weak, even
nonexistent, such that 2Ru > Pu, she will accept an increasing and concave compensation
in performance. Otherwise, if 2Ru < Pu, the curvature of the optimal payment cannot
be clearly determined without additional information about the Agent’s preferences, and
more speciﬁcally, her degree of prudence.
10The prudence is also known under the term of downside risk aversion. When the Agent is downside
risk averse, she does not like a very sensitive wage in bad states of nature, i.e. when the performance is
bad.
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Let us ﬁrst propose the following deﬁnition.
Definition 1 (degree of prudence) The Agent is:
(i) non prudent when 2Ru −Pu > 0 and Pu = 0,
(ii) weakly prudent when 2Ru −Pu > 0 and Pu > 0,
(iii) very prudent when 2Ru −Pu < 0 and Pu > 0 .
We thus have Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Consider a risk neutral Principal and a risk averse Agent.
(i) When the Agent is ‘non prudent’ or ‘weakly prudent’, the reward function w∗(x)
is strictly concave in the performance signal x: w′′(x) < 0.
(ii) When the Agent is ‘very prudent’, the optimal reward function w∗(x) is con-
vex in performance (i.e. w′′(x) > 0) whenever the likelihood ratio is linear.
However, the result is undetermined if the likelihood ratio is strictly concave.
As speciﬁed by Chaigneau et al. (2017), the curvature of the optimal compensation depends
on both the curvature of the likelihood ratio in the performance signal x, and the Agent’s
risk preferences. In their paper, the optimal contract is more convex (in terms of curvature)
than the likelihood ratio if and only if 2Ru −Pu < 0. Same as in our model, they assume
the monotonicity of the likelihood ratio. We furthermore assume its concavity. This means
that in our study, a given variation of the performance in its low levels (i.e. in bad states
of nature or the downside) procures more information about the Agent’s eﬀort levels than
the same variation of performance in its high levels (i.e. in good states of nature or the
upside). We call this the likelihood ratio effect. Thus, without considering the agents’ risk
preferences, the optimal compensation shall be more sensitive to ﬁnal performance on the
downside than on the upside. This incentive is shaped by the likelihood ratio. We name
this the incentive effect.
The risk neutral Principal would thus prefer to oﬀer the Agent a strictly increasing and
concave compensation in performance. First, the increasing compensation incites the
Agent to reach higher performance levels. Second, the concave likelihood ratio implies
that, for variation in performance on the downside, her compensation varies more than for
the same variation in performance on the upside. Due to this incentive effect, the Agent
will exert higher eﬀort levels, to "rapidly" increase her compensation (especially on the
downside). This incentive property is however balanced by the Agent’s prudence.
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Indeed, when the Agent is prudent (i.e. downside risk averse), both an incentive effect and
a downside risk effect appear. This latter eﬀect appears when the Agent is downside risk
averse. In this case, the Agent is reluctant to bear high variability of her compensation in
bad states of nature, and may, hence, refuse a concave compensation. Nevertheless, her
degree of prudence (i.e. degree of downside risk aversion) may inﬂuence this result, as we
explain it in the following explanations.
When the Agent is very prudent, the downside risk effect is stronger than the incentive
effect. She might thus be very reluctant to accept a concave contract, and would rather
accept one that is less sensitive to performance in bad states of nature. In this case, non
concave contracts appear.
For a weakly prudent Agent, the incentive effect prevails over the downside risk effect.
In this case, the optimal compensation w∗ remains therefore concave, as preferred by the
Principal.
Finally, when the Agent is non prudent, and thus not averse to downside risk, the
downside risk effect is nonexistent. In that case, she does not mind bearing risk in bad
states of nature. Hence, only the likelihood ratio effect matters. For a concave likelihood
ratio, the optimal concave reward function gives the maximal incentive effect, especially
on the downside. The optimal compensation w∗ preferred by the risk neutral Principal is
therefore accepted by the risk averse and non prudent Agent.
Note that these results are valid whether both eﬀort dimensions have the same or
diﬀerent costs for the Agent, in terms of cost-of-eﬀort. This is because, as mentioned
earlier, both eﬀorts are additive and only the total amount of cost-of-eﬀort is taken into
account in determining the optimal reward structure.
In what follows, we illustrate our results with three examples.
Examples
The following examples show the case of a prudent (i.e. downside risk averse) Agent.
We present three utility functions, among which two lead to a concave optimal reward (i.e.
DARA utility function with σ > 1, and CARA utility function), and one leads to a convex
optimal reward (i.e. DARA utility function with 0< σ < 1).
The Principal is risk neutral. Consider that the distribution function F (x|t1, t2), pa-
rameterized by the Agent’s discrete eﬀort levels t1 ∈ {1,2} and t2 ∈ {0,1}, follows a gamma
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distribution with mean κ(t1 + t2), κ > 0. We deﬁne performance as x˜= t1 + t2 + ε, where
ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2. Let us use the notation t= t1+ t2.
With the assumption on x˜, we have f(x|t1, t2) ≡ f(x|t1 + t2) ≡ f(x|t). As the probability
distribution function follows a gamma distribution, we have that
f(x|t) =
1
Γ(κ)
(
t−κ·xκ−1·e−
x
t
)
,
and that
ft1(x|t) = ft2(x|t) =
xκ−1
Γ(κ)
(
−κ· t−κ−1·e−
x
t + x· t−κ−2·e−
x
t
)
.
We thus have the following likelihood ratios:
ft1(x|t)
f(x|t)
=
ft2(x|t)
f(x|t)
=
x−κt
t2
It is easy to verify that they are increasing and linear in x (i.e.
(
fti (x|t)
f (x|t)
)′
> 0 and(
fti (x|t)
f (x|t)
)′′
= 0, i= 1,2). Thus, linearity being a form of concavity, Assumption 1 holds.
The Agent has a DARA utility function
Suppose the Agent has a DARA utility function u(w(x)) = w(x)
1−σ
1−σ , ∀σ ∈ R
+\{0,1}. We
have the Agent’s absolute risk aversion Ru = σw(x) and her absolute prudence Pu =
σ+1
w(x)
,
∀w > 0, ∀x > 0, ∀σ ∈ R+ \ {1} 11. Thus, 2Ru −Pu = σ−1w(x) which is positive when σ > 1,
and negative when 0 < σ < 1. From Proposition 2, we shall have w′′ < 0 when σ > 1
(the Agent is weakly prudent: 2Ru −Pu > 0). However, w’s concavity is not guaranteed
anymore when 0 < σ < 1 (the Agent is very prudent: 2Ru − Pu < 0). The ﬁrst-order
condition (2.9) becomes, with t= t1 + t2 and ∀x,
w(x)σ = γ+ λ
x−κt
t2
+µ
x−κt
t2
= γ+ (λ+µ)
x−κt
t2
.
Hence:
w∗(x) =
(
γ+ (λ+µ)
x−κt
t2
) 1
σ
(2.11)
11Ru = −
−σw(x)−σ−1
w(x)−σ
= σ
w(x)
, and Pu = −
σ(σ+1)w(x)−σ−2
−σw(x)−σ−2
= σ+1
w(x)
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Case 1: A weakly prudent Agent (σ > 1)
The optimal reward function is concave as expected (i.e. w′′(x) < 0)12. This scheme is
depicted on Figure 2.2, using parameters σ = 2, γ = 0.2, λ= 0.05, µ= 0.1 and κ= 2. We
determine the optimal eﬀort levels by introducing w∗(x) in the objective function of the
Agent and by solving Program (2.5-2.7). We take into account the cases where it is more
or less costly for the Agent to exert t1 compared to t2, or where both eﬀorts represent the
same cost for her. The optimal eﬀort levels are (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (1,1).
Figure 2.2: w∗(x) for a risk averse and weakly prudent Agent (DARA u(w(x)))
Case 2: A very prudent Agent (0< σ < 1)
As predicted by Proposition 2, the optimal reward function is convex (i.e. w′′(x) > 0).
This is depicted on Figure 2.3, using the same parameters than before, except that now
σ = 0.5. The optimal eﬀort levels are (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (1,0).
Figure 2.3: w∗(x) for a risk averse and very prudent Agent (DARA u(w(x)))
12w∗
′′
(x) =
(
λ+µ
t2
)2
1
σ
(
1
σ − 1
)[
γ + x−κt
t2
(λ+µ)
] 1
σ
−2
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The risk averse Agent has a CARA utility function
Now, suppose that the Agent has a CARA utility function u(w(x)) = −1t1+t2 e
−(t1+t2)w(x),
such that she is weakly prudent (2Ru −Pu > 0 and Pu > 0). The optimal reward function
is
w∗(x) =
1
t1 + t2
· ln
[
γ+ (λ+µ)
x−κt
t2
]
(2.12)
It can be checked that w∗(x) is concave (i.e. w′′(x) < 0). This is conﬁrmed on Figure
2.4 hereafter. Again, we depict the optimal reward functions, using parameters γ = 0.2,
λ= 0.05, µ= 0.1 and κ= 2. The optimal eﬀort levels are (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (2,1).
Figure 2.4: w∗(x) for a risk averse and weakly prudent Agent (CARA u(w(x)))
Let us in the following Subsection consider the case where the Principal is not risk
neutral anymore.
2.3.3 Optimal compensation with a risk averse and prudent Principal
Consider now a risk averse and prudent Principal, whose preferences satisfy v′(.) > 0,
v′′(.) < 0 and v′′′(.) > 0. The Agent is risk averse and may be prudent.
The curvature of the optimal compensation w∗ is determined by the second derivative of
the left-hand-side term of Equation (2.9). It has to be negative to satisfy the characteristics
of the Equation’s right-hand-side term. The second derivative can be found by following
Theorem 1’s proof in Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018). It is given in Appendix B.1.
Furthermore, when both parties are prudent, we adopt the latter authors’ deﬁnition of a
"more downside risk averse" Principal than the Agent, by a factor k. By denoting Dom(v)
and Dom(u) the Principal’s and the Agent’s utility functions’ respective domains, Sinclair-
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Desgagne and Spaeter (2018) deﬁne that the Principal is more prudent than the Agent
by a factor k > 0, when kPuRu 6 PvRv, w(x) ∈ Dom(u) and x− w(x) ∈ Dom(v), for
any real number x.13 PuRu and PvRv capture the intensity of both parties’ prudence (i.e.
downside risk aversion) (Modica and Scarsini, 2005; Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter, 2018).
We thus have the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Consider a risk averse and prudent Principal, and a risk averse Agent.
(i) When the Agent is ‘non prudent’, the optimal reward function w∗(x) is concave
in the performance signal x: w′′(x) < 0.
(ii) When the Agent is ‘prudent’, but the Principal is more prudent by a factor
k > 0, in the sense defined by Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018), the optimal
reward function w∗(x) is ‘approximately concave’ in the performance signal x.
Proof of point (i). See Appendix B.1. 
The risk averse and prudent Principal is reluctant to bear the whole risk, in particular
the downside risk. Hence, he does not like a high sensitivity of his net proﬁt x−w(x) to ﬁnal
performance in bad states of nature. He would therefore prefer the Agent to “absorb” a
part of the net proﬁt’s variability in these states. Given that the ﬁnal performance depends
on the Agent’s eﬀort levels, and more importantly, that the likelihood ratio is concave,
he would like to propose her an increasing and concave compensation14. However, in this
case, both parties’ degrees of downside risk aversion may enter in conﬂict. The optimal
reward thus depends on their respective degrees of prudence.
When the Agent is non prudent, the downside risk effect is nonexistent. She accepts
downside risk in bad states of nature, and thus, a contract with a concave reward. This is
point (i) of Proposition 3.
Contrary to Hau (2011) and Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018) who obtain this result
with one single eﬀort for the Agent, we obtain it with two tasks. Hence, under complete
awareness of the Agent, the standard moral hazard problems with one single eﬀort for the
Agent can be generalized to cases of multiple additive eﬀorts.
13Alternatively, the Principal is more prudent than the Agent by a factor k, when k ·
u′′′(w(x))
u′(w(x))
6
v′′′(x−w(x))
v′(x−w(x))
, for w(x) ∈ Dom(u) and x−w(x) ∈ Dom(v).
14As seen in Section 2.3.2, a concave compensation gives the maximal incentive effect, especially on the
downside, when the likelihood ratio is concave.
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Now, when the Agent is prudent, she does not like a very sensitive reward in perfor-
mance in bad states of nature. This is also the case for the prudent Principal, knowing
that bad states for him are linked to low levels of his net proﬁt x−w(x). Hence, both
parties’ degrees of prudence enter in conﬂict. This is point (ii) of Proposition 3.
Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018) establish that “a Principal who is more downside
risk averse than the Agent [by a factor k] should set an incentive compensation (...) that
is approximately concave ((δ(k),0)-concave) in outcome”, where δ is a non-negative num-
ber15. They adapt the concept of approximate concavity from the mathematical property
of approximate concavity developed by Páles (2003). The more downside risk averse the
Principal is compared to the Agent, the more downside risk is delegated to the Agent, and
the more the optimal reward scheme ‘approaches some concave function’ in performance.
This means that, in a contract composed of concave (e.g. capped bonuses, ...) and convex
(e.g. stock call options, ...) components in performance, the convex ones become less
important in the contract than the concave ones. Hence, if our Principal is more downside
risk averse (i.e. prudent) than the Agent by a factor k, we obtain the same result, but
with multiple tasks.
Table 2.1 summarizes the six diﬀerent scenarios (in terms of both parties’ risk prefer-
ences) studied in this section.
Table 2.1: Optimal compensation schemes according to the parties’ preferences, for a
completely aware Agent
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
Principal
Agent
risk averse
&
non prudent
risk averse
&
weakly prudent
risk averse
&
very prudent
risk neutral & non prudent concave concave non concave
risk averse & prudent concave "approx. cc" ∗ "approx. cc" ∗
∗ "Approximately concave" means that the Principal is more prudent than the Agent by a factor k, in the
sense of Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018).
All these results are valid when the Agent is aware that her second eﬀort has an
impact on the ﬁnal performance level x. Unfortunately, this may no longer be the case
when unawareness appears. In the following Section, we study the optimal compensation
characteristics when the Agent may be unaware of the impact of her second eﬀort on the
distribution of x.
15To learn more about this function, see Lemma 2 of Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018).
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2.4 A two-task Principal-Agent model with possible unawareness
An Agent may not measure all the consequences her multiple tasks have on the ﬁnal
outcome, by underestimating the actual impact of some of them. Hence, she focuses on
those she believes to be relatively more signiﬁcant in impacting her work and salary. Her
impact estimation can, however, be more or less accurate, so that she can have diﬀerent
awareness levels, going from completely aware to completely unaware about this impact.
The modeling of the Agent’s wrong beliefs can, among others, be found in the literature
on exploitative contracting. These models assume that the Principal knows the Agent’s
tendency to commit (cognitive) mistakes, so that he is more informed about her beliefs
than she is (Köszegi, 2014). Likewise, we assume that, contrary to the Agent, the Principal
knows her unawareness level. Moreover, the Agent does not make deductions about her
awareness level from the oﬀered contract. This allows the Principal to "take advantage"
of the Agent’s mistaken beliefs by ‘adapting’ the contract. In Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
this "exploitation" occurs as follows. Naive Agents (buyer) underestimate the fact that
the product they want to buy needs add-on purchases.16 The Principal (seller) therefore
sells the product cheaper in the ﬁrst place, so that he can increase his future beneﬁts (if
the Agent pays for the add-ons to use the product properly). In our model, the Principal
may "use" the fact that the Agent underestimates her action’s impact on performance, by
adapting the compensation level given the unawareness level. This might allow him to
"compensate" a decrease of his proﬁt when the Agent chooses a lower optimal eﬀort level
due to her unawareness. In both cases, the Agent does not notice the Principal’s "strategy"
when accepting the contract.
Adapting the moral hazard model presented in Section 2.3, we introduce a parameter
being the Agent’s awareness level. Hence, according to the parameter, this model displays
symmetric as well as asymmetric awareness about the Agent’s second eﬀort’s impact on
performance. The Agent’s second eﬀort being unobservable, the Principal cannot signal
t∗2 in the contract when the Agent is unaware. He has to ﬁnd another way to limit the
decrease of his expected proﬁt.
16The transaction between the buyer and the seller can be seen as a contract between them, whereas the
product’s price is apparent to the compensation level.
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2.4.1 The possible unawareness model
This section presents a static moral-hazard model with a continuous degree of awareness
level of the Agent. We speciﬁcally study the case of a risk neutral Principal and a risk
averse Agent: v′(.) = 1, respectively u′(.) > 0,u′′(.) 6 0,u′′′(.) > 0. We introduce the
Agent’s level of awareness with the parameter α ∈ [0,1], observable by the Principal.
α = 0 represents a completely unaware Agent, 0 < α < 1 a partially aware Agent, and
α= 1 a completely aware Agent about the impact of t2 on performance x. The Principal is
completely aware about t2’s impact on x, such that he considers the conditional probability
density distribution f(x|t1, t2). The Agent, however, may unconsciously minimize this
impact. She believes in a conditional distribution of x that may be less sensitive to t2 than
in reality. We denote f (α)(x|t1, t2) the conditional probability density function considered
by the Agent. We make the following assumption in the remaining analysis:
Assumption 2 Let f (α)(x|t1, t2) be a probability density function.
∀t1, t2, ∀x, ∀α ∈ [0,1]: f
(α)
t1
(x|t1, t2) = ft1(x|t1, t2) and f
(α)
t2
(x|t1, t2) = αft2(x|t1, t2)
When the Agent underestimates t2’s impact on the distribution of x, she considers a lower
sensitivity to a given performance xˆ, as well as for given eﬀorts t1 and t2, than in the
case of complete awareness17. Intuitively, the probability to achieve a minimal given ﬁnal
performance xˆ or more (i.e. Proba(xˆ 6 x 6 x¯)) is lower when she underestimates t2’s
impact, than otherwise.
Let us furthermore consider the following deﬁnition of the probability density functions.
Definition 2 Let f and g be conditional probability density functions. We deﬁne the
following properties, ∀ x and ∀ t1, t2:
(i) f (α)(x|t1, t2) = f(x|t1, t2), when α= 1
(ii) f (α)(x|t1, t2) = g(x|t1), when α= 0
When α= 0, we infer from point (ii) that ft1(x|t1, t2) = gt1(x|t1), ∀ x and ∀ t1. We deﬁne
the likelihood ratio of the probability density function g(x|t1) by miG(x|t1) ≡
gti(x|t1)
g(x|t1)
,
i= 1,2. Similar to Section 2.3, we assume the following:
Assumption 3 (CMLRP). The Concave Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property holds for
g(x|t1): mix(x|t1) > 0, m
i
xx(x|t1)6 0, i= 1,2
17P roba(α)(x < xˆ) > P roba(1)(x < xˆ), when 06 α < 1
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The remaining assumptions of this possible unawareness model are similar to those of
the complete awareness model of Section 2.3. The Agent’s unobservable eﬀort levels t1
and t2 are limited such that ti ∈ [0, ti], for i = 1,2. The Principal pays the Agent with
a compensation depending on the performance x, and on the exogenous awareness level
α, denoted w(x,α). The Concave Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (CMLRP) of
Assumption 1 holds. Finally, recall from Section 2.3 that the Agent’s cost-of-eﬀort function
is increasing, strictly convex and twice-diﬀerentiable in both eﬀorts, denoted C(t1, t2) =
1
2
t21 +
1
2c t
2
2, with c > 0.
Applying the ﬁrst-order-approach to the Principal’s maximization program, it states that:
max
w
∫
(x−w(x,α)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx (2.13)
subject to∫
u(w(x,α)) · f (α)t1 (x|t1, t2)dx= t1 (2.14)∫
u(w(x,α)) · f (α)t2 (x|t1, t2)dx=
1
c
t2 (2.15)∫
u(w(x,α)) · f (α)(x|t1, t2)dx−
1
2
t21 −
1
2c
t22 > U0 (2.16)
Recall that t1 and t2 have been optimally chosen by the Principal. Computing ∂L∂w = 0 from
the Lagrangian of the Principal’s program (2.13-2.16) leads to the following Kuhn-Tucker
conditions:
1
u′(w(x,α))
=
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)

γ+ λf (α)t1 (x|t1, t2)
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
+µ
f
(α)
t2
(x|t1, t2)
f (α)(x|t1, t2)

 , ∀x (2.17)
Computation of Equation (2.17) is detailed in Appendix B.1.
Following Assumption 2 and Deﬁnition 2, Equation (2.17) becomes:
1
u′(w(x,α))
= γ
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+ λ
ft1(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+µα
ft2(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
, ∀x (2.18)
Computation of Equation (2.18) is detailed in Appendix B.1. This condition must be
satisﬁed for any level of x, which allows us to characterize the optimal compensation w∗(x)
in Subsection 2.4.2.
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2.4.2 Optimal compensation
The determination of the optimal compensation scheme depends on the structure of the
right-hand-side term of Equation (2.18).
With respect to performance
Let us ﬁrst analyze the curvature of the optimal compensation with performance x, for
given a given awareness level of the Agent. According to this level (α ∈ [0,1]), diﬀerent
Kuhn-Tucker conditions appear:
Case 1: The Agent is completely aware (α= 1). Equation (2.18) becomes Equation (2.9)
of Section 2.3 with a risk neutral Principal:
1
u′(w(x,α))
= γ+ λ
ft1(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+µ
ft2(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
, ∀x (2.19)
We recover the same result as in Subsection 2.3.2 (cf. Propositions 1 and 2).
Case 2: The Agent is completely unaware (α= 0). Equation (2.18) becomes:
1
u′(w(x,α))
=
g(x|t1)
f(x|t1, t2)
[
γ+ λ
gt1(x|t1)
g(x|t1)
]
, ∀ x. (2.20)
We notice that no likelihood ratio related to the Agent’s second eﬀort appears in the Kuhn-
Tucker condition (2.20). The contract w(x,α) depending directly on the ﬁnal performance
x, the Principal indirectly incentivizes the Agent to exert a positive second eﬀort through
x, except that she believes that her second eﬀort is useless for x. Thus, she will only exert
a positive eﬀort on her ﬁrst task.
According to Assumption 3, gt1 (x|t1)
g(x|t1)
is increasing and concave in x. Yet, the structure
of the right-hand-side term of Equation 2.20 depends on g(x|t1)
f (x|t1,t2)
. There are thus two
diﬀerent scenarios18.
Scenario (a) When g(x|t1)
f (x|t1,t2)
is such that the right-hand-side term of Equation 2.20 is
increasing and concave in x, the left-hand-side term must also be increasing and concave
in x. This means that we recover Equation 2.10. We thus have the same results as in
18A third scenario appears when the ratio
g(x|t1)
f (x|t1,t2)
is such that the right-hand-side term of Equation
2.20 is undetermined. In this case, we cannot conclude on the structure of w.
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Subsection 2.3.2 (cf. Propositions 1 and 2). In this scenario, we recover Chaigneau et al.
(2017)’s result, saying that the reward is convex if and only if the Agent is ‘very prudent’,
but with two tasks for an unaware Agent.
Scenario (b) When g(x|t1)
f (x|t1,t2)
is such that the right-hand-side term of Equation 2.20 is
increasing and convex in x, the left-hand-side term must also be increasing and convex in
x. This means that Equation 2.10 must be positive, as displayed hereafter:
∂2
∂x2
(
1
u′(w(x))
)
=(2Ru −Pu) ·
[
w′(x)
]2
+w′′(x)> 0 (2.21)
Given Proposition 1, we see that when the Agent is very prudent (i.e. 2Ru −Pu < 0), a
necessary condition to satisfy Equation 2.21 is w′′(x,α) > 0. Hence, the optimal reward is
strictly convex in this case.
Recall that Assumption 3 still prevails: performance levels in good states of nature
are less informative about the Agent’s eﬀort levels, than performance levels in bad states
of nature. Furthermore, a very prudent Agent does not like downside risk. Yet, we ﬁnd
that in this case, the optimal reward should be convex in x. This means that a trade-oﬀ
between the ‘likelihood ratio eﬀect’ and the strong prudence of the Agent appears. On one
hand, the concavity of the likelihood ratio tells us that the reward w should have a strong
variability with x in bad states of nature, and a weak variability with x in good states of
nature, all other things being equal. On the other hand, the Agent’s prudence tells us the
contrary. To resolve this trade-oﬀ, the Agent’s degree of prudence comes into play.
When the Agent is non or weakly prudent, the likelihood eﬀect is stronger than the Agent’s
prudence. Hence, w∗ may be concave or convex.
When the Agent is very prudent, her downside risk aversion is stronger than the likelihood
eﬀect. Hence, w∗ is strictly convex.
Contrary to Chaigneau et al. (2017) who ﬁnd under the assumption of a linear likelihood
ratio, that the optimal reward is convex if and only if the Agent is ‘very prudent’, we ﬁnd
that it is possible to have a convex reward when the Agent is not ‘very prudent’, when the
Agent is unaware. We thus have the following Proposition:
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Proposition 4 Consider a risk neutral Principal and a risk averse and unaware Agent,
such that the right-hand-side term of the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker condition is
convex in x.
When the Agent is ‘very prudent’ (i.e. 2Ru −Pu < 0), the optimal reward function
w∗(x,α) is strictly convex in x: w′′(x,α) > 0.
In Appendix B.2, interested readers will ﬁnd a particular case of this model when
α = 0. We adapt the model to the case where t2 is observable by the Principal, and the
Agent is not paid when t2 , t∗2. We recover similar results than in Propositions 1 and 4.
Case 3: The Agent is partially unaware (0< α < 1). The Kuhn-Tucker condition (2.18)
stays unchanged. According to Assumption 2, ft1 (x|t1,t2)
f (x|t1,t2)
and ft2 (x|t1,t2)
f (x|t1,t2)
are increasing and
concave in x. Hence, the structure of the ﬁnal compensation depends on f
(α)(x|t1,t2)
f (x|t1,t2)
. When
this ratio is such that the right-hand-side term of Condition 2.20 is increasing and concave
in x, we recover the results of Subsection 2.3.2 (cf. Propositions 1 and 2). On the contrary,
when this ratio is such that the right-hand-side term of Condition 2.20 is increasing and
convex in x, we recover the results of Propositions 1 and 4.
In hand of all these results, we notice that when the Agent is unaware, her optimal
reward depends on her degree of downside risk aversion.
With respect to the Agent’s awareness level
Let us now analyze the impact of the Agent’s awareness level α on the optimal compen-
sation w∗, for a given performance level x.
The more the Agent’s awareness level increases, the "more aware" she is about her
second eﬀort t2’s impact on the distribution of x. Hence, she knows that when increasing t2,
all other things being equal, she puts more weight on higher performance levels, and less on
lower performance levels. Accordingly, we make the following assumption on F (α)(x|t1, t2):
Assumption 4 F (α)(x|t1, t2) is such that
∂
∂α
∫ xˆ
0
f (α)(x|t1, t2)dx < 0 and
∂
∂α
∫ x¯
xˆ
f (α)(x|t1, t2)dx > 0
and
∂2
∂α2
∫ x
0
f (α)(x|t1, t2)dx= 0.
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Assumption 4 says that when the performance x is under a given level xˆ, distribution f (α)
decreases when α increases. Then, when performance x reaches a level between xˆ and a
maximum x¯, distribution f (α) increases with α. Graphically, compared to the distribution
f of a completely aware Agent (i.e. α= 1), an unaware Agent’s distribution f (α) is under
f when x ∈ [0, xˆ[, and above it when x ∈]xˆ, x¯].
The ﬁrst derivative of Equation 2.17’s right-hand-side term (let us denote it A), with
respect to α, is given by:
∂
∂α
A= γ
f
(α)
α (x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+µ
ft2(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
, ∀x, ∀α ∈ [0,1] (2.22)
Furthermore, Equation 2.17’s left-hand-side term’s ﬁrst derivative, with respect to α, is
given by:
∂
∂α
(
1
u′(w(x,α))
)
=
[
−u′(w(x,α))−2 ·u′′(w(x,α))
]
·w′(x,α), ∀x, ∀α ∈ [0,1] (2.23)
When x ∈ [0, xˆ[, according to Assumption 4, ∂∂α f
(α) < 0. In that case, under the con-
dition γ|f (α)α | > µft2 , Equation (2.22) is negative. Hence, when this condition is satisﬁed
(which we assume), Equation (2.23) must be negative too. A necessary condition to satisfy
this, is w′(x,α) < 0, ∀x ∈ [0, xˆ].
Now when x ∈]xˆ, x¯], according to Assumption 4, ∂∂α f
(α) > 0. In this case, Equation
(2.22) is always positive. Hence, Equation (2.23) must be positive too. A necessary
condition to satisfy this, is w′(x,α) > 0, ∀x ∈]xˆ, x¯].
The second derivative of Equation 2.17’s right-hand-side term, with respect to α, is
f
(α)
αα , which is zero according to Assumption 4. Hence, the second derivative of Equation
2.17’s left-hand-side, with respect to α, must also be zero. ∀x, ∀α ∈ [0,1], it is given by:
∂2
∂α2
(
1
u′(w(x,α))
)
=
[
2
u′(w)3
·w′ ·u′′(w)−
1
u′(w)2
·u′′′(w) ·w′
]
·w′+
[
−1
u′(w)2
·u′′(w)
]
·w′′ (2.24)
A necessary condition for Equation (2.24) to be zero, is w′′(x,α) > 0.
All this permits us to state the following Proposition:
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Proposition 5 Consider a risk neutral Principal and a risk averse Agent, and let α ∈ [0,1]
be the Agent’s awareness level about her second effort’s impact on performance x.
(i) The higher α, the lower the Agent’s reward level when x ∈ [0, xˆ] (i.e. wα(x,α) <
0), and the higher her reward level when x ∈]xˆ, x¯] (i.e. wα(x,α) > 0).
(ii) The higher α, the higher the incentive effect, that is, the more variable the
optimal reward function w∗(x,α) with x, ∀x (i.e. wαα(x,α) > 0).
Point (i) of Proposition 5 tells us that the Principal strategically takes the Agent’s
awareness level into account. For two given awareness levels, the Agent will receive an
equal average reward. However, the more aware the Agent is, the more the Principal will
pay her, but not at any performance levels: he will pay her more at higher performance
levels. Indeed, he wants to incentivize her to exert higher t2 levels to achieve higher x
levels. On the contrary, when the Agent is less aware, the Principal ﬁnds it useless to
pay her more at higher performance levels (i.e. performance levels that can be reached by
combining high eﬀort levels on both tasks t1 and t2), since she will not increase her second
eﬀort level t2. Hence, he can "use" the Agent’s lack of awareness and pay her at the level
she believes to be rightful according to her awareness level on t2’s impact on x.
Point (ii) of Proposition 5 can be explained as follows. When the Agent’s belief is such
that 06 α < 1, she will always choose a lower t2 level than the optimal one wanted by the
Principal19: she will choose a t2 level corresponding to the belief she has on t2’s impact
on performance x. The Principal thus ﬁnds it useless to propose her a reward with a
strong incentive effect. It is, however, possible to incentivize a more aware Agent to exert
higher t2 levels, in order to reach higher performance levels. To do so, he will increase her
downside risk to increase the incentive effect.
For concreteness, we now illustrate our results in hand of two examples. We consider
a DARA utility function for the Agent.
Examples
Consider a risk neutral Principal and a risk averse and prudent Agent. Recall the examples
of Subsection 2.3.2 with a DARA utility function (i.e. u(w(x)) = w(x)
1−σ
1−σ , ∀σ ∈ R
+\{0,1})
for the Agent. Consider the distribution function F (x|t1, t2) following a gamma distribu-
tion with mean κ(t1 + t2), κ > 0, and parameterized by the Agent’s discrete eﬀort levels
19Moreover, when α = 0, she will exert t2 = 0
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t1 ∈ {1,2} and t2 ∈ {0,1}. We deﬁne performance as x˜ ≡ t1 + t2 + ε, where ε is normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2. Given the assumption on x˜, we denote the
probability density function of a completely aware agent f(x|t1, t2) ≡ f(x|t1 + t2). Ad-
ditionally, we deﬁne a density function, denoted f (α)(x|t1, t2), which corresponds to the
probability density function an Agent considers when she underestimates t2’s impact on x.
We have that f (α)(x|t1, t2) ≡ f(x|t1 +αt2). As the distribution function follows a gamma
distribution, we have that
f(x|t1 + t2) =
1
Γ(κ)
(t1 + t2)
−κ·xκ−1·e
− x
t1+t2 (2.25)
and
f(x|t1 +αt2) =
1
Γ(κ)
(t1 +αt2)
−κ·xκ−1·e
− x
t1+αt2 (2.26)
Diﬀerentiating (2.25) with respect to t1 and t2 respectively, we determine that
fti(x|t1 + t2) =
xκ−1
Γ(κ)
·
(
x
(t1 + t2)κ+2
−
κ
(t1 + t2)κ+1
)
· e
− x
t1+t2 , i= 1,2 (2.27)
The likelihood ratios of f are the following:
fti(x|t1 + t2)
f(x|t1 + t2)
=
x−κ(t1 + t2)
(t1 + t1)2
, i= 1,2 (2.28)
It is easy to verify that the likelihood ratio is increasing and linear in x20. Thus, Assump-
tion 1 holds. From (2.25) and (2.26), we have
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
=
f(x|t1 +αt2)
f(x|t1 + t2)
=
[
t1 + t2
t1 +αt2
]κ
· e
(α−1)xt2
(t1+αt2)(t1+t2) (2.29)
Given (2.28) and (2.29), the ﬁrst-order condition (2.18) becomes, ∀x:
w(x)σ = (λ+µα)
x−κ(t1 + t2)
(t1 + t2)2
+ γ
[
t1 + t2
t1 +αt2
]κ
· e
(α−1)xt2
(t1+αt2)(t1+t2) (2.30)
20 ∂
∂x
(
fti (x|t)
f (x|t)
)
> 0 and ∂
2
∂x2
(
fti (x|t)
f (x|t)
)
= 0, i = 1,2
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The optimal reward level w∗(x) is thus
w∗(x) =
[
(λ+µα)
x−κ(t1 + t2)
(t1 + t2)2
+ γ
[
t1 + t2
t1 +αt2
]κ
· e
(α−1)xt2
(t1+αt2)(t1+t2)
] 1
σ
(2.31)
In the following two cases, we determine the optimal eﬀort levels for three levels of
awareness of the Agent (i.e. α= 1,α= 0.5 and α= 0). We then depict the optimal reward
functions, given the Agent’s awareness level, to see how the optimal reward depends on
the Agent’s awareness.
Case 1: A weakly prudent Agent (σ > 1)
As in Subsection 2.3.2, it can be checked that when σ > 1, the optimal reward function is
concave as expected (w′′(x) < 0). The optimal eﬀort levels are determined by introducing
(2.31) in the Agent’s objective function, and by solving Program (2.14)-(2.16). Table
2.2 gives the Agent’s optimal eﬀort levels (from the eﬀort levels considered) for diﬀerent
awareness levels.
Table 2.2: Optimal eﬀort levels for a weakly prudent Agent (DARA utility function), given
her awareness level α
α= 1 α= 0.5 α= 0
σ > 1 (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (1,1) (t
∗
1, t
∗
2) = (2,0) (t
∗
1, t
∗
2) = (2,0)
Parameters: σ = 2, γ = 0.2, λ = 0.05, µ = 0.1 and κ = 2
Figure 2.5 depicts the optimal rewards w∗. Note that when the Agent is completely
aware (α= 1, black curve) the optimal reward is the same than in the example of Section
2.3.
Figure 2.5: w∗(x,α) for a weakly prudent Agent and diﬀerent α levels (DARA u(w(x,α)))
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By scaling Figure 2.5 on lower performance levels, we conﬁrm Point (i) of Proposition
5, with xˆ = 4. This is depicted hereafter, where condition γ|f (α)α | > µft2 is satisﬁed for
x ∈ [0,4], with κ= 2, γ = 0.2, µ= 0.1, and the eﬀort levels determined in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.5: w∗(x,α) for a weakly prudent Agent and diﬀerent α levels (DARA u(w(x,α)))
Case 2: A very prudent Agent (0< σ < 1)
When 0 < σ < 1, the optimal reward function is convex (w′′(x) > 0). The optimal eﬀort
levels, from t1 ∈ {1,2} and t2 ∈ {0,1}, are presented in Table 2.3 hereafter.
Table 2.3: Optimal eﬀort levels for a very prudent Agent (DARA utility function), given
her awareness level α
α= 1 α= 0.5 α= 0
0< σ < 1 (t∗1, t
∗
2) = (1,0) (t
∗
1, t
∗
2) = (1,0) (t
∗
1, t
∗
2) = (1,0)
Parameters: σ = 0.5, γ = 0.2, λ = 0.05, µ = 0.1 and κ = 2
The optimal rewards for the Agent’s diﬀerent levels of awareness are depicted in Figure
2.6. Again, when the Agent is completely aware (α = 1, black curve) the optimal reward
is the same than in the example of Section 2.3.
Figure 2.6: w∗(x,α) for a very prudent Agent and diﬀerent α levels (DARA u(w(x,α)))
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2.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
As shown in hand of these examples, the optimal reward function has always the
same structure (e.g. concavity, convexity, ...) for given utility functions and distribution,
regardless of the Agent’s awareness level toward t2’s impact on x. However, the reward
level depends on the Agent’s awareness level.
2.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
This chapter incorporates possible asymmetric awareness in a standard two task principal-
agent model with moral hazard. We assume that the Principal is equally or more aware
than the Agent about her second eﬀort’s impact on the outcome’s distribution. This
means that, when less aware than the Principal, the Agent has an information structure
with missing or incomplete information concerning her second task, such that she has
mistaken beliefs about the true environment. In this context, we determine the optimal
compensation scheme the Principal should oﬀer the Agent. We do not intent to make the
Agent aware by modifying her information structure. Our basic assumption is that it is
in the interest of the Principal to leave the Agent unaware when she is.
We show that, when both parties have symmetric awareness levels, the optimal com-
pensation is impacted by (1) the assumption of the Monotone Concave Likelihood Ratio
Property, and (2) the degree of downside risk aversion (i.e. prudence) of both parties. The
Agent refuses a strictly concave reward in performance when being too prudent, because
such a contract is too risky (i.e. variable) on the downside. The shape of the optimal re-
ward in this case depends on the Principal’s risk preferences, who has to make a trade-oﬀ
between incentive effect and downside risk effect.
When asymmetric awareness emerges, under the assumption of a zero default eﬀort
level of the Agent, we show that the previous trade-oﬀ still prevails. An interesting ﬁnding
is that the Principal takes the Agent’s awareness level into account when proposing the
contract: although the average reward is the same regardless of the awareness degree, the
less aware the Agent, the less the Principal will pay her for good performance levels, in
addition to decrease the incentive eﬀect of the reward. Making the reward less variable
with performance adds risk for the Principal, but being risk neutral, this is not an issue.
Let us end this chapter with a brief application of our results, and consider the case
of a renovation work, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. The Principal is a
project manager, the Agent is a craftsman and the performance observed by the project
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manager represents the renovated building’s ﬁnal energy performance. The craftsman’s
ﬁrst task can be seen as the actual renovation of the building. Her associated eﬀort is the
eﬀort level she puts into her work: more conscientiously, or faster and without caution.
Her second task can be considered as the participation in a low-energy training to learn
new eﬀective renovation techniques. Her associated eﬀort is the eﬀort level she puts into
such a speciﬁc training.
The craftsman’s degree of risk aversion plays an important role in the incentive eﬀect the
project manager can give: when too prudent (i.e. downside risk averse), the craftsman will
be reluctant to accept a concave contract. Hence, she will be more diﬃcult to incentivize
to spend a high number of hours in a low-energy training. Now, when the craftsman
additionally underestimates the impact of learning eﬃcient techniques (and applying them
correctly), on the building’s performance, she will be very diﬃcult to incentivize to simply
participate in a training. Indeed, as she ﬁnds it less important or useless, she will less or
not participate in a training, and thus be unable to apply these eﬃcient techniques on the
renovation work. Such a behavior is likely to have a negative impact on the building’s ﬁnal
performance. Given this situation, the project manager will nevertheless try to increase
his beneﬁt out of this project. Knowing the craftsman’s awareness level, he will propose
her a contract incentivizing her to exert the highest possible eﬀort level corresponding to
the impact she believes the training may have on the buildings performance.
The main limit of our model, if the main purpose of energy renovation is to achieve
a high energy performance of the building (i.e. high levels of performance), is that it
does not make the Agent aware about the importance of being trained to achieve the
highest possible performance levels. Determining models making Agents aware about it
and incentivizing them to choose the best eﬀort levels could be the purpose of a future
research.
In another future extension of this research, it would be interesting to analyze the
impact of the contract’s shape (concavity, convexity) given the Agent’s participation con-
straint. Considering the application on the renovation works, this would allow to determine
which contracts may "attract" trained or non trained craftsmen. Knowing this is interest-
ing since the participation of trained craftsmen may positively impact the building’s ﬁnal
energy performance.
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B.1 Proofs of Propositions and equation computations
Computation of Equation (2.9) Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian (2.8) with respect to w
gives, ∀x:
∂L
∂w
= 0
⇔ − v′(x−w(x)).f(x|t1, t2) + λ[u′(w(x)).ft1 ] +µ[u
′(w(x)).ft2 ] + γ[u
′(w(x)).f(x|t1, t2)] = 0, ∀x
⇔
v′(x−w(x))
u′(w(x))
= γ+ λ
ft1(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+µ
ft2(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
, ∀x 
Proof of Proposition 1 Since the right-hand-side term of Equation (2.9) is increasing in
the performance signal x (given the positive Lagrange multipliers and Assumption
1), the left-hand-side term must present the same characteristics for any x.
∂
∂x
(
v′(x−w(x))
u′(w(x))
)
> 0
⇔
v′′(x−w(x)) · (1−w′(x)) ·u′(w(x))− v′(x−w(x)) ·u′′(w(x)) ·w′(x)
[u′(w(x))]2
> 0
⇔
−w′(x) ·
[
v′′(x−w(x)) ·u′(w(x)) + v′(x−w(x)) ·u′′(w(x))
]
+ v′′(x−w(x)) ·u′(w(x))
[u′(w(x))]2
> 0
⇔ −
1
u′(w(x))
[
−w′(x) ·
[
v′′(x−w(x))− v′(x−w(x)) ·Ru(x)
]
+ v′′(x−w(x))
]
> 0
(B.1)
where Ru is the Agent’s absolute risk aversion ratio of Arrow-Pratt (Pratt, 1964). Given
the risk preferences v′ > 0, u′ > 0, v′′ 6 0, u′′ 6 0, a necessary condition to satisfy Equation
(B.1), when either v′′ < 0 or u′′ < 0, is w′(x) > 0. 
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Computation of Equation (2.10) Diﬀerentiating the right-hand-side term of Equation (2.9),
where the Principal is risk neutral entails the following Equation:
∂2
∂x2
(
1
u′(w(x))
)
6 0
⇔ −u′′′(w(x)) ·
[
w′(x)
]2
·
[
u′(w(x))
]−2
−u′′(w(x)) ·w′′(x) ·
[
u′(w(x))
]−2
+ 2
[
u′′(w(x))
]2
·
[
w′′(x)
]2
·
[
u′(w(x))
]−3
6 0
⇔
1
u′(w(x))
[
−
u′′′(w(x))
u′′(w(x))
·
u′′(w(x))
u′(w(x))
·
[
w′(x)
]2
−
u′′(w(x))
u′(w(x))
·w′′(x) + 2
(
u′′(w(x))
u′(w(x))
)2
·
[
w′′(x)
]2]
6 0
⇔
1
u′(w(x))
[
−PuRu ·
[
w′(x)
]2
+Ru ·w
′′(x) + 2Ru
[
w′′(x)
]2]
6 0
⇔
Ru
u′(w(x))
[
(2Ru −Pu) ·
[
w′(x)
]2
+w′′(x)
]
6 0
⇔(2Ru −Pu) ·
[
w′(x)
]2
+w′′(x)6 0 (B.2)
It is easy to see from Equation (B.2), that when 2Ru > Pu, the optimal compensation
w∗(x) is concave (i.e. w′′(x) < 0). In other words, if the Agent’s prudence is suﬃciently
weak, even nonexistent, the Agent will accept a concave compensation in the performance
x. 
Proof of Point (i) of Proposition 3 When the Principal is risk averse and prudent, the
second derivative of the left-hand-side term of Equation (2.9) (calculated in the
proof of Theorem 1 in Sinclair-Desgagne and Spaeter (2018)) is given by
2w′(x) ·Ru ·
∂
∂x
[
v′(x−w(x))
u′(w(x))
]
+
v′(x−w(x))
u′(w(x))
·
[
w′′(x) · (Rv +Ru) + (1−w′(x))2PvRv −
[
w′(x)
]2
·PuRu
]
(B.3)
The sign of Expression (B.3) depends on the sign of
w′′(x) · (Rv +Ru) + (1−w′(x))2PvRv −
[
w′(x)
]2
·PuRu (B.4)
For a risk averse and non prudent Agent, we have Ru > 0 and Pu = 0. Thus, as
Expression (B.4) has to be negative (i.e. Assumption 1, CMLRP), we can solve:
w′′(x) · (Rv +Ru) + (1−w′(x))2 ·PvRv 6 0 (B.5)
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For a risk averse and prudent Principal, we have Rv > 0 and Pv > 0. A necessary con-
dition to satisfy Equation (B.5), is to have w′′(x) > 0, i.e. the optimal compensation
has to be concave in the performance signal x. 
Computation of Equation (2.17) The Lagrangian of maximization program (2.13-2.16) is
L(w,λ,µ,γ) =
∫
(x−w(x,α)) · f(x|t1, t2)dx
+ λ
[∫
u(w(x,α)) · f (α)t1 (x|t1, t2)dx− t1
]
+µ
[∫
u(w(x,α)) · f (α)t2 (x|t1, t2)dx−
1
c
t2
]
+ γ
[∫
u(w(x,α)) · f (α)(x|t1, t2)dx−
1
2
t21 −
1
2c
t22 −U0
]
(B.6)
Diﬀerentiating Lagrangian (B.6) with respect to w gives, ∀x:
∂L
∂w
= 0
⇔ − 1 · f(x|t1, t2)
+ λ[u′(w(x,α)) · f (α)t1 ]
+µ[u′(w(x,α)) · f (α)t2 ]
+ γ[u′(w(x,α)) · f (α)(x|t1, t2)] = 0, ∀x
⇔
1
u′(w(x,α))
= λ
f
(α)
t1
f
+µ
f
(α)
t2
f
+ γ
f (α)
f
, ∀x
⇔
1
u′(w(x,α))
=
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)

λf (α)t1 (x|t1, t2)
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
+µ
f
(α)
t2
(x|t1, t2)
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
+ γ

 , ∀x 
Computation of Equation (2.18) Replacing the properties f (α)t1 = ft1 and f
(α)
t2
= αft1 in
Equation (2.17) gives, ∀x:
1
u′(w(x,α))
=
f (α)
f

λf (α)t1
f (α)
+µ
f
(α)
t2
f (α)
+ γ


=
f (α)
f
[
λ
ft1
f (α)
+µ
αft2
f (α)
+ γ
]
= λ
ft1(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+µα
ft2(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
+ γ
f (α)(x|t1, t2)
f(x|t1, t2)
,∀x 
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B.2 A two-task Principal-Agent model with complete unawareness:
the case of an observable second task
In this extension of Section 2.4, we assume that the Agent is completely unaware that
her eﬀort for the second task impacts the ﬁnal performance’s distribution (i.e. α = 0).
Hence, the Agent considers only t1 as a decision variable. In the meantime, the Principal
is looking for a way to incentivize the Agent to choose optimal levels for both eﬀorts t1 and
t2. As in Section 2.4, we study the case of a risk neutral Principal and a risk averse and
possibly prudent Agent. However, we now make the assumption that the Agent’s second
task is observable by the Principal.
B.2.1 The complete unawareness model
The assumptions made in Section 2.4 remain valid for this model. Furthermore, we assume
that, being completely unaware (α= 0), the Agent chooses to exert no eﬀort t2. Knowing
the Agent’s awareness level, the Principal anticipates this, and, hence, does not support
t2’s optimal eﬀort choice by an incentive constraint. This would be useless and costly
for him. Auster (2013) also argues that there exists no direct incentive effect (through
performance), and that only the participation effect matters. Consequently, according to
Auster (2013), the best for the Principal is to leave the Agent unaware. However, in our
model, the Principal can create an explicit monetary incentive, since t2 is observable. As
Baron and Kreps (1999, p. 269) explain, “if a task is not formally recognized in a worker’s
incentive pay, he or she has less incentive to pay attention to that task”. To do this, he
can propose a contract that announces explicitly t∗2: w(x,α, t
∗
2). Making the Agent aware
is not important for the Principal. By signaling t∗2, he actually restricts the Agent’s choice
set, which is the opposite than enlarging her awareness level. The action of signaling t∗2
is, however, costly for the Principal. We thus make the following assumption:
Assumption 5 When the Agent is completely unaware (α = 0) and her second task t2 is
observable, it is in the Principal’s interest to signal t∗2 in the contract.
Furthermore, as an incentive for the Agent to exert t2 = t∗2 despite her complete unaware-
ness, the Principal decides to not pay her if she exerts a lower eﬀort level than t∗2, such
that w(x,α, t2) = 0, ∀ t2 , t∗2.
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Hence, the Principal’s maximization program is as follows:
max
w
∫
(x−w(x,α, t∗2))f(x|t1, t
∗
2)dx (B.7)
subject to
t1 ∈ argmax
∫
u(w(x,α, t∗2))g(x|t1)dx−C(t1, t
∗
2) (B.8)∫
u(w(x,α, t∗2))g(x|t1)dx−C(t1, t
∗
2)> U0 (B.9)
w(x,α, t2) = 0,∀ t2 , t∗2 (B.10)
The density function g(x|t1) considered by the Agent indicates that she is unaware that
her second eﬀort has consequences on the distribution of x.
The Lagrangian of the maximization program can be written as:
L(w,λ,γ,η) =
∫
(x−w(x,α, t∗2)) · f(x|t1, t
∗
2)dx
+ λ[
∫
u(w(x,α, t∗2))gt1(x|t1)dx− t1]
+ γ[
∫
u(w(x,α, t∗2))g(x|t1)dx−
1
2
t21 −
1
2c
(t∗2)
2 −U0]
+ η[w(x,α, t2)] (B.11)
where the Lagrange multipliers λ, γ and η are positive (Jewitt, 1988; Jung and Kim, 2015).
Similarly to Section 2.3, computing ∂L∂w = 0 leads to the following Kuhn-Tucker condition:
1
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
=
g(x|t1)
f(x|t1, t∗2)− η
[
λ ·
gt1(x|t1)
g(x|t1)
+ γ
]
(B.12)
This condition must be satisﬁed for any level of x, which allows us to characterize
the optimal compensation w∗(x,α, t∗2). The computation of Equation (B.12) is available
in Appendix B.2.3. The following Subsection B.2.2 describes the optimal compensation
scheme.
B.2.2 Optimal compensation
The positive Lagrange multipliers and the increasing and concave likelihood ratio gt1 (x|t1)
g(x|t1)
in performance x (cf. Assumption 3) entail that the term into brackets in Equation (B.12)
is increasing and concave in x. Hence, the structure of Equation (B.12)’s right-hand-
side term depends on the ratio g(x|t1)
f (x|t1,t∗2)−η
. Consequently, when the Agent exerts t∗2, we
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recover the results given in Propositions 1 and 4. The shape of the reward does not change,
regardless of t2’s observability. Otherwise, her payment is zero.
Contrary to the model with unobservable t2, this model captures t2 twice: (a) im-
perfectly through ﬁnal performance and (b) perfectly through the direct observation of
t2.
Thus, in the present scenario (α=0), the main diﬀerence between both models may
concern the level of the optimal compensation: on one hand, when the Agent chooses
t2 = t∗2, the Agent’s reward w increases directly through t
∗
2 included in the contract, and
indirectly through the impact of t∗2 on the distribution of the performance x (the Principal
pays the Agent twice). On the other hand, contrary to the model with an unobservable
t2, when the Agent chooses t2 , t∗2, her payment is zero, regardless of the eﬀort exerted on
her ﬁrst task.
Hence, the Agent’s average payment level is lower when t2 is observable than when unob-
servable.
B.2.3 Computation related to the complete unawareness model
Computation of Equation (B.12) Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian of the maximization prob-
lem (B.7)-(B.9) with respect to the compensation w leads to the following Kuhn-
Tucker condition.
∂L
∂w
= 0
⇔f(x|t1, t∗2) = λ[u
′(w(x,α, t∗2)) · gt1(x|t1)] + γ[u
′(w(x,α, t∗2)) · g(x|t1)] + η
⇔
f(x|t1, t∗2)
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
= λ · gt1(x|t1) + γ · g(x|t1) +
η
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
⇔
f(x|t1, t∗2)
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
−
η
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
= λ · gt1(x|t1) + γ · g(x|t1)
⇔
f(x|t1, t∗2)− η
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
= λ · gt1(x|t1) + γ · g(x|t1)
⇔
1
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
= λ ·
gt1(x|t1)
f(x|t1, t∗2)− η
+ γ ·
g(x|t1)
f(x|t1, t∗2)− η
⇔
1
u′(w(x,α, t∗2))
=
g(x|t1)
f(x|t1, t∗2)− η
[
λ ·
gt1(x|t1)
g(x|t1)
+ γ
]
,∀x. 
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Chapter 3
Knowledge acquisition or incentive to
foster coordination ? A real-effort
weak-link experiment with craftsmen
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CHAPTER 3. COORDINATION IN A REAL-EFFORT WEAK-LINK EXPERIMENT
3.1 Introduction
After having studied the vertical problematic in Chapter 2, we are interested in Chapter 3 to
analyze, in an economic experiment with "real" craftsmen, which contract features a project
manager may propose to multiple craftsmen, in order to trigger successful and eﬃcient
coordination among them. We may call this the horizontal problematic as displayed in
Figure 3.1 hereafter.
Note: Both the project owner and the project manager can have the role of the Principal.
Figure 3.1: Horizontal problematic between a project manager and multiple craftsmen
In a lot of situations, coordination is key to success for teams. For example, a sports
team can have the best athletes, or a business the most talented employees, if they cannot
coordinate their actions towards the goal, they will not succeed. Although necessary,
specialization and skills are not always suﬃcient to achieve the best outcomes.
In this chapter, we present the results of a real-eﬀort lab experiment in which we com-
pare, in a within-group design, individual-based and group-based incentives to coordinate
on high eﬀort levels for craftsmen working on renovation projects. The originality of the
experiment is that it gathers "real" workers from the construction sector where coordina-
tion is essential given the weak-link property of the tasks (i.e. one worker fails to achieve
her goal and all the work is spoiled). Furthermore, we do not only compare the eﬀects
of diﬀerent incentives, but also look at the eﬀect of coordination training by comparing
subjects having endogenously been trained to coordination and others who have not.
A long literature has shown that in many diﬀerent situations teams end up coordinating
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at ineﬃcient outcomes (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Weber et al., 2001; Brandts and Cooper,
2006, ...), and thus, failing to coordinate. Such coordination failure can be due to subject-
pool eﬀects (Engelmann and Normann, 2010), the lack of possibility to choose his team
members (Riedl et al., 2016), team heterogeneity in terms of productivity (Meidinger et al.,
2003), free-riding, even when cooperation is a dominant strategy (Holmstrom, 1982) or
strategic uncertainty (Van Huyck et al., 1990).
Importantly, strategic uncertainty may make incentive contracts "fragile", particularly
in environments presenting a weak-link property (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Cooper et al.,
2018). This uncertainty arises (1) when subjects ﬁnd it too risky to exert a high-eﬀort level
(i.e. choosing the payoﬀ-dominant eﬀort) while being not sure about their team members’
strategies, and (2) when subjects keep in mind earlier periods of the game. For instance, it
has been shown that when earlier outcomes were low, because of one team member choosing
a low eﬀort, subjects ﬁnd it hard to trust the others to coordinate at high eﬀort levels.
As exposed by Knez and Simester (2001), a typical example of a weak-link environment is
the take-oﬀ of an airplane. Before departing, many operations and procedures have to be
fulﬁlled (e.g. cleaning, fueling, loading of the food, security checks, loading of the luggage,
passenger boarding, ...). All these tasks are complementary, because if one of these is
not well executed, the plane will not take-oﬀ on time. Furthermore, some employees’ high
eﬀorts may be in vain if only one of them does not perform well in her task. Such a linkage
corresponds to a "production technology of the weak-link type". It means that a ﬁrm’s
outcome (e.g. on-time departure) depends on the employees’ worst performance. In other
words, to achieve a high performance, every employee must coordinate on exerting high
eﬀort levels. As the outcome depends on the worst performance (i.e. the minimum eﬀort)
of the members of a team, so does everyone’s payoﬀ. Such a contract is thus appropriate
to incentivize towards eﬃcient coordination among the employees.
However, using laboratory experiments1, Van Huyck et al. (1990) have shown that such
a mechanism is only eﬃcient for very small groups of workers (i.e. two players). Additional
mechanisms are thus required to increase coordination, especially in larger groups. Here
again, the experimental literature has pointed out ﬁve diﬀerent tools that are eﬀective to
facilitate coordination in weak-link situations.
First, costless pre-play communication has been shown to be eﬀective in facilitating
1The weak-link technology has been studied in the lab through the so-called weak-link games, also called
minimum eﬀort games.
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coordination (see, for instance, Cooper et al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007). When
subjects can send messages to their team members, before choosing their action, it re-
assures players on the team members’ intentions to target high eﬀort levels, and helps
them overcome strategic uncertainty. Secondly, endogenous group formation, where sub-
jects can endogenously choose their group members, has also proved to be very eﬀective.
Particularly, Riedl et al. (2016) show how exclusion can be a disciplining device. When
high performers can exclude low performers, the latter increase their eﬀort to avoid being
excluded. Chen (2017) also points out a social identity eﬀect such that "a person who
chooses her own group will more strongly identify with that group, and care more about
the outcome of the group’s other members". Thirdly, Bornstein et al. (2002) show that
competition between groups is also eﬀective in increasing coordination. They show that
members of a group of seven were coordinating at much higher levels when additionally
confronted to an inter-group payment. In such a competition, the group presenting the
overall weakest eﬀort level was paid nothing, whereas the other one was paid according
to the weakest performance of their group members. The authors show that even when
paying the "less eﬃcient" group less (instead of nothing) than the other group, inter-group
competition was still signiﬁcantly more eﬀective (but slightly less) than no competition.
Fourthly, Chaudhuri et al. (2009) have proven the eﬀectiveness of inter-generational advice.
In their game, they simulate non overlapping generations with groups playing non simul-
taneously. When the ﬁrst range of groups are done, they can pass on advice (in the form
of written messages) to the succeeding groups (i.e. the next generation). Chaudhuri et al.
(2009) explain that the second generation must start at an eﬃcient level in order to main-
tain it in the following periods. Subjects, thus, have to receive the right advice and choose
the right action. To achieve this, the authors show that the mechanism is most eﬀective
when the advice given from one generation to the next is shared to everybody and made
common knowledge. A last eﬃcient mechanism is the priming of subjects’ identity, tested
by Chen et al. (2014). More speciﬁcally, when priming a minority identity (e.g. Asian,
Caucasian), subjects are less likely to coordinate at high eﬀort levels, whereas priming a
school identity signiﬁcantly increases eﬃcient coordination and high payoﬀs (Chen et al.,
2014). Thus, identity and subjects’ prejudices play an important role in coordination.
On the grounds of these evidence, this chapter presents a weak-link game where the
weak-link is the worst performance exerted by the member of a group of three players. Our
subjects are craftsmen working on renovation construction sites. In a within-group design,
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we introduce successively an Individual-based Incentive, and a Group-based Incentive. Fol-
lowing Bortolotti et al. (2016), we implement a real-eﬀort task instead of a chosen-eﬀort
set-up for two reasons. First, the "selection" of the highest eﬀort with the Individual In-
centive (and thus the eﬃciency of this incentive) would be trivial in a chosen-eﬀort set-up.
Second, an eﬀort chosen by the subject might not represent his real abilities, and thus the
eﬀort he would exert in reality. This can be problematic for the external validation of our
results. As mentioned by Bortolotti et al. (2016), chosen-eﬀort set-ups might point to the
possible limited external validity of past collected data on weak-link games.
The novelty of our experiment is twofold. First, we do not only compare individual and
group incentive for active workers from the construction sector, but we speciﬁcally assign
subjects’ individual performance targets they should achieve. Brandts and Cooper (2007)
ﬁnd that allowing communication between managers (the experimenter) and employees
(players) leads to increased eﬃcient coordination and higher payoﬀs. They recommend
that managers request a speciﬁc eﬀort level. In addition, contrary to Cooper et al. (2018),
we did not increase the diﬃculty of escaping a performance trap (i.e. be stuck at low eﬀort
levels) by keeping the other team members’ past eﬀort levels unobservable. Second, we
look at the impact of exogenous training courses on group coordination. More speciﬁcally,
the pool of subjects is made of construction craftsmen, working, among others, on (low
energy) renovations, in the Region Grand Est, in north-eastern France.2 Some of these
subjects have been incentivized to coordinate their eﬀorts (and tasks) through a training
course on eﬃcient coordination, they participated in, called DORéMI. This training course
teaches the craftsmen (1) eﬃcient low energy renovation techniques, (2) how to coordinate
their complementary tasks with other craftsmen, and (3) the importance of coordination
to achieve high performance. Our control group is composed of craftsmen who did not
participate in this training course. We are thus interested in identifying possible behavioral
diﬀerences between trained and non trained subjects, and seeing if a simple mechanism
of exogenous training about coordination is eﬃcient to achieve coordination at high eﬀort
levels.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on coordination dynamics by providing
evidence of the eﬀect of individual and group weak-link incentives on eﬀort provision and
2A renovation site presents the weak-link property. Every craftsman has his own specialty and task
to renovate a building. Their tasks are complementary to achieve an eﬃcient ﬁnal energy performance.
Yet, when one of the craftsmen fails to eﬃciently execute his task, the buildings ﬁnal performance will
be (negatively) impacted. It thus depends on worst performance of all the craftsmen working on the
renovation site.
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coordination, when subjects have to exert a real eﬀort rather than to choose their action.
To our knowledge, Bortolotti et al. (2016) are the ﬁrst and only one, until today, having
implemented Individual and Group Incentives in a real-eﬀort weak-link game.
Practically, we test subject-pool eﬀects, and more speciﬁcally, the coordination capacity
between trained and non trained craftsmen. Hence, we implement a "2 x 2" experimen-
tal design, where we compare how both subject groups act when facing both treatments
(Individual-based Incentive, and Group-based Incentive with weak-link payment). In other
words, we want to determine (1) if it is possible to incentivize towards more coordination
through a weakest-link contract (that would make all the craftsmen of one project respon-
sible toward correctly accomplishing a common work), and (2) whether this Group-based
Incentive3 has the same incentive eﬀect on both subject groups.
The subjects had to count the number of ones in a table of 50 randomly selected ones
and zeros. They had to resolve as many tables as possible in a given time period, by trying
to attain individual performance targets (a minimum acceptable target, and a maximum
ideal target) in terms of number of tables to resolve. We normalized the cost-of-eﬀort across
the subjects by scaling the targets to their actual individual abilities, in a ﬁrst stage. Every
subject thus had his or her own targets, and had to exert a substantial eﬀort to attain
the ideal target. In the Individual treatment, subjects experienced no strategic uncertainty
and were paid according to their individual performance. In the Group treatment, subjects
were randomly assigned in groups of three, which stayed unchanged for the rest of the
experience, except that trained subjects were assigned with other trained subjects, and
the same was done for non trained subjects. They were paid according to a weak-link
payment function, that is, the worst performance exerted by all the members of their
group. Every group member thus received the same payment. As in "standard" weak-link
games, subjects experienced strategic uncertainty.
The main results of the experiment suggest that trained subjects coordinate at sig-
niﬁcantly higher eﬀort levels than non-trained subjects when facing an individual-based
incentive. However, when facing a group-based incentive, non-trained subjects seem to
"catch up" trained subjects in terms of coordination level, while these latter subjects do
not signiﬁcantly increase their performance level. This result suggests that proposing a
group-based incentive to subjects who have previously been trained on coordination, does
3The aim of the Group-based Incentive is not to teach craftsmen how to coordinate their tasks, but
rather to seek a common high eﬀort level to achieve low energy performance of the renovated building.
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not yield higher coordination levels. Indeed, their exogenous sensitivity to successful and
eﬃcient coordination seems to be a suﬃcient mechanism to incentivize towards common
high eﬀort levels. Yet, when enforcing the subjects to play sequentially with a given
amount of time for the entire group (i.e. time constraint, trained subjects playing before
the last one in the group, seem to adopt a self-restricting strategy, so that they perform
signiﬁcantly worse than when facing an individual-based incentive. It seems that the pos-
sibility to not achieve eﬃcient coordination causes them stress. Hence, trained subjects
voluntarily target lower performance levels to have the certainty to reach a suﬃcient high
performance, so that the last member in the sequence order has enough time to reach
his or her acceptable target. Such a strong eﬀect of time constraint is not visible on the
coordination behavior of non trained subjects. Finally, our results suggest that the tested
incentives have diﬀerent impacts on the subject groups’ worst performance levels. Indeed,
individual-based incentives may be better suited for trained subjects to achieve the highest
average worst performance, whereas group-based incentives seem to be more eﬃcient to
increase non trained subjects’ worst performance.
Let us however mention that relatively few trained subjects could be mobilized to
participate in the experiment. It would be interesting to conduct further sessions with
trained craftsmen to validate the above mentioned results.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experimental
design. Section 3.3 presents the hypotheses of the paper, and Section 3.4 exposes de-
scriptive statistics and the empirical results. Finally, in Section 3.5 we conclude after a
discussion of our results.
3.2 Experimental design
The experiment consists of a real-eﬀort game played repeatedly. Following Abeler et al.
(2011) and Marchegiani et al. (2016), in all periods, subjects were confronted with a te-
dious and focus-demanding task, which consists of counting the number of ones in tables
composed by 50 randomly placed ones and zeros. This real-eﬀort task has various ad-
vantages: (1) no prior (economic) knowledge is needed from the subjects, (2) nearly no
learning is possible from the subjects throughout the game periods, (3) subjects’ perfor-
mance is measurable without diﬃculty, (4) the boringness ensured a positive cost-of-eﬀort
from the subjects, and (5) the pointlessness ensured that no subject could derive any ben-
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eﬁt (e.g. personal utility) from it. It ensures that the subjects all have the same utility by
participating to this experiment. Furthermore, an important advantage of this simple task
is that it is clearly artiﬁcial and the output has no value to the experimenter which should
reduce tendency for subjects to increase their eﬀort as a way to reciprocate for payments
oﬀered by the experimenter.
The experiment is divided in two main phases: an individual productivity elicitation
phase and a phase which consists of repeated work. These two phases are detailed below,
but Figure 3.2 presents in short the timing of a session. We ﬁrst elicit individual productiv-
ity in Stage I, in order to set individual production targets. Then, Phase II comprises four
successive stages, where subjects have to execute a real-eﬀort task, wherein the incentives
change from stage to stage.
Throughout the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to a group of three play-
ers having the same exogenous training on coordination. The groups were ﬁxed until the
end of the session and it was not possible for a subject to know the identity of the other
members of the group. During the experiment, subjects accumulated payoﬀs in ECU ,
with the conversion rule 100ECU = 1 euro. The ﬁnal gains were distributed anonymously
in cash after having answered a post-experimental questionnaire in the End Phase.
Subjects were told about the total number of stages from the beginning, however, de-
tailed instructions4 were read out loud by the experimenter before starting each stage,
to ensure that the game’s description was common information. Subjects had the pos-
sibility to simultaneously read these instructions on paper and ask any question to the
experimenter before beginning a stage.
Figure 3.2: Flow of the experiment
4The instructions are available in French in Appendix C.1.
150
3.2. DESIGN
3.2.1 The individual productivity elicitation
After a short (unpaid) training of two minutes (120 seconds), where subjects could become
familiar with the task and the manipulation, subjects had ﬁve minutes (300 seconds) to
count as many tables as possible. In order to elicit individual productivity, subjects were
oﬀered a pure piece-rate compensation scheme. For each table correctly processed, they
receive 10 ECU. The gain from this ﬁrst phase is then given by πelicitationi = 10 ·Pelicitation,
where Pelicitation is the number of tables resolved. Wrong answers were not penalized5 and
the number of tables resolved was displayed on the screen during the task. The screen
also displayed a timer to make subjects aware of the time running.
The number of tables they correctly counted was used to design a feasible contractual
eﬀort in subsequent parts of the experiment, but subjects were not informed about this. As
in Marchegiani et al. (2016) and Cosaert et al. (2019), this phase permitted to normalize
the cost-of-eﬀort for the task across players by scaling the individual performance targets,
assigned in Phase II, to the subjects’ actual abilities.
3.2.2 The repeated real-effort game
In Phase II, subjects play three stages repeatedly and the task is again to count ones.
Instead of being paid piece-rate as in the previous phase, subjects are oﬀered successively
an individual-based and a group-based incentive. For reasons that are exposed below, the
three stages are of diﬀerent time length. In the Stages 1 and 2, subjects had to execute the
task during ﬁve periods of two minutes (120 seconds) each.6 The main diﬀerence between
both is the incentive given to the subjects: either individual or group-based. In Stage
3, the subjects also face a group-based incentive but they do not play simultaneously.
They are given six minutes (360 seconds) for the entire group, and the sequence of their
intervention is imposed. After a group member reaches his or her acceptable target and
passes her turn, or after he or she achieves his or her ideal target, the next subject executes
the task with the remaining time.
5The subjects had three attempts to solve a table. After three errors, a new table appeared. This
was done in order to prevent subjects to guess the number of ones too many times in a row. To prevent
guessing, Abeler et al. (2011), for example, deducted a piece-rate of 10 cents when subjects failed in all
three attempts.
6For the sake of simpliﬁcation and contrary to Bortolotti et al. (2016), we decided to not sell extra time
to subjects to achieve any of the targets.
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Acceptable and ideal performance targets
The incentives oﬀered to subjects are based on targets that were assigned to each subject.
Indeed, in the beginning of Phase II, subjects were assigned two diﬀerent individual targets
they had to attain in terms of number of rightly counted tables. These targets were set
individually following the productivity elicitation in Phase I. During Phase II, they were
asked to at least reach the (1) acceptable performance target, denoted P acceptable targeti (it
corresponds to 90% of the productivity exerted in Stage 1), and at best reach the (2)
ideal performance target, denoted P ideal targeti (it corresponds to 110% of the productivity
exerted in Stage 1).
In a two minutes period, individual performance targets to pursue were determined as
follows7:
P
acceptable target
i = 90% ·
P elicitationi
5min
· 2min (3.1)
P
ideal target
i = 110% ·
P elicitationi
5min
· 2min (3.2)
Subjects were not made aware about how their targets had been determined, nor that
every participant had diﬀerent targets, according to their performance in the elicitation
phase. We did not give them this information and announced the targets only in Phase II,
in order to prevent from strategic behavior in Phase 1. We justify the 10% discount rate on
the acceptable target by the tiredness that can result after repeating the task over and over.
As mentioned by Marchegiani et al. (2016), the (acceptable) target should be achieved by
exerting a high, but not too high, eﬀort on the task8. The ideal target, however, has
voluntarily been determined to be more diﬃcult to achieve. Only very motivated subjects
would thus try to attain it after having reached the acceptable target.
Why two different performance targets? Assigning subjects two diﬀerent targets is a
particularity of this experiment. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst one to propose this.
In a socio-economic environment, workers have tasks to execute. They can execute the
minimum that has been required by their employer, or they can go further and perform
7P
acceptable target
i was rounded downwards, whereas P
ideal target
i was rounded upwards to prevent hav-
ing the same acceptable and ideal targets for some subjects.
8Marchegiani et al. (2016) only assigned the subjects the equivalent of our acceptable task in their
experiment.
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their task even better. For example, a window installer can decide to "correctly" install a
window, but he can also decide to install it in a air-tight way to gain energy eﬃciency of the
building. Such tasks are often complementary with tasks of other co-workers. To continue
our example, if not every co-worker achieves air-tightness, the energy performance of the
building is decreased. We want the subjects to coordinate on the highest possible eﬀort
level. Thus, assigning them only one target corresponding to the highest level may not
permit to determine whether the subject is willing to achieve the best possible performance,
or just the acceptable one. By introducing two performance targets (acceptable and ideal),
we can make the following observations. When a subject executes his task until reaching
his acceptable performance target P acceptable targeti , it might indicate that he is willing to
coordinate on an acceptable high eﬀort level. However, when he continues to execute
it to reach his ideal performance target P ideal targeti , it might indicate that he is willing
to coordinate on an even higher eﬀort level, that is, an ideal very high eﬀort level. In
other words, he wants to coordinate on a common goal with the other group members.
Concerning the targets’ names, we claim that, psychologically, reaching an "acceptable"
target already represents an achievement. Wanting to continue until reaching an "ideal"
target may indicate the willingness of subjects to accomplish their task in the best possible
way, without being satisﬁed with the minimum acceptable.
Individual-based and group-based incentives
As explained above, Phase II is composed of three stages. In Stage 1, subjects played
successively ﬁve periods of two minutes. In each period, their payoﬀs were determined ac-
cording to an individual-based incentive. Following Bortolotti et al. (2016), the Individual
Incentive for subject i in Stage 1, denoted πS1i is deﬁned as follows:
πS1i = F +B ·
ResolvedTablesi
P
acceptable target
i
(3.3)
were ResolvedTablesi is the number of correctly counted tables by subject i, that is, the
individual performance. We ﬁxed F = 100 and B = 800. The higher the individual perfor-
mance, the higher the gain. Contrary to Brandts and Cooper (2006), we did not impute
the payment by the individual cost-of-eﬀort, because our real-eﬀort set-up permitted to
normalize the cost-of-eﬀort across the subjects.
In Stage 2, subjects also played successively ﬁve rounds of two minutes, but in each
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round, their payoﬀs were determined according to a group-based incentive. This incentive
introduces a weak-link mechanism in order to induce subjects to coordinate on the highest
eﬀort level. The weak-link here corresponds to the worst performance of the three members
of the group. The payoﬀs for a subject i in Stage 2 is deﬁned as follows:
πS2i = F +B · min
i∈1,2,3
[
ResolvedTablesi
P
acceptable target
i
]
(3.4)
Incentives (3.3) and (3.4) correspond to a high performance pay, that is, low ﬁxed
payment F and high incentives B to coordinate at, respectively, execute, high eﬀort levels
(Cooper et al., 2018).9
In Stage 3, subjects faced the same group-based incentive (3.4). However, they do not
play ﬁve rounds of 2 minutes each, but instead, execute the task during three periods of six
minutes (360 seconds) each. The six minutes where however assigned to the entire group,
and subjects had to play sequentially, contrary to before. They played one after another,
with an enforced sequence. In each period, subjects had diﬀerent playing sequence. Indi-
vidual performance targets were kept unchanged. Indeed, by dividing the six minutes by
three (group members), every group member should optimally play two minutes. Subjects
had to reach at least P acceptable targeti . Once attained, a button appeared on the screen
to hand over to the next group member at any moment. In case they continued until
maximum P ideal targeti , the handing over occurred automatically.
This stage of the experience has the particularity to indirectly enforce the task chronol-
ogy (and thus their coordination) among subjects. It was thus very important for the
subjects to be attentive to give the last player enough time to reach his or her target.
Otherwise, every group member would be impacted by receiving a low payment. Hence,
the design of Stage 4 adds a time constraint, which results in a severe "punishment" for
the entire group if not considered and respected. This time constraint also adds pressure
on the subjects to work quickly to achieve their target.
As explained by Bortolotti et al. (2016), although we measure subjects’ real eﬀort, our
Group Incentive (3.4) shares important characteristics with standard weak-link games10.
First, the bonus B variates with the ﬁrm’s (e.g. renovation work) worst performance.
Second, subjects (e.g. employees, craftsmen) will receive a positive payment F , even when
9A low performance pay, on the contrary, has a high ﬁxed payment F and low incentives B to coordinate
at, or simply execute, high eﬀort levels.
10Recall that they generally consider chosen-eﬀort of subjects.
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exerting no eﬀort, or when one of the group members decides not to work. Thus, if realising
the task represents a positive cost-of-eﬀort for the subjects, they will only exert a positive
eﬀort when they expect every group member to do the same. Furthermore, the subjective
cost-of-eﬀort certainly being lower than the bonus amount B (because B has been set to
a relatively high amount compared to F ), successfully coordinating on reaching at least
the acceptable target results in higher payments for all the group members. We thus
replicate the trade-oﬀ of standard weak-link games, experienced by the subjects, between
choosing the risky strategy (i.e. successfully coordinating on exerting high eﬀort by at least
achieving the acceptable target) and the safe strategy (i.e. exerting low eﬀort because of
the uncertainty that the other group members will exert a positive eﬀort).
3.2.3 Procedures
Subjects were actual craftsmen working, among other, on energy renovations in the Region
Grand Est in north-eastern France. They were recruited by the means of the Region Grand
Est and coordinators of renovation platforms located in the entire region. They were
invited to assist to an information meeting organized by the Region, where they were told
that they could also participate in an economic experiment followed by a convivial aperitif
organized by the University of Strasbourg. The experiment was conducted with mobile
devices (tablets) of the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of Strasbourg (LEES),
using the software EconPlay11.
A total number of 36 subjects participated. The sessions were organized in diﬀerent
locations of the Region. The ﬁrst session took place in Saint-Dié-des-Vosges in October
2018, with 27 non-trained (to coordination) craftsmen (75%).12 The subject group with
trained craftsmen was tested in a session organized in Sélestat in December 2018, with 9
subjects (25%). Thus, each subject was selected in only one subject group. The entire
panel was composed of 9% of women, and 91% of men, who were on average between
41 and 50 years old. Some heterogeneity was to be observed in terms of education level
across the panel, so that 34.28% had a higher education, and 5.71% had no education
at all. Futhermore, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between trained and non-trained
11Software created by Kene Boun My, CNRS engineer at the University of Strasbourg
(www.econplay.fr).
12One of the subjects left during the session because he had diﬃculties to read the ones and zeros in the
tables. To permit the other players of its team to continue the experiment, we replaced the missing subject
by one our colleagues of the University of Strasbourg. However, to ensure this member did not bias our
results, we decided to eliminate its observation in the ﬁnal database.
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subjects in terms of revenue. The average earnings in the experiment was 32.91 euros
(going from 27 to 39 euros). One session lasted one hour and a half, including time for
instructions and the post-experience questionnaire.
Our experiment is thus a semi-ﬁeld experiment, with a controlled environment, but
with professionals instead of students. We had two main subject groups: (1) trained
on coordination (denoted group T), and (2) non trained on coordination (denoted group
NT) on a low energy renovation site. As explained above, craftsmen of subject group
T were trained through the DORéMI energy renovation training course, which stands for
"Operational Device for the Energy Renovation of Individual Houses". Table 3.1 hereafter,
summarizes the "2 x 2" design of our experiment.
Table 3.1: Experimental "2x2" design
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
Treatment
Subject Group
Trained to
coordination
(T)
Not trained to
coordination
(NT)
Individual-based incentive (I) T - I NT - I
Group-based incentive (G) T - G NT - G
Between the periods, subjects had the possibility to brieﬂy rest. During this pause,
subjects received statistics on the number of tables they had to solve to attain their
acceptable (resp. their ideal) target, the number of tables resolved during the period, the
percentage of their acceptable (resp. ideal) target achieved, and their gain for the period.
In Stage 3 and 4, where a group incentive was given, they additionally received statistics
on the percentage of the acceptable (resp. ideal) target their two group members achieved
respectively. Evidence of the eﬃciency of providing subjects’ with information about the
members of their own group’s previous strategy choices, is mitigated in the literature.
Engelmann and Normann (2010) ﬁnd that it deteriorates eﬃcient group coordination in
groups of four, but that it is an eﬃcient instrument in groups of six players. Berninghaus
and Ehrhart (2001) ﬁnd the same latter result with groups of eight, and Brandts and
Cooper (2006) with groups of four subjects. Although our experiment analyses groups of
only three players, we decided to implement this feature for two reasons. First, it is a
more realistic real life situation, and, second, Van Huyck et al. (1990), among others, have
shown that smaller groups tend to coordinate more eﬃciently than larger groups. We,
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however, choose to not show them information about other group’s result, as Chen (2017)
shows that it has no signiﬁcant eﬀect in improving coordination.
3.3 Predictions
We are interested in studying the diﬀerence in eﬀort provision when given diﬀerent types
of incentives, namely, an Individual-based Incentive (I) and a Group-based Incentive (G).
Furthermore, as we test these incentives on actual craftsmen, we analyse their coordination
behaviour, whether they have been professionally trained for coordination in their work
(T), or not (NT).
Participating, for instance, in a training course on the importance of coordination and
its application to achieve eﬃcient outcomes, contributes to make individuals more opti-
mistic about coordination.13 It aims to increase their positive beliefs about the eﬃciency
of coordination. Hence, subjects presenting such a background (i.e. T) certainly are opti-
mistic about the chance to achieve coordination at high and eﬃcient levels. As long-term
outcomes in coordination games are largely driven by initial beliefs (see Van Huyck et al.,
1990), Cooper et al. (2018) state that assigning a high performance pay14 to "optimists"
(e.g. trained subjects) increases the chance of eﬃcient coordination. Thus, as we assign a
high performance pay to both of our subject groups (T and NT), it should intuitively be
more eﬃcient on subjects T than on subjects NT. This brings us to the ﬁrst hypothesis,
stated hereafter:
Hypothesis 1 The average effort in subject groups T is higher than in subject groups NT.
Considering more speciﬁcally the Group-based Incentive, it has been designed to induce
eﬃcient group coordination. In the weakest-link game, every subject wants to achieve a
common goal. Moreover, they are all incentivized to play their "full part" in reaching this
common goal, when assured that all the others will also play their "full part" (Barrett,
2016). The game has multiple (pure strategy) Nash equilibria, where subjects of a group
have to coordinate and choose the same strategy. Indeed, this game does not allow for free-
riding. If an individual is the only one to free-ride, he will be "punished" by receiving a low
13Note that we have in mind that the fact of being inclined to adopt a cooperative behaviour can also be
inherent to a person. We therefore asked a speciﬁc question in the ﬁnal questionnaire to be able to control
for this aspect
14Recall, as explained in Section 3.2, that the incentive given to the subjects are a high performance pay:
low ﬁxed payment and high incentives to coordinate at, respectively, to execute high eﬀort levels.
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payment, as well as all his team members’15, according to his achieved performance. He
thus has no interest in doing so. Moreover, free-riding is oﬀset by peer pressure (Kandel
and Lazear, 1992; Meidinger et al., 2003). The weak-link of the Group-based Incentive
actually exhibits an inherent peer pressure which encourages coordinated behaviour. Peer
pressure has been found to be an eﬃcient solution against coordination failure (Kandel and
Lazear, 1992; Carpenter et al., 2009; Corgnet et al., 2015; Falk and Ichino, 2006) among
subjects. Kandel and Lazear (1992) stress that the shame felt by the subjects performing
worse than the group average, works as an eﬃcient mechanism, and permits to understand
the eﬀectiveness of peer pressure. Falk and Ichino (2006) state that when pay is based on
group incentives, peer pressure might be decisive in increasing performance, especially if
group members can directly exert peer pressure in the form of sanctions. In our game, the
peer pressure is exerted through the incentive design in the form of "global" punishment
(i.e. low payment). The enhanced performance eﬀect described by Falk and Ichino (2006)
may nevertheless also occur in our game, especially because by exerting on low eﬀort and
thus achieving a low performance, the strategic uncertainty of the other members will
increase. They will thus tend to choose the less risky strategy of a weak.link game, which
is, not exerting a high eﬀort. Otherwise, they might work hard without being paid. This
situation will lead to a productivity trap, also called performance trap, mentioned, among
others, by Brandts et al. (2007) and Cooper et al. (2018). Contrary to the Individual-based
Incentive, once uncertainty about the others’ future eﬀorts is too high, coordinating on
high eﬀort levels is very diﬃcult without the behavior of a controllable instrument as for
example communication (through the intervention of an external manager (Brandts and
Cooper, 2007), formal punishment (Dai et al., 2015; Vranceanu et al., 2015), or letting the
subjects choose their group partners (Riedl et al., 2016; Chen, 2017). To avoid falling in
a performance trap, subjects have thus no interest in exerting low eﬀort levels. The peer
pressure and the indirect punishment arising from the Group-based Incentive, but being
absent with the Individual-based Incentive, the former incentive should incentivize to exert
higher eﬀort levels on average than the latter one, especially if subjects have never been
trained to coordinate. This brings us to Hypothesis 2 stated hereafter:
Hypothesis 2 In the NT group of subjects, the average effort with the Group-based Incen-
tive is higher than with the Individual-based Incentive.
15Recall that subjects are assigned to the same group with the same members during the entire experi-
ment.
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However, as explained for Hypothesis 1, assigning a high performance pay (which
corresponds to both of our treatments I and G) to subjects T, increases the chance of
coordination at high eﬀort levels. Recall that their training may have made their prior
beliefs more optimistic about eﬃcient coordination. Thus, the Group Incentive is not
as incentive on subjects T than on subjects NT, who on average have a less optimistic
prior belief on eﬃcient coordination. In other words, the Group Incentive might not be
more incentive on subjects T than the Individual Incentive. This brings us to our last
hypothesis, stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3 In the T group of subjects, the average effort with the Group-based Incentive
is not higher than with the Individual-based Incentive.
3.4 Results
This section presents the main results of our experiment. We ﬁrst look at some descriptive
characteristics of our sample of craftsmen. We then run a series of non-parametric tests in
order to validate our hypotheses. An econometric estimation of the drivers of individual
performance conﬁrm our predictions and concludes this section.
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
In our sample of craftsmen, 74% are self-employed and 26% work for a general contractor
in the building industry16. 89% of the involved ﬁrms are "RGE" labeled, which stands
in French for "Recognized as environmentally responsible". This label is mandatory in
the energy renovation sector in France, in order for the project owners (i.e. clients) to
apply for governmental ﬁnancial aids. This high percentage indicates that, in order to
stay competitive and attractive in the energy renovation sector, a ﬁrm must apply for this
environmental label. Furthermore, 20% of our subjects are specialized in more than one
trade, and nearly half of the panel has been working in the building sector for more than
20 years.
In the ﬁnal questionnaire of the experiment, we ask them a series of general and speciﬁc
questions about their work as well as coordination at work. Interestingly, it appears that
their opinion about coordination depends on the presence or absence of a project manager
16General contractors in the building industry include several trades, and can thus propose complemen-
tary works to project owners willing to renovate their building.
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during the execution phase. The role of a project manager is to help the craftsmen to
coordinate their diﬀerent tasks and interventions on a construction/renovation site. In
presence of a project manager, T and NT craftsmen evaluate the diﬃculty to coordinate
their tasks during the work, on average around 4.66 on a scale going from 1 to 10, with 10
ﬁnding it very diﬃcult to coordinate. This is a rather low estimated diﬃculty, which tends
to show that the intervention of a project manager may reassure workers. Yet, without
project manager, T subjects ﬁnd it signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult than NT to coordinate their
task with others17. A possible explanation may be that T subjects are more sensitive to
eﬃcient and successful coordination than NT ones. By answering this question, they may
thus have thought in the diﬃculty of achieving an eﬃcient coordination, resulting in the
expected outcome in terms of building performance.
Nevertheless, in presence of a project manager, T subjects feel signiﬁcantly more moti-
vated in trying to coordinate their tasks with others than NT subjects. Without manager,
however, there is no signiﬁcant motivation diﬀerence between both subject groups. Note
that, on average, the subjects of the panel estimates their conﬁdence in their co-workers
to be 6.54 on a scale going from 1 to 10. This mitigated conﬁdence level may explain
the lessened motivation towards coordination in the absence of a project manager. Yet,
in general, T subjects feel signiﬁcantly more enthusiastic than NT subjects, to coordinate
their interventions with their co-workers.
All in all, all subjects believe that it is (very) important to try to coordinate the tasks
of all the craftsmen present on a project, and attach great importance to their reputation
in the energy renovation sector.
3.4.2 Non-parametric analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the results of the experiment, using the statistical non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (with Z, the test’s statistic). It permits to test
the null hypothesis saying that the medians of two groups are similar.18 The test does not
assume a normal distribution, and when the null hypothesis is rejected19, we can conclude
to have a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between both groups.
17On average, 6.57 out of 10 for T, compared to 4.88 out of 10 for NT craftsmen.
18In other words, the likelihood that a randomly selected variable from the ﬁrst group is lower or greater
than a randomly selected variable from the second group, is equal.
19When the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is lower than 0.10, the null hypothesis is rejected.
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Productivity elicitation
In Phase I, during the individual productivity elicitation, both subject groups (T and NT)
had ﬁve minutes to resolve as many tables as possible. Figure 3.3 displays, for both groups,
the average number of tables they were able to resolve rightly, and those validated with
the wrong number of ones counted.
?
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Figure 3.3: Average number of correctly and wrongly resolved tables in the elicitation
phase
At ﬁrst glance, we observe that NT subjects resolved more tables than T, however, the
diﬀerence between both groups is not signiﬁcant20. Whether trained or not, our subjects
are not diﬀerent in terms of individual capacity (i.e. ability) of counting ones in tables. It
will thus be possible to compare their performance in the three Stages of the experiment.
Performance indicator
The individual performance targets, given to the subjects in Phase II, are based on the
capacity that each subject revealed in Phase I. On the basis of these targets, we determined
two individual performance indicators. The ﬁrst one, denoted PerfIndicatoracceptablei , is
the ratio between the number of revolved tables, and the individual acceptable target, as
shown hereafter:
PerfIndicator
acceptable
i =
ResolvedTablesi
P
acceptable target
i
(3.5)
20Z = −1.079, p-value = 0.281
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The second indicator, denoted PerfIndicatorideali , is the ratio between the number of
revolved tables, and the individual ideal target, as presented hereafter21:
PerfIndicatorideali =
ResolvedTablesi
P
ideal target
i
(3.6)
In other words, the performance indicators give us the percentage of a target (acceptable
or ideal) that has been achieved by the subjects. Recall that in our experiment, the period
ended automatically once a subject achieved his ideal target. Hence, PerfIndicatorideali
cannot be superior to 100%, contrary to PerfIndicatoracceptablei .
Table 3.2 summarizes the average performance indicators of both groups of subjects,
throughout the stages, where diﬀerent incentives are given. It also indicates the average
worst group performances throughout the stages22. As a reminder, Stage 1 tested an
individual-based incentive (I), Stage 2 tested a group-based incentive without time con-
straint (G), and Stage 3 tested a group-based incentive with time constraint (G + t.c.),
where the entire group had a given time to accomplish the individual tasks sequentially.
Table 3.2: Summary of average acceptable, ideal and worst group performances of T and
NT when facing diﬀerent incentives
Performance indicator I G G + t.c.
Trained to coordination (T)
PerfIndicatoracceptable 142.4 % 142.8 % 138.9 %
mini∈1,2,3
[
P erfIndicator
acceptable
i
]
117 % 112.2 % 112.6 %
PerfIndicatorideal 90.9 % 90.9 % 88.3 %
mini∈1,2,3
[
P erfIndicatorideali
]
79.9 % 77.5 % 74.3 %
Not trained to coordination (NT)
PerfIndicatoracceptable 121.9 % 131.8 % 130.5 %
mini∈1,2,3
[
P erfIndicator
acceptable
i
]
100 % 113.7 % 110.6 %
PerfIndicatorideal 84.2 % 90.2 % 90.1 %
mini∈1,2,3
[
P erfIndicatorideali
]
68.7 % 79.5 % 76.3 %
I: Individual-based incentive, G: Group-based incentive, t.c.: time constraint.
Observing the average performances throughout the experiment, both subject groups al-
ways perform better than their acceptable target, but never achieve their ideal target. In
21Recall that P
acceptable target
i is the individual’s acceptable target, P
ideal target
i is the individual’s ideal
target, and ResolvedT ablesi is the number of tables resolved by the individual.
22Recall that the worst group performance is actually the minimum P erfIndicator
acceptable
i of a group
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the remaining of the subsection, we analyze and interpret the diﬀerent achieved perfor-
mances summarized in Table 3.2.
Individual-based incentive
The performances presented in Table 3.2 show that on average, T subjects, who have been
trained and sensitized on eﬃcient coordination, performed better than NT subjects when
facing an individual-based incentive. Figure 3.4 displays the averages throughout the ﬁve
periods of Stage 1, and we observe that T subjects achieve higher percentages of their
targets than NT subjects in all ﬁve periods. This is true for both types of performance
and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant23.
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(b) P erfIndicatorideali
Figure 3.4: Evolution of subjects’ average performance throughout the ﬁve periods of
facing an individual-based incentive (Stage 1)
Hypothesis 1 of the paper is thus conﬁrmed with the following result:
Result 1 When facing an individual-based incentive, ex-ante trained subjects (T) are more
efficient than the non-trained ones (NT) towards coordinating at their target levels.
This ﬁrst result seems to indicate that training about coordination may have an eﬀect
on how subjects are willing to coordinate on higher eﬀort levels. The subjects who have
been trained are signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient than the others.
This ﬁnding is also visible when observing the average worst performances of each
group, on Figure 3.5. Apart from the ﬁrst period, T subjects’ worst performances are
higher than those of NT subjects’. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test indeed shows us that,
on average, T group subjects’ worst performance are signiﬁcantly higher than NT group
23P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 4.548, p-value = 0.000; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = 2.011, p-value = 0.044
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subjects’, when facing an individual-based incentive.24 We can also see that, contrary to
T, NT group subjects’ worst performance has the tendency to decrease over the periods of
the Stage, indicating a tiredness or a decrease in the motivation to coordinate eﬃciently.
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P erfIndicator
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(b) mini∈1,2,3
[
P erfIndicatorideali
]
Figure 3.5: Evolution of the groups’ average worst performance throughout the ﬁve periods
of facing an individual-based incentive (Stage 1)
Let us now analyze subjects’ performances when facing a group-based incentive.
Group-based incentive without time constraint
In Stage 2 of the experiment, subjects were confronted with group-based incentives, so
that their payoﬀ depended on the worst performance of all the members of a team. They
still play simultaneously (i.e. without time constraint). This means that they were not
enforced to "manage" the time given to their other team members to execute their task.
In Table 3.2, we do not see much diﬀerence between T and NT subjects. When observ-
ing the evolution of T subjects’ coordination levels on Figure 3.6, we see that their average
performance stays similar throughout the ﬁve periods of Stage 2. However, when compar-
ing stages 1 and 2, we can clearly see that NT subjects’ average performance increased a
lot compared to when under individual-based incentive as displayed in Figure 3.4. This
important eﬀect on NT subjects’ performance is such that both groups’ coordination levels
seem to end up being more or less confounded, especially with regard to the ideal target.
24W orstP erfInd.acc.group: Z = 3.454, p-value = 0.001; W orstP erfInd.
ideal
group: Z = 3.189, p-value = 0.001
164
3.4. RESULTS
?
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
? ? ? ? ???????
? ??
(a) P erfIndicatoracceptablei
?
??
??
?
??
?
??
?
? ? ? ? ???????
? ??
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Figure 3.6: Evolution of subjects’ average performance throughout the ﬁve periods of
facing a group-based incentive without time constraint (Stage 2)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that NT subjects perform better when knowing that
their payoﬀ also depends on the performance of their team members. Indeed, compared
to when facing an individual-based incentive, they coordinate at signiﬁcantly higher eﬀort
levels (with respect to their targets) when given a group-based incentive25. On the con-
trary, we observe that T subjects do not signiﬁcantly perform better with a group-based,
than with an individual-based incentive26. Interestingly, it seems that having been trained
leads to an already high level of performance, such that the group-based incentive does not
impact coordination behaviour. This leads us to the Result 2, that validates hypotheses 2
and 3:
Result 2 When facing a group-based incentive (without time constraint), contrary to T
subjects, NT subjects coordinate at more efficient performance levels than when facing
an individual-based incentive.
This result may partly be due to the increase in performance of NT subject groups’
average worst performance when facing a group-based incentive, compared to when facing
an individual-based incentive. We indeed ﬁnd that NT subject groups’ worst performance
is signiﬁcantly higher with the group-based incentive than with the individual-based incen-
tive.27 Although we observe more variation of the worst performance for T subject groups
throughout the periods with the group-based incentive, than with the individual-based
25P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = −2.575, p-val = 0.010; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = −2.726, p-value = 0.006
26P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 0.070, p-value = 0.945; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = −0.263, p-value = 0.793
27W orstP erfInd.acc.group: Z = −4.147, p-value = 0.000; W orstP erfInd.
ideal
group: Z = −3.967, p-value
= 0.000
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incentive, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (as for the average performance
of every T subject).28 Figure 3.7, hereafter, displays both subject groups’ average worst
performance when facing a group-based incentive without time constraint.
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of the groups’ average worst performance throughout the ﬁve periods
of facing a group-based incentive without time constraint (Stage 2)
Yet, regarding total performances, we observe that when facing such a group-based
incentive, T subjects still signiﬁcantly perform better than NT subjects, towards coordi-
nating at their acceptable target29, contrary to coordinating towards their ideal target30.
Group-based incentive with time constraint
In the last stage of the game (Stage 3), subjects were confronted with a group-based
incentive with time constraint. They had a given time for their entire team, and had
to play sequentially. The sequence of their respective intervention was enforced, since
every of the three team members experienced all the positions (1st, 2nd, or 3rd member
to intervene) throughout the three periods of the stage. This set-up enforced the subjects
playing in the ﬁrst and second position to "manage" the time they allow for the next team
members. Indeed, leaving the last player not enough time to coordinate at a high enough
performance level, would impact the payoﬀ of all the members.
Regarding subjects’ average coordination performance levels, we notice that there is no
clear "domination" from one group of subjects to the other (see Table 3.2). As for Stage 2,
we do not observe diﬀerences throughout the three periods of Stage 3 in Figure 3.8. The
28W orstP erfInd.acc.group: Z = 1.435, p-value = 0.151; W orstP erfInd.
ideal
group: Z = 1.175, p-value = 0.240
29Z = 2.531, p-value = 0.011
30Z = 0.328, p-value = 0.743
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Wilcoxon rank-sum test, indeed, shows that, there is, on average, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between T and NT subjects’ coordination performance, when playing sequentially, while
facing a group-based incentive31.
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of subjects’ average performance throughout the three periods of
facing a group-based incentive with time constraint (Stage 3)
The distribution of both groups’ average worst performance is very similar to the total
performance, as can be seen on Figure 3.9, hereafter. We ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between T and NT group subject’s average worst performance, when facing a
group-based incentive without time constraint.32
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Figure 3.9: Evolution of the groups’ average worst performance throughout the three
periods of facing a group-based incentive with time constraint (Stage 3)
Although it is important to notice that these results do not take into account the
sequence order in which the subjects intervened. The sequential set-up being a notable
31P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 1.368, p-value = 0.171; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = −0.659, p-value = 0.510
32W orstP erfInd.acc.group: Z = 0.232, p-value= 0.816; W orstP erfInd.
ideal
group: Z = −0.821, p-value= 0.412
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diﬀerence with the previously one in Stage 2 (i.e. group-based incentive without time
constraint), the order of play may aﬀect the performance. The average performances,
given the sequence order, and with respect to subjects’ acceptable and ideal targets, are
summarized in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Subjects’ average performance according to their sequence order
A ﬁrst observation is that, when playing in the 3rd position, T subjects achieve 100% of
their ideal target. This was, on average, not the case when playing simultaneously. We
indeed ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of T subjects’ coordination performance,
towards reaching their ideal target33. This is not the case towards reaching their accept-
able target34, and for NT subjects, who perform signiﬁcantly equally than without time
constraint (i.e. Stage 2)35.
Regarding the eﬀect of time constraint on T subjects, we observe that, while there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between those intervening at the ﬁrst and second position36, the
last player to intervene performs signiﬁcantly better than the ﬁrst two players37.
These results indicate that time constraint may aﬀect T subjects’ coordination perfor-
mances. A possible mechanism may be the stress felt by T subjects intervening before the
last one. As they seem to be more sensitive than NT subjects towards high and successful
coordination (cf. Result 1), the possibility to not achieve eﬃcient coordination causes
them stress. As a response strategy, we notice that they censor themselves by voluntar-
33P erfIndicatorideali : Z = −2.157, p-val = 0.031
34P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = −1.219, p-val = 0.223
35P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = −0.810, p-val = 0.418; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = −1.386, p-val = 0.166
36P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 0.139, p-value = 0.889; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = 0.226, p-value = 0.821
371st vs. 3rd: P erfIndacc.i : Z = −1.74, p-val = 0.082; P erfInd
ideal
i : Z = −2.840, p-val = 0.005
2nd vs. 3rd: P erfIndacc.i : Z = −2.011, p-value = 0.044; P erfInd
ideal
i : Z = −2.842, p-val = 0.005
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ily targeting a lower performance level and have the certainty to reach a suﬃcient high
performance (even if lower than what they could have reached with more time), so that
the last member has enough time to reach his or her acceptable target. This observation
is supported by the fact that T subjects perform signiﬁcantly worse (when not the last
player) when facing a group-based incentive with time constraint, than when facing an
individual-based incentive38.
This brings us to a third result:
Result 3 When playing sequentially and facing a group-based incentive, T subjects inter-
vening before the last member are less efficient at coordinating on high effort levels
than the last member. Moreover, time constraint makes them perform worse than
when facing an individual-based incentive without time constraint.
Regarding NT subjects, we ﬁnd that they do not perform signiﬁcantly better when
being the last member to intervene, than when not.39 Yet, when playing as the ﬁrst or
second member, we observe that NT subjects do not perform signiﬁcantly better, than
when facing an individual-based incentive.40 Without time constraint, this was however
the case (cf. Result 2). Nevertheless, they also do not signiﬁcantly perform worse with
than without time constraint.41 Hence, in a ﬁrst place, time constraint seemed to put
a certain pressure on players intervening before the last one. Yet, in a second place, it
becomes clear that it does not signiﬁcantly alter the eﬃciency of giving NT subjects a
group-based, instead of an individual-based incentive. Note that when considering the
average performance of all the group members, we ﬁnd that NT subjects perform signiﬁ-
cantly better with the group-based (with time constraint), than with the individual-based
incentive.42
This brings us to a fourth result, presented hereafter:
Result 4 Time constraint has a limited impact on NT subjects playing before the last mem-
ber, so that we observe that it is more efficient (in terms of coordination) to give NT
subjects a group-based incentive (when playing simultaneously or sequentially), than
an individual-based incentive.
38P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 1.977, p-value = 0.048; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = 2.220, p-value = 0.026
391st vs. 3rd: P erfIndacc.i : Z = −1.091, p-val = 0.275; P erfInd
ideal
i : Z = −1.132, p-val = 0.258
2nd vs. 3rd: P erfIndacc.i : Z = −1.315, p-value = 0.189; P erfInd
ideal
i : Z = −1.518, p-val = 0.129
40P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = −1.042, p-val = 0.297; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = −1.348, p-val = 0.178
41P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 1.065, p-value = 0.287; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = 0.604, p-val = 0.546
42P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = −1.987, p-val = 0.047; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = −2.400, p-val = 0.016
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To understand why the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two and the last member to play, is
signiﬁcant for T, let us take a look at the time subjects spent to execute their task. As the
entire team was given six minutes (360 seconds) to play, every member should optimally
have played two minutes (120 seconds) each. Figure 3.11, hereafter, displays the time
spent by T and NT to execute their task, with respect to their order of intervention.
Figure 3.11: Average time spent for the task, given the subjects’ sequence order (in seconds)
A ﬁrst obvious observation, is that on average, teams did not use the entire time at their
disposal. Yet, we note only a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in time spent, between N and NT, when
being the 2nd member to play.43 More interestingly, for T and NT respectively, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in time spent, between all the incentive types.44 On average, subjects
needed (or used) signiﬁcantly more time to achieve their targets with the individual-based
incentive than with the group-based incentive, and this diﬀerence is even larger with the
group-based incentive with time constraint.45 When facing a group-based incentive, both
groups also spent signiﬁcantly more time without than with time constraint.46
By contemplating the average performances of the entire group (the last member to
intervene, included), when playing sequentially and facing a group-based incentive, we
ﬁnd that T subjects do not perform signiﬁcantly worse anymore than when facing an
individual-based incentive47 or a group-based incentive without time constraint48. As
431st: Z = −0.849, p-val = 0.396 ; 2nd: Z = −1.851, p-val = 0.064 ; 3rd: Z = −0.472, p-val = 0.637
44Except for T, who do not spend signiﬁcantly more time with the individual-based, than with the
group-based incentive without time constraint (Z = 0.572, p-value = 0.567)
45For T, individual vs. group with time constraint: Z = 2.111, p-value = 0.035
For NT, individual vs. group without time c.: Z = 2.244, p-value = 0.025 ; individual vs. group with time
c.: Z = 3.257, p-value = 0.001
46Without vs. with time c., for T: Z = 1.836, p-val = 0.066 ; for NT: Z = 1.817, p-val = 0.069
47P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 0.837, p-val = 0.4024; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = 0.596, p-val = 0.552
48P erfIndicatoracc.i : Z = 0.705, p-val = 0.481; P erfIndicator
ideal
i : Z = 0.748, p-val = 0.455
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mentioned earlier, the inclusion of the last member’s coordination performance level sig-
niﬁcantly increases the global performance of the group. However, the previous analysis
on subjects’ performance level when they are not the last in the sequence, shows us a de-
creased performance of the ﬁrst and second subjects compared to without time constraint.
Hence, when facing a group-based incentive, all the members of the group will be "pun-
ished" by receiving a lower payment. This indicates that time constraint has a twofold
negative impact regarding T subjects: (1) it lowers their coordination performance level,
and (2) it lowers their ﬁnal payoﬀs.
These ﬁndings allow us to state a last result:
Result 5 We observe that it is not efficient to impose time constraint on T subjects, because
it "inhibits" their coordination performance, and punishes them by lowering their
payments.
Interestingly when subjects face a group-based incentive, not all the team members
seem to be responsible for lowering the coordination level (and thus the payoﬀ) of the
group throughout the periods. Indeed, the worst group performance in the ﬁrst period
does not seem to negatively inﬂuence the other group members’ in the following periods.
This result is in accordance with the observations made by Bortolotti et al. (2016), but
it is diﬀerent to standard chosen eﬀort experiments results where a bad performance in
the beginning of a stage has been shown to spoil the performance of the whole team for
the remaining periods. This phenomenon is visible in Figure 3.12 that shows the average
performances for each period of Stages 2 and 3. Note also that there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the average worst group performance level, between T and NT subjects49.
49W orstP erfInd.acc.group: Without time constraint: Z = −1.259, p-val = 0.208 ; with time constraint:
Z = 0.232, p-val = 0.816
W orstP erfInd.idealgroup: Without time constraint: Z = −1.464, p-val = 0.143 ; with time constraint: Z =
−0.821, p-val = 0.412
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Figure 3.12: Evolution of the average worst group performances and their PerfIndicator
throughout the periods of facing a group-based incentive
Nevertheless, we see that on average, the worst group performance reaches at least
subject’s acceptable target level (see Figure 3.12 (a) and (b)), which indicates that they
at least try to achieve their "ﬁrst" target (i.e. a "good quality" work). On the contrary,
the ideal target is never attained by T, nor by NT subjects (see Figure 3.12 (c) and (d)).
3.4.3 Econometric analysis
In order to verify the validity of our results, we perform an econometric analysis where
we control for a series of factors, namely, heterogeneity of the subjects. To do so, we
apply a multiple linear regression analysis by running diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. The
econometric model for a subject i can be written as follows:
PerfIndicator
p
i = α+ γZi + βKX
′
iK + εi
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where PerfIndicatorpi with p = (acceptable, ideal) are the dependent variables, α rep-
resents the intercept, γ is the estimated coeﬃcient of the independent variable Z, βK
captures the estimated coeﬃcient for the vector XK which includes K exogenous control
variables50 and εi the error term. The tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, hereafter, display dif-
ferent regressions. In Table 3.3, the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations are concerned with Stage 1
(individual-based incentives), speciﬁcations 3 and 4 with Stage 2 (group-based incentives
without time constraint). We compare T and NT subjects’ average performances when
facing those incentives. The last two columns (5 and 6) compare the individual-based and
the group-based incentive without time constraint, for T and NT respectively.
As stated in Result 1 when facing an individual-based incentive, T subjects perform
signiﬁcantly better towards coordinating at their acceptable target51, than NT subjects
(column 1). Result 1 needs however to be moderated, as this diﬀerence is not signif-
icant towards reaching their ideal target52 (column 2), contrary to the results of the
non-parametric analysis. When controlling for other factors these latter results are not
signiﬁcant anymore.
Regarding the performance diﬀerence between T and NT, when facing a group-based
incentive (without time constraint), we ﬁnd that T subjects do not perform signiﬁcantly
better than NT subjects, regardless of the performance targeted (PerfIndicatoracc.i
53 in
column 3, and PerfIndicatorideali
54 in column 4). Recall that with the non-parametric
analysis, we found a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between both groups, towards reaching their
ideal target. This interesting new ﬁnding implies the following result:
Result 6 When facing a group-based incentive, NT subjects "catch up" the performance
levels T subjects acquired with their exogenous training, so that there is no significant
difference in coordination performance between both groups.
Now comparing both incentive types with regard to T and NT subjects respectively,
we ﬁnd that, as stated in Result 2, NT subjects perform signiﬁcantly better when given
a group-based, than an individual-based incentive (PerfIndicatoracc.i
55 in column 5, and
50The control variables included in the model speciﬁcations are the dummy variables Age>40 (Age>40
= 1 if the subject is more than 40 years old, and 0 otherwise), Men (Men = 1 if the subject is a man, and 0
otherwise), and High education (High education = 1 if the subject has a diploma higher than high-school,
and 0 otherwise).
51t-statistic = 2.34, p-value = 0.025
52t-statistic = 1.33, p-value = 0.192
53t-statistic = 1.28, p-value = 0.209
54t-statistic = 0.31, p-value = 0.757
55t-statistic = 3.03, p-value = 0.005
173
CHAPTER 3. COORDINATION IN A REAL-EFFORT WEAK-LINK EXPERIMENT
PerfIndicatorideali
56 in column 6). Moreover, we see that, as before, T subjects do not
perform signiﬁcantly diﬀerently when facing a group-based (without time constraint),
than when facing an individual-based incentive (PerfIndicatoracc.i
57 in column 5, and
PerfIndicatorideali
58 in column 6). This conﬁrms the fact that the exogenous training
followed by NT subjects may play a role in T subjects’ coordination behaviour, and that
adding a group-based incentive does not lead them towards even higher coordination levels.
Table 3.3: Determinants of performance in I and G
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PerfIndacc. PerfIndideal PerfIndacc. PerfIndideal PerfIndacc. PerfIndideal
T 20.62∗ 6.250 12.86 1.254
(2.34) (1.33) (1.28) (0.31)
NT baseline baseline
T 21.50∗ 6.771
(2.45) (1.47)
NT - I baseline baseline
NT - G 9.892∗∗ 6.015∗∗
(3.03) (3.16)
T - I baseline baseline
T - G -9.515 -6.038
(-1.34) (-1.45)
Age>40 2.307 -0.501 4.006 0.331 3.157 -0.0850
(0.35) (-0.12) (0.47) (0.10) (0.47) (-0.03)
Men 4.193 0.813 11.07 4.856 7.631 2.835
(0.60) (0.12) (0.96) (0.98) (1.23) (0.67)
High education -4.075 -2.992 0.588 -0.0873 -1.743 -1.540
(-0.50) (-0.69) (0.06) (-0.03) (-0.21) (-0.45)
Constant 122.2∗∗∗ 85.41∗∗∗ 128.9∗∗∗ 89.56∗∗∗ 120.6∗∗∗ 84.48∗∗∗
(18.60) (18.94) (19.28) (23.21) (18.84) (19.78)
N 175 175 175 175 350 350
R2 0.090 0.031 0.040 0.009 0.076 0.036
t statistics in parentheses ; std. errors corrected at an individual level
# p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(1) and (2) compare T and NT when facing an individual-based incentive (I).
(3) and (4) compare T and NT when facing a group-based incentive without time constraint (G).
(5) and (6) compare I and G, for T and NT respectively.
In Table 3.4, all the speciﬁcations are concerned with Stage 3 (G + t.c.), and more
speciﬁcally, the comparison of T and NT subjects’ performances, respectively, when being
third to play, or not. Note that when studying T subjects’ performances (cf. columns 1
56t-statistic = 3.16, p-value = 0.003
57t-statistic = −1.34, p-value = 0.190
58t-statistic = −1.45, p-value = 0.157
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and 2), we do not include control variables, because of small number of observations (27).
While there exist no exact rule about the number of covariates to be included in a model,
we apply the thumb rule according to Koebel et al. (2016) by using 10 observations per
covariate, to prevent the problem of overﬁtting.
The results of the econometric analysis conﬁrms those of the non-parametric analysis
(cf. Results 3 and 4). Namely, contrary to NT subjects (PerfIndicatoracc.i
59 in column
3, and PerfIndicatorideali
60 in column 4), the last T subjects to intervene, perform signiﬁ-
cantly better than the ﬁrst two (PerfIndicatoracc.i
61 in column 1, and PerfIndicatorideali
62
in column 2).
Table 3.4: Determinants of performance in G+t.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PerfIndacc. PerfIndideal PerfIndacc. PerfIndideal
3rd seq. order baseline baseline baseline baseline
1st seq. order -24.89∗ -16.56∗ -7.538 -4.154
(-2.96) (-3.07) (-1.12) (-0.98)
2nd seq. order -28.44∗ -18.44∗ -10.65 -6.077
(-3.09) (-3.25) (-1.48) (-1.41)
Age>40 -8.044 -8.705∗
(-1.32) (-2.13)
High education -2.586 -4.872
(-0.38) (-1.57)
Men 14.32# 7.606∗∗∗
(1.87) (3.75)
Constant 164.0*** 100.5*** 138.7*** 97.51***
(13.67) (36.39) (20.74) (27.48)
N 27 27 78 78
R2 0.312 0.346 0.093 0.155
t statistics in parentheses ; std. errors corrected at an individual level
# p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
(1) and (2) consider T subjects only, and (3) and (4) consider NT subjects only.
Furthermore, Table 3.5 shows speciﬁcations comparing the group-based incentive with
593rd vs. 1st: t-statistic = −1.12, p-value = 0.272 ; 3rd vs. 2nd: t-statistic = −1.48, p-value = 0.151
603rd vs. 1st: t-statistic = −0.98, p-value = 0.337 ; 3rd vs. 2nd: t-statistic = −1.41, p-value = 0.170
613rd vs. 1st: t-statistic = −2.96, p-value = 0.018 ; 3rd vs. 2nd: t-statistic = −3.09, p-value = 0.015
623rd vs. 1st: t-statistic = −3.07, p-value = 0.015 ; 3rd vs. 2nd: t-statistic = −3.24, p-value = 0.012
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time constraint, with the individual-based, and the group-based incentive without time
constraint, for T and NT subjects respectively. Given the previous results, we, however,
distinguish between the case where subjects played only the ﬁrst and the second sequence
order (columns 1 and 2), and the case were all the sequence orders are considered (columns
3 and 4) in the group-based incentive with time constraint.
On the one hand, when considering all the sequence orders (columns 3 and 4), the
econometric analysis conﬁrms our non-parametric results (cf. Results 4 and 5). In this
case, T subjects do not perform signiﬁcantly worse when facing a group-based incentive
with time constraint, than when given an individual-based63 or a group-based incentive
without time constraint64 (cf. Result 5). On the contrary, NT subjects do coordinate at
signiﬁcantly higher levels when given a group-based incentive with time constraint, than
an individual-based incentive65 (cf. Result 4).
On the other hand, when considering only the ﬁrst two sequence orders (columns 1 and
2), we can conﬁrm the fact that NT subjects do not perform signiﬁcantly better with the
group-based incentive with time constraint, than with the individual-based incentive66, an
that they also do not perform signiﬁcantly worse when facing a group-based incentive with
time constraint, than without time constraint67 (cf. Result 4). Furthermore, we see that,
as stated in Result 3, T subjects perform signiﬁcantly worse when given a group-based
incentive with time constraint, than when given an individual-based incentive, towards
reaching their ideal target68. However, Result 3 turns out to be moderated, as they do
not perform signiﬁcantly better towards reaching their acceptable target69. This result
shows that time constraint especially retains T subjects to work until reaching their ideal
target, and prefer to target a lower coordination level. Nevertheless, they do not stop
before reaching at least their acceptable target. Even though they adopt a self-restricting
strategy, as explained in the previous subsection, coordination at a level representing a
"good" quality work, seems to remain important to them.
63P erfInd.acc.i : t-statistic = 1.42, p-val = 0.165 ; P erfInd.
ideal
i : t-statistic = 1.64, p-val = 0.110
64P erfInd.acc.i : t-statistic = 0.37, p-val = 0.715 ; P erfInd.
ideal
i : t-statistic = 0.56, p-val = 0.582
65P erfInd.acc.i : t-statistic = −2.66, p-val = 0.012 ; P erfInd.
ideal
i : t-statistic = −2.58, p-val = 0.014
66P erfInd.acc.i : t-statistic = −1.26, p-val = 0.215 ; P erfInd.
ideal
i : t-statistic = −1.36, p-val = 0.181
67P erfInd.acc.i : t-statistic = 0.77, p-val = 0.449 ; P erfInd.
ideal
i : t-statistic = 0.52, p-val = 0.605
68t-statistic = 1.94, p-val = 0.061
69t-statistic = 1.68, p-val = 0.103
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Table 3.5: Determinants of performance in I, G and G+t.c. with respect to individual
performances
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PerfIndacc. PerfIndideal PerfIndacc. PerfIndideal
T 3.086 -6.116 9.096 -1.887
(0.29) (-1.25) (0.98) (-0.53)
NT - G+t.c baseline baseline baseline baseline
NT - I -5.612 -4.200 -8.644∗ -5.905∗
(-1.26) (-1.36) (-2.66) (-2.58)
NT - G 4.281 1.815 1.249 0.110
(0.77) (0.52) (0.33) (0.05)
T - G+t.c. baseline baseline baseline baseline
T - I 17.99 12.59# 12.13 8.461
(1.68) (1.94) (1.42) (1.64)
T - G 8.475 6.551 2.618 2.423
(0.89) (1.12) (0.37) (0.56)
Age>40 -0.319 -2.406 0.318 -2.015
(-0.05) (-0.79) (0.05) (-0.68)
Man 8.793 3.518 9.331 3.834
(1.51) (1.00) (1.56) (1.15)
High education -2.512 -2.091 -2.441 -1.987
(-0.32) (-0.67) (-0.31) (-0.66)
Constant 127.5∗∗∗ 89.62∗∗∗ 130.3∗∗∗ 91.11∗∗∗
(32.25) (34.20) (29.62) (34.36)
N 420 420 455 455
R2 0.069 0.043 0.068 0.038
t statistics in parentheses ; std. errors corrected at an individual level
# p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(1) and (2) exclude 3rd order sequence in G+t.c.; (3) and (4) include it.
Finally, in Table 3.6, all the speciﬁcations compare both groups’ worst performances,
when facing diﬀerent incentives. More speciﬁcally, regressions (1) and (2) compare both
group-based incentives with the individual-based incentive, for T and NT subjects, and (3)
and (4) compare the group-based incentive with time constraint, with the individual-based
and the group-based incentive without time constraint, for T and NT subjects.
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The econometric analysis conﬁrms the results given in the non-parametric analysis. We
indeed see that NT subject groups’ worst performance levels are signiﬁcantly higher when
facing group-based incentives (without and with time constraint), than when facing an
individual-based incentive (columns 1 and 2). For T subject groups, we ﬁnd the opposite
result. Their worst performance levels are signiﬁcantly lower then facing a group-based
incentive, than when facing an individual-based incentive (columns 1 and 2). Finally, we
also see in Table 3.6 that neither T nor NT subject groups’ worst performances signiﬁcantly
vary between both group-based incentives (columns 3 and 4).70 These ﬁndings indicate
that they may be due to the fact that the worst performances of the groups (and not only
the best group performances) vary a lot given what type of incentive subjects are facing.
This brings us to a last result:
Result 7 Incentive types impact the worst group performance levels, so that this latter one
is lower with group-based than with individual-based incentives, for T subjects, and
higher with group-based than with individual-based incentives, for NT subjects.
This result is interesting and important when being confronted to a weak-link production
type. Indeed, when the ﬁnal outcome (and not only the payoﬀ) of a teamwork depends
on the lowest performance of the team, the most important output is precisely this worst
performance level. Result 7 may thus be important to consider when proposing an ap-
propriate contract in the context of a weak-link environment, as for example a low energy
renovation or construction work.
70This was not the case for T subject groups, according to the non-parametric analysis.
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Table 3.6: Determinants of performance in I, G and G+t.c. with respect to worst group
performances
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WorstPerfacc.group WorstPerf
ideal
group WorstPerf
acc.
group WorstPerf
ideal
group
NT baseline baseline baseline baseline
T 18.21* 11.58* 3.117 -1.516
(2.69) (2.72) (0.58) (-0.38)
NT - I baseline baseline -10.65*** -7.567**
(-3.65) (-3.51)
NT - G 13.73*** 10.75*** 3.075 3.183
(4.02) (3.77) (0.84) (1.07)
NT - G+t.c. 10.65*** 7.567** baseline baseline
(3.65) (3.51)
T - I baseline baseline 15.09* 13.10*
(2.67) (2.71)
T - G -18.53** -13.08** -3.431 0.017
(-3.33) (-2.85) (-0.78) (0.00)
T - G+t.c. -15.09* -13.10* base line base line
(-2.67) (-2.71)
Age>40 8.024* -0.160 8.024* -0.160
(2.04) (-0.04) (2.04) (-0.04)
Men 10.40# 8.182# 10.40# 8.182#
(1.83) (1.85) (1.83) (1.85)
High education -9.044 -5.065 -9.044 -5.065
(-1.44) (-1.17) (-1.44) (-1.17)
Constant 99.02*** 69.44*** 109.7*** 77.01***
(19.89) (17.40) (31.41) (23.48)
N 429 429 429 429
R2 0.097 0.069 0.097 0.069
t statistics in parentheses ; std. errors corrected at an individual level
# p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
(1) and (2) compare group-based incentives with the individual-based incentive, for T and NT subjects.
(3) and (4) compare the group-based incentive with time constraint, with the individual-based and the
hhhhhhhhhhgroup-based incentive without time constraint, for T and NT subjects.
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3.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we presented an experiment where subjects played a real-eﬀort weak-link
game. The aim of the study was to analyze the coordination capacity of ex-ante trained and
non trained (to coordination) craftsmen, when facing individual-based and group-based
incentives without and with time constraint (with weak-link payment). A particularity of
the experiment is the behavior of individual performance targets (a minimum acceptable,
and a maximum ideal target) subjects had to achieve.
Our results suggest that trained subjects coordinate at signiﬁcantly higher eﬀort levels
than non-trained subjects when facing an individual-based incentive. However, when fac-
ing a group-based incentive, non-trained subjects appear to "catch up" trained subjects in
terms of coordination level, while these latter subjects do not signiﬁcantly increase their
performance level compared to when given an individual-based incentive. This suggests
that proposing a group-based incentive to subjects who have previously been trained on
coordination does not yield higher overall coordination levels. Indeed, their enhanced
sensitivity to successful and eﬃcient coordination (that is, their optimist beliefs about
coordination) seems to be a suﬃciently strong mechanism to incentivize towards coordi-
nating at high eﬀort levels. This corroborates the ﬁndings of Cooper et al. (2018), who
suggest that assigning a high performance pay to "optimists", increases the probability of
high and successful coordination. The fact that, in our experiment, trained subjects were
aware about their team members’ same training reinforced their trust in the coordination
capacity of the other members, and may explain the realization of this result. Yet, an
unexpected result when enforcing the subjects a sequential game (with a group-based in-
centive) with a given amount of time for the entire group (i.e. time constraint) is that,
contrary to non trained subjects, trained subjects playing before the last one in the group
perform signiﬁcantly worse than the last player. By adopting a self-restricting strategy,
they perform signiﬁcantly worse than when facing an individual-based incentive. As the
possibility to not achieve eﬃcient coordination causes them stress, trained subjects volun-
tarily target lower performance levels (than their real ability), so that the last member in
the sequence order has enough time to reach his or her acceptable target. Such a strong
(and negative) eﬀect of time constraint is not visible on the coordination behavior of non
trained subjects. Indeed, they perform signiﬁcantly better with a group-based than with
an individual-based incentive, whether they have to play simultaneously or sequentially.
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In hand of the results presented in this section, imposing a time constraint when sub-
jects have to intervene sequentially (i.e. attributing delay penalties to the entire team
when coordination on high performance levels has failed in a given time), does not seem to
be an eﬃcient solution to incentivize towards successful coordination. This is particularly
the case for subjects having participated in a training on coordination. However, training
courses on coordination, although time demanding and expensive, is a very eﬃcient al-
ternative measure to group-based incentives. Though this latter incentive is very eﬃcient
to increase performance of subjects who have never participated in a training course on
coordination. Group contracts may thus be a good solution, cheaper (with regard to time
and money) than a training, to incentivize towards eﬃcient coordination. However, when
working in an environment presenting the weak-link property, our results indicate that it
may be more eﬃcient to assign group-based incentives (with or without time constraint) to
non trained subjects, and individual-based incentives to trained subjects. This result is in
contradiction with the one presented by Bortolotti et al. (2016), who ﬁnd that group-based
incentives are as eﬀective as individual-based incentives. Considering non trained subjects
(as it is the case in other studies), we observe that worst performance is signiﬁcantly lower
with individual-based than with group-based incentives.
The small number of trained subjects having participated to the experiment (9) com-
pared to the number of non trained subjects (27), constitutes the main limitation of the
present study. The reason for this small number, is the diﬃculty to mobilize them si-
multaneously in a given location, as only around 200 craftsmen were trained through this
particular training course (Dorémi), in the entire Grand Est Region, in northeastern of
France. It would however be interesting to conduct a further session with trained subjects,
to increase the possibility of external validation of the results.
In a further version of this experiment it would also be interesting to add a stage,
where subjects would not be paid beyond their acceptable target. This would allow us
to determine if subjects actually took into account the fact that they were assigned two
distinct targets, and not only an ideal one, in their coordination behavior.
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C.1 Instructions of the experiment in French
C.1.1 Informations générales
Nous vous remercions de participer à cette expérience sur la prise de décision. Dans cette
expérience, vos gains dépendent de vos décisions et de celles d’autres participants. Nous
vous demandons donc de lire attentivement ces instructions, elles doivent vous permettre
de bien comprendre l’expérience. Toutes vos décisions sont anonymes. Vous n’entrerez
jamais votre nom sur l’ordinateur. Vous indiquerez vos choix à la tablette devant laquelle
vous êtes assis(e).
À partir de maintenant nous vous demandons de ne plus parler. Si vous avez une
question levez la main et un expérimentateur viendra vous répondre en privé. Il est
formellement interdit de communiquer avec un autre participant pendant l’expérience. Si
vous ne respectez pas cette règle vous serez exclu de l’expérience et de tout paiement
éventuel.
Tout au long de l’expérience, vous ferez partie d’un groupe composé de 3 joueurs choisis
aléatoirement par l’ordinateur : vous et 2 autres joueurs participant à l’expérience. Vous
ne pouvez pas connaitre l’identité des autres membres de votre groupe, de même qu’aucun
membre de votre groupe ne peut connaitre votre identité. Vous ne connaissez pas non
plus la constitution des autres groupes. Votre groupe restera identique tout au long de
l’expérience.
L’expérience sera subdivisée en 4 parties. Les instructions spéciﬁques à chaque partie
vous seront transmises avant celle-ci. Dans chaque partie, vous pourrez accumuler des
gains exprimés en ECU (devise propre au jeu). à la ﬁn de l’expérience vos gains totaux
en ECU accumulés au cours des 4 parties seront convertis en euros au taux suivant :
100ECU = 1 euro.
Les gains en euros que vous aurez réalisés vous seront alors versés en liquide.
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C.1.2 Instructions de la Partie 1
Lors de la Partie 1, votre tâche consiste à compter le nombre de ’1’ présents dans une
table composée de ’0’ et ’1’. Vous avez 5 minutes, soit 300 secondes, pour résoudre le plus
de tables possibles. Le jeu se présente de la manière suivante :
Sur l’écran est présent une table composée de ’0’ et ’1’ et vous devez entrer, à l’aide
des touches numériques, le nombre de ’1’ dans la fenêtre de réponse située à droite. Vous
n’avez pas besoin d’appuyer sur la case vide avant de taper les chiﬀres : la saisie se fera
directement à l’aide des touches numériques. Pour valider votre réponse, il faut appuyer
sur "OK". Si vous voulez modiﬁer votre réponse, il faut appuyer sur "Annuler", puis retaper
votre réponse à l’aide des touches numériques. Le temps restant est aﬃché sous forme de
compte à rebours en secondes en haut à droite de l’écran. Si vous voyez qu’en cliquant
2 fois de suite sur l’écran, vous avez zoomé, vous pouvez à tout moment dé-zoomer en
faisant glisser 2 doigts dans un mouvement de pincement sur l’écran, comme indiqué sur
la photo suivante :
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Si vous validez un résultat incorrect, un message d’erreur apparaîtra comme indiqué
sur la capture d’écran suivante :
Vous aurez alors 2 nouvelles chances pour donner la bonne réponse. Si vous vous
trompez 3 fois, un nouveau tableau sera généré. En bas à droite, le nombre de tables
résolues est aﬃché. Notez que vous ne serez pas pénalisé si vous vous trompez. Seul le
nombre de tables résolues sera pris en compte.
Gardez en tête que le compte à rebours des 5 minutes démarre dès que la première
table est aﬃchée.
À la ﬁn de la période de 5 minutes, un écran aﬃchera le nombre de tables que vous
avez correctement résolues, ainsi que votre gain pour cette période.
Vous toucherez 10 ECU par table résolue. Si vous avez par exemple compté correcte-
ment 5 tables, votre gain sera de 50 ECU :
GainP1= 5 · 10= 50ECU
Les gains de cette Partie vous seront payés à la ﬁn de l’expérience.
Avant de commencer la Partie 1, vous aurez une phase d’entraînement de 2 minutes,
pour vous familiariser avec le jeu et le fonctionnement de la tablette. Cette phase ne sera
pas rémunérée.
C.1.3 Instructions de la Partie 2
Dans la Partie 2, votre tâche consiste à nouveau à compter le nombre de ’1’ présents
dans des tables composées de ’0’ et ’1’. Vous faites toujours partie du même groupe de 3
personnes. La Partie 2 est divisée en 5 périodes de 2 minutes, soit 120 secondes, chacune.
Contrairement à la Partie 1, vos gains dépendent de la réalisation des objectifs qui vous
sont assignés. En eﬀet, deux objectifs vous seront donnés:
1. Un objectif de performance individuelle ACCEPTABLE
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2. Un objectif de performance individuelle IDEALE
Pour comprendre la diﬀérence entre ces deux objectifs, voyons un exemple concret. Imag-
inez un menuisier sur un chantier de rénovation. L’objectif acceptable représente le fait
que le menuisier ait correctement posé la nouvelle fenêtre. L’objectif idéal représente le fait
que le menuisier ait posé sa fenêtre de telle sorte à ce qu’elle puisse permettre d’atteindre
le niveau d’étanchéité à l’air minimum requis pour atteindre un niveau BBC (Bâtiment
Basse Consommation). En pratique, il faut au minimum atteindre votre objectif accept-
able, mais atteindre votre objectif idéal vous permet de contribuer à l’atteinte du niveau
BBC. L’objectif acceptable sera donc toujours inférieur à l’objectif idéal. Vos objectifs à
atteindre vous seront communiqués au début de la Partie 2, comme aﬃché ci-dessous. Vos
objectifs peuvent être diﬀérents que sur cette capture d’écran.
Vos gains lors de chaque période de 2 minutes sont déterminés par votre performance
individuelle et sont calculés de la manière suivante :
GainP2= 100+ 800 · tables résoluesobjectif de performance ind. ACCEP T ABLE
Prenons un exemple dans lequel on vous demande de résoudre 4 tables pour atteindre
votre objectif acceptable, et de résoudre 6 tables pour atteindre votre objectif idéal. Si
vous résolvez 3 tables pendant la période de jeu, vous avez atteint 3
4
(soit 75%) de votre
objectif acceptable et votre gain pour cette période est
GainP2= 100+ 800 ·
(
3
4
)
= 700ECU
Si au contraire, vous résolvez 4 tables, vous avez rempli 100% votre objectif acceptable et
votre gain est
GainP2= 100+ 800 ·
(
4
4
)
= 900ECU
De même, si vous résolvez 5 tables (soit 125% de votre objectif acceptable) votre gain est
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GainP2= 100+ 800 ·
(
5
4
)
= 1100ECU
La réalisation de votre objectif idéal n’intervient pas dans vos gains. Cependant, si vous
aviez, toujours dans le même exemple, réussi à résoudre 6 tables (soit 150% de votre
objectif acceptable), vous avez rempli vos deux objectifs, acceptable et idéal, et votre gain
pour cette période est
GainP2= 100+ 800 ·
(
6
4
)
= 1300ECU
Dans le jeu, vous ne pouvez pas aller au-delà de votre objectif idéal. Lorsque vous atteignez
le nombre de tables résolues qui correspond à cet objectif, la période de jeu s’achève, et
les résultats sont aﬃchés. Une page vous aﬃchera les informations suivantes :
1. Le nombre de tables à résoudre pour atteindre votre objectif acceptable ;
2. Le nombre de tables à résoudre pour atteindre votre objectif idéal ;
3. Le nombre de tables que vous avez résolues lors de la période de jeu ;
4. Le pourcentage de tables résolues par rapport à votre objectif acceptable ;
5. Le pourcentage de tables résolues par rapport à votre objectif idéal ;
6. Votre gain pour cette période (en ECU).
Le gain que vous remporterez pour la Partie 2 sera tiré au sort parmi les 5 périodes
de jeu que vous allez jouer. Vous ne remportez donc le gain que d’une seule période sur 5
jouées.
C.1.4 Instructions de la Partie 3
La Partie 3 est similaire à la Partie 2 que vous venez de jouer. Vous jouerez toujours 5
périodes de 2 minutes chacune. Cependant, vos gains pour chaque période seront calculés
diﬀéremment qu’à la Partie 2.
Lors de la Partie 2, vos gains dépendaient uniquement de votre performance individuelle
lors de chaque période de jeu. Dans la Partie 3, vos gains dépendent aussi de la performance
individuelle des autres membres de votre groupe. Plus précisément, ils dépendent de la
performance individuelle du membre du groupe qui a fait la plus faible performance par
rapport à son objectif de performance individuelle acceptable. Les gains des trois membres
du groupe sont identiques et sont calculés comme ceci :
GainP3= 100+ 800·(plus faible atteinte de l’obj. accecptable au sein du groupe)
Prenons un exemple. Vous avez atteint votre objectif acceptable, soit 100%, le 2nd membre
du groupe a atteint 125% de son objectif acceptable, et le 3ème membre du groupe a atteint
75% de son objectif acceptable. Le gain de chacun des membres de votre groupe sera le
même:
GainP3= 100+ 800 · 75%= 700ECU
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Si au contraire, vous avez atteint 50% de votre objectif acceptable, le 2nd membre du
groupe a atteint 140% de son objectif acceptable, et le 3ème membre du groupe a atteint
90% de son objectif acceptable, le gain de chacun des membres de votre groupe sera le
suivant:
GainP3= 100+ 800 · 50%= 500ECU
Le gain que vous remporterez pour la Partie 3 sera tiré au sort parmi les 5 périodes de jeu
que vous allez jouer. Vous ne remportez donc le gain que d’une seule période sur 5 jouées.
C.1.5 Instructions de la Partie 4
Vos gains à la Partie 4 seront calculés de la même manière qu’à la Partie 3. Le jeu sera le
même que dans toutes les parties précédentes.
Le changement à la Partie 4 est que vous allez eﬀectuer votre tâche chacun à votre
tour au sein du groupe dont vous faites partie. Plus précisément, le jeu consistera en 3
périodes de 6 minutes, soit 360 secondes, chacune.
Au cours de chaque période, un des membres du groupe commencera en premier et
aura comme auparavant l’objectif d’atteindre au moins son objectif acceptable. Il pourra
alors continuer pour essayer d’atteindre son objectif idéal.
Dès qu’il atteint son objectif acceptable, il peut passer la main au joueur suivant. Par
contre, s’il le souhaite, il peut continuer jusqu’à atteindre son objectif idéal puis passer la
main automatiquement au joueur suivant.
Les 360 secondes disponibles dans cette période sont pour l’ensemble du groupe. Le
nombre de secondes utilisées par un joueur ne sont plus disponibles pour les suivants. Le
temps restant sur le total des 360 secondes est aﬃché en haut à droite. Au moment de
jouer, votre ordre de passage pour la période vous est indiqué sur l’écran. Votre ordre de
passage est déterminé aléatoirement. Si vous êtes le 1er joueur à jouer, le jeu démarrera
immédiatement comme indiqué sur la capture d’écran suivante :
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Si vous êtes le 2ème ou le 3ème à jouer, le temps restant à jouer vous sera précisé sur
un écran à part avant de commencer à jouer. Sur la capture d’écran suivante par exemple,
l’ordre de passage du joueur 7 est 2ème à la période 2 sur 3. Il lui reste 272 secondes à
jouer à partir du moment où il appuie sur "OK". Cela signiﬁe que le 1er membre du groupe
a déjà joué pendant (360− 272=) 88 secondes avant lui.
Si vous êtes le 1er ou le 2ème joueur dans l’ordre de passage, dès que vous atteignez
votre objectif acceptable, un bouton "Passer la main" apparait en bas à droite de l’écran
comme indiqué sur la capture d’écran suivante :
Vous avez alors le choix soit de passer la main au prochain joueur pour qu’il puisse
commencer à jouer, soit de continuer à jouer jusqu’à au plus votre objectif idéal. Si vous
décidez de continuer, vous pourrez quand même passer la main à tout moment.
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Gardez en tête que vos gains sont calculés comme à la Partie 3 et dépendent de la plus
faible performance individuelle du groupe. Il est donc important de laisser suﬃsamment
de temps aux joueurs qui vont jouer après vous.
Prenons un exemple. Vous atteignez 100% de votre objectif acceptable en 125 secondes
et vous décidez de passer la main au prochain joueur. Puis, le second joueur atteint
son objectif acceptable mais décide de continuer à jouer. Il décide de passer la main
lorsqu’il a atteint 110% de son objectif acceptable, après 200 secondes de jeu. Il reste alors
(360− 125− 200=) 35 secondes au dernier joueur pour jouer. Il atteint alors 40% de son
objectif acceptable avec les 35 secondes restantes. La plus faible performance individuelle
du groupe est donc de 40%. Le gain de chaque joueur est alors de
GainP4= 100+ 800 · 40%= 420ECU
Le gain que vous remporterez pour la Partie 4 sera tiré au sort parmi les 3 périodes de jeu
que vous allez jouer. Vous ne remportez donc le gain que d’une seule période sur 3 jouées.
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C.2 Post-experimental questionnaire in French
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General Conclusion
The main objective of the thesis is to increase the number of energy retroﬁtting measures
in the long-term through making the energy renovation market more reliable, sustainable
and capable of existing without ﬁnancial intervention of the State. Large consumption
savings can thus be made, leading to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and slowing
global warming down. The declared objective is addressed from an empirical, theoretical
and experimental perspective.
Chapter 1 is motivated by determining potential psychological risk factors with respect
to energy related behaviors that could explain a systematic overestimation of the predicted
ex-post energy consumption. Identifying such factors does not only permit to design more
accurate prediction models (used by thermal energy auditors), but it also allows insurance
companies and banks to more adequately measure the risk for households to not carry
out suﬃcient savings. They will thus be able to better estimate insurance premiums and
interest rates for energy renovation related products and credit loans.
However, households’ behaviors ex-post to an energy renovation are far from being
the only factors inﬂuencing the non-achievement of the energy performance related to
an individual building. Factors intervening at the renovation stage do not have to be
underestimated, as, for instance, the quality of the craftsmen’s work. This assertion is the
starting point of Chapters 2 and 3. Rather than assessing the magnitude of this risk, in
these chapters we focus on determining adequate contracts allowing in the end to improve
the ﬂow and quality of work on a renovation site.
Additionally to reducing the risk of not achieving energy eﬃcient buildings, it may
reassure households in the reliability of renovation projects, thus contributing to the long-
term existence of the energy renovation market.
The present thesis thus refers to the literature in economics (e.g. behavior, construc-
tion, contract theory, energy, experiment) and uses concepts of the psychology literature,
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that permitted to bring up several interesting ﬁndings summarized below.
More precisely, Chapter 1 identiﬁes four cognitive biases leading to a distortion of
occupants’ energy behaviors (i.e. Status Quo Bias with respect to manual ventilation
and Optimism Bias with respect to daily attention paid to energy consumption), their
environmental attitudes (i.e. Attitude-Behavior Gap) and their environmental motivations
(i.e. Intention-Behavior Gap). Analyzing separately the Net Losing Energy Savings (i.e.
the EPG of those having consumed more than predicted) and the Net Gaining Energy
Savings (i.e. the EPG of those having consume less than, or as predicted), with respect
to the renovation program Je rénove BBC conducted by EDF and the Alsace region,
permitted to point out the fact that the four studied cognitive biases played a signiﬁcant
role in the EPG of households exhibiting higher consumption patterns than predicted.
The percentage of these households represents about 38% of the entire database of 129
households, obtained through a self-administrated questionnaire. These ﬁndings could
be highlighted through analyzing our imputed database. We indeed applied a multiple
imputation method to impute the 7% of missing observations, allowing us to obtain more
robust results with respect to households consuming more than predicted.
The estimation results show that households presenting Net Losing Energy Savings
and not adapting their manual ventilation habits in the renovated house (i.e. Status Quo
Bias) ended up having on average a nearly 27% larger EPG than those adapting these
habits. Regarding the Optimism Bias, it has a large impact on the EPG: households
presenting Net Losing Energy Savings and declaring to pay less attention to their daily
energy consumption than before renovation ended up exhibiting a 343% larger EPG than
those continuing to pay attention to their consumption. This shows the importance for
households to not solely rely on the energy performance of the building, but also to rely
on an adapted energy related behavior to achieve the targeted consumption. However,
our analysis points out that this negative eﬀect can be lowered by heating under 19°C
during the night: the EPG between the concerned households turned out to decrease on
average by 35% per degree less heated. Finally, we observed an Attitude-Behavior Gap
and an Intention-Behavior Gap with respect to households consuming more and less than
predicted. More particularly, occupants reporting to be more concerned about ecological
and environmental issues than before do, on average, not consume less than the others
(i.e. Attitude-Behavior Gap). Moreover, those declaring to having renovated because they
were (very) motivated to live in an environmental friendly house, do not consume less than
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the less motivated households (i.e. Intention-Behavior Gap).
Beyond these results describing how these cognitive biases impact the EPG, a contri-
bution of Chapter 1 may lie in the diﬀerent steps of the methodology we applied. Dealing
with a relatively small sample (129 respondents), the problem of overparametrization has
to be avoided by including a limited number of parameters in our regressions. We thus
applied learning models to select as control variables, the covariates that best explain
our dependent variable (i.e. the EPG). Furthermore, as a self-reported behavior (as a
measurement for a cognitive bias) might potentially suﬀer from an ‘omitted variable bias’
(i.e. endogeneity problem) when this behavior is caused by another factor than the cog-
nitive bias, we apply a method estimating causal eﬀects (i.e. the ‘inverse probability of
treatment weighting’ method). This permits us to obtain a modiﬁed database. Running
our model regressions again with this latter database allows us to assess that the house-
holds’ self-declared energy related behaviors and environmental related attitudes do not
seem to suﬀer from an endogeneity problem, with respect to the observed variables. This
interesting ﬁnding indicates that using occupants’ declarations as a measurement for cog-
nitive biases may to some extent be a valid method. We however observed a potential
endogeneity problem related to the measurement variable of the Intention-Behavior Gap:
the motivation households’ experienced to renovate in order to live in an environmental
friendly house may be caused by non observed factors.
All in all, our results point to the fact that cognitive biases may indeed play a role in
the occurrence of an EPG, and that studying their impact through occupants’ declarations
may be a valid solution. Until now, the energy literature seems to have been reluctant
to study psychological factors with respect to households’ energy consumption. This may
be due to two main reasons: (1) measuring such factors can be problematic (e.g. what
behavior should be tested) and (2) there is a lack of databases comprising such household
declarations.
Nevertheless, Chapter 1’s ﬁndings can be useful to deduce key (policy) implications in
two ways.
First, the results point to the importance to design eﬀective tools to inform occupants
about the risk (e.g. consuming more than predicted) related to not adapting their energy
related behaviors in low energy buildings. Raising awareness about the occurrence of
cognitive biases is key to reduce the EPG in such buildings.
As such, it would be necessary to explain households to limit manual ventilation to a
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few minutes per day, to continue to pay attention to their energy consumption once the
renovation works are undertaken, and to heat under 19°C at night. This message can be
transmitted through (1) the advice of the prime contractor1 or/and (2) the introduction
of energy conservation nudges. The use of descriptive, injunctive messages (i.e. emoti-
cons) or instructive energy-saving tips represent helpful tools to sustain and encourage
pro-conservation behavior (see, for instance, Rasul and Hollywood, 2012). It would be in-
teresting to test the eﬃciency of such information instruments with respect to households’
energy consumption and their EPG.
Second, our ﬁndings provide valuable insights to improve the predicted energy con-
sumption by integrating underlying occupant habits that inﬂuence the EPG. For instance,
at an individual project level, thermal energy auditors could meet the households before
estimating a savings prediction, to ask them about their habits (e.g. heating, airing, at-
tention to energy consumption). However, as we detected an Attitude-Behavior Gap and
an Intention-Behavior Gap, information about the tendency to be concerned about en-
vironmental issues, or willing to live in an environmental friendly house, may not be an
indicator about a less energy consuming household. All these information would permit
to establish a general behavior proﬁle that could be integrated in the prediction model,
allowing to make energy consumption predictions more reliable. Further eﬀorts would be
needed to determine to what extent these behaviors may impact the energy consumption.
Nevertheless, by doing so, the risk of not achieving the predicted energy consumption is
reduced, which may incentivize banks and insurance companies to more and more rely on
these predictions. This way, it allows them to avoid ethical issues that could arise by using
household information to estimate the risk per individual behavior proﬁle, which may be
considered as "discriminating". Better rely on predictions and taking into account the
average likelihood to consume more than predicted (based on our database, the likelihood
of attaining Net Losing Energy Savings is 38%) will permit them to improve and develop
insurance contracts and leverage bank loans.
Yet, a number of limits may emerge from the above recommendations. First, individ-
ually collecting information about households’ habits to estimate savings predictions is
costly (in time and money). However, the underlying beneﬁts for the thermal energy au-
ditors might appear in the mid and long term: more reliable predictions will lead to more
1The participants of the Je rénove BBC program have told us about their trust in the advice of the
project’s prime contractor.
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reassured households and banks, which will lead to an increase in the number of renovation
projects and a more sustainable renovation market, thus resulting in more clients for the
auditors. A second limit lies in the diﬃculty to directly consider the declarations we used
to measure the cognitive biases to improve prediction models. Most of the self-reported
behaviors we used arise from questions asking how a given behavior evolved compared to
before renovation2, which cannot be answered before renovation. As such, only general
habits existing before renovation can be integrated in the prediction models. Finally, al-
though our empirical results are valid and robust, our sample size is relatively small. To
validate the formulated policy implications, our ﬁndings should be replicated and extended
by using a national representative and large sample.
Another approach to reduce the risk of non-achievement of energy performance is to
incentivize craftsmen to better execute the renovation works. Although unpredictable
events (e.g. harsh weather conditions, receiving defective materials) can happen, we have
the possibility to improve craftsmen’s workmanship through designing more adequate con-
tracts. The analysis of such contracts is addressed in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
We focus on contract designs from two diﬀerent perspectives: the ﬁrst type of contract
is designed for one two-task Agent (cf. Chapter 2) and the second type of contract is
designed to trigger teamwork and coordination among multiple Agents (cf. Chapter 3).
The research in Chapter 2 develops a two-task theoretical model between a Principal
(e.g. a project manager) and an Agent (e.g. a craftsman), where the Agent may under-
estimate the actual impact one of her tasks (e.g. participating in a training course about
eﬃcient renovation techniques) has on the distribution of the outcome (e.g. the build-
ing’s ﬁnal energy performance). Knowing the Agent’s unawareness degree, the Principal
proposes an adequate contract incentivizing her to exert high eﬀort levels when she has
two tasks to execute. This chapter determines the optimal reward structures to oﬀer the
Agent.
We show that when both parties have symmetric awareness levels (i.e. the Agent does
not underestimate the above mentioned impact), the optimal compensation is aﬀected
by (1) the assumption of the Monotone Concave Likelihood Ratio Property and (2) the
degree of downside risk aversion (i.e. prudence) of both parties. The Agent refuses a
2E.g. ‘Do you open less/equally/more your windows than before renovation?’, ‘Are you paying less/e-
qually/more attention to your energy consumption than before?’, ‘You have the tendency to be less/equal-
ly/more concerned about ecological and environmental issues than before.’
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strictly concave reward in performance when being too prudent, because such a contract
is too risky (i.e. variable) on the downside. The shape of the optimal reward in this case
depends on the Principal’s risk preferences, who has to make a trade-oﬀ between incentive
effect and downside risk effect.
Now when asymmetric awareness emerges (i.e. the Agent underestimates the above
mentioned impact), we show that the previous trade-oﬀ still prevails in same cases. An
interesting additional ﬁnding is that the Principal strategically takes the Agent’s awareness
level into account: the more the Agent underestimates the impact of her task on the
performance distribution, (1) the more the Principal pays her for low performance levels,
and (2) the less he pays her for high performance levels. Indeed, in high performance
levels he ﬁnds it useless to pay her much, since her unawareness will lead her to neglect
the corresponding task.
As far as possible, no general policy conclusion can be recommended without having
empirical information about the parties’ risk preferences in real life. However, we can
conclude that, when the craftsman underestimates how much recent renovation techniques
can increase the buildings’ energy eﬃciency, it may be appropriate to propose him a higher
salary for "low" performance levels, and a lower salary for energy eﬃcient performance
levels.
More possible recommendations may be drawn from our results arising from experi-
mentally testing individual-based and group-based incentives on trained and non trained
(to coordination) "real" craftsmen. By doing so, Chapter 3 suggests that trained craftsmen
coordinate at signiﬁcantly higher eﬀort levels than non-trained craftsmen when facing an
individual-based incentive. However, when facing a group-based incentive, non-trained
craftsmen seem to "catch up" trained craftsmen in terms of coordination level, while these
latter craftsmen do not signiﬁcantly increase their performance level. This ﬁnding indicates
that proposing a group-based incentive to subjects who have previously been trained on
coordination, does not yield higher coordination levels. Indeed, their exogenous sensitivity
to successful and eﬃcient coordination seems to be a suﬃcient mechanism to incentivize
towards common high eﬀort levels. Yet, when enforcing the craftsmen to play sequentially
with a given amount of time for the entire group (i.e. time constraint), trained craftsmen
playing before the last one in the group, seem to adopt a self-restricting strategy, so that
they perform signiﬁcantly worse than when facing an individual-based incentive. It seems
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that the possibility to not achieve eﬃcient coordination causes them stress. Hence, trained
craftsmen voluntarily target lower performance levels to have the certainty to reach a suf-
ﬁcient high performance, so that the last member in the sequence order has enough time
to reach his acceptable target. Such a strong eﬀect of time constraint is not visible on the
coordination behavior of non trained craftsmen. Finally, our results show that the tested
incentives have diﬀerent impacts on the craftsmen groups’ worst performance levels. In-
deed, individual-based incentives may be better suited for trained craftsmen to achieve
the highest average worst performance, whereas group-based incentives seem to be more
eﬃcient to increase non trained craftsmen’ worst performance.
Results of Chapter 3 suggest that imposing a time constraint when craftsmen have to
intervene sequentially (i.e. attributing delay penalties to the entire team when coordina-
tion on high performance levels has failed for a given amount of time), does not seem to
be an eﬃcient solution to incentivize towards successful coordination. This is particularly
the case for craftsmen having participated in a training on coordination. However, train-
ing courses on coordination, although time demanding and expensive, are a very eﬃcient
alternative measure to group-based incentives. Hence, this latter incentive is very eﬃcient
to increase the performance of craftsmen who have never participated in a training course
on coordination. Group contracts may thus be a good solution, cheaper (with regard to
time and money) than a training, to incentivize towards eﬃcient coordination. However,
when working in an environment presenting the weak-link property, our results indicate
that it may be more eﬃcient to assign group-based incentives (with or without time con-
straint) to non trained subjects, and individual-based incentives to trained subjects. This
result is in contradiction with the one presented by Bortolotti et al. (2016), who ﬁnd that
group-based incentives are as eﬀective as individual-based incentives. Considering non
trained craftsmen (as it is the case in other studies), we observe that worst performance
is signiﬁcantly lower with individual-based than with group-based incentives.
The external validity of the experiment’s results may be increased due to the imple-
mentation of a real eﬀort task instead of a chosen eﬀort set up, and the intervention of
subjects from the "real" world. However, the results of Chapter 3 have to be considered
prudently, since we encountered diﬃculties to mobilize trained craftsmen to participate in
our experiment (9 trained subjects, compared to 27 non trained subjects). This experiment
should thus be replicated by conducting further sessions with trained craftsmen.
Another limit of our experiment is the ability to determine if the participants actually
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took into account the fact that they were assigned two distinct targets (i.e. an acceptable
and an ideal target). This makes it harder to conclude about whether craftsmen just
targeted the highest goal, or whether they were actually prone to achieve "an energy
eﬃcient result". Indeed, during the sessions, craftsmen were informed about what both
targets could represent in the "real" world: reaching an acceptable accomplished task, or
reaching an ideal executed task permitting the building to be energy eﬃcient. In a further
version of this experiment, it may thus be interesting to eliminate the monetary incentive
for the craftsmen after having reached their acceptable target.
We may conclude with saying that further eﬀorts and research are needed since there
are still uncertainties about which factors, including their magnitude, play a role in the
risk of having an Energy Performance Gap. Yet, this thesis contributed to detect (from the
literature neglected) psychological risk factors (i.e. cognitive biases) impacting this gap,
which may allow, if taken into account, to make energy consumption prediction models
more accurate. Finally, we also proposed more appropriate contract designs for craftsmen
allowing to achieve energy eﬃcient buildings more systematically, since they contribute to
trigger better executed renovation works.
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Evaluation du risque de non atteinte de la
performance énergétique après rénovation:
Biais cognitifs, asymétries d’information et incitations optimales
Résumé
Cette thèse vise à contribuer à rendre le marché de la rénovation énergétique durable
et autonome. Pour y parvenir, notre objectif est de contribuer à quantifier le
risque de non atteinte de la performance énergétique après rénovation. Dans un
premier chapitre, nous analysons les facteurs psychologiques à prendre en compte
pour améliorer les futurs modèles de prédictions de consommation d’énergie. En
nous appuyant sur le programme de rénovation Je rénove BBC, nous mettons en év-
idence quatre biais cognitifs des ménages impactant négativement la différence entre
la consommation d’énergie réelle et prédite. Par la suite, nous étudions les struc-
tures de contrats les plus appropriés pour améliorer le déroulement des chantiers de
rénovation, incitant les artisans à mieux travailler. Ainsi, nous déterminons d’une
part des contrats destinés à un Agent devant effectuer deux tâches et qui sous-estime
l’impact de l’une d’entre elles sur la performance du bâtiment. D’autre part, nous
testons des incitations individuelles et de groupe sur la capacité de plusieurs Agents
réels (artisans) à se coordonner, selon leur formation initiale (formation DORéMI
ou autre).
Mots-clés: biais cognitifs, économétrie appliquée, théorie des contrats, économie
expérimentale, rénovation énergétique
Abstract
This thesis aims at contributing to make the energy renovation market long-lasting
and self-sustaining. To achieve this, our objective is to quantify the risk of not
achieving energy performance after renovation. In a first chapter, we analyze the
psychological factors that should be taken into account to improve future energy
consumption prediction models. Drawing on the Je rénove BBC renovation pro-
gram, we highlight four cognitive biases of households that negatively impact the
difference between actual and predicted energy consumption. Then, we study the
most appropriate contract structures to improve the flow and quality of renovation
projects, encouraging craftsmen to work better. Thus, on one hand, we determine
optimal contracts for an Agent who has to perform two tasks and underestimates
the impact of one of them on the building’s performance. On the other hand, we
test individual-based and group-based incentives on the ability of several real Agents
(craftsmen) to coordinate, according to their initial training (DORéMI training or
other).
Keywords: cognitive biases, applied econometrics, contract theory, experimental
economics, energy renovation
